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THE DIVIDED NATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

By JOUNGWON ALEXANDER KIM and CAROLYN CAMPBELL KIM*

WITH the seating of the representatives of the People's Republic of China, membership in the United Nations system has now become almost universal. The major exception to the general rule of universality is the exclusion of the divided nations: Germany (combined population: 68,000,000), Korea (combined population: 47,000,000), and Vietnam (combined population: 35,000,000).

None of the divided nations hold membership in the United Nations proper, although all three of the Western-affiliated sectors have been given observer status at the UN. It is not well known, however, that all of the major specialized agencies of the United Nations, designed to fulfill needed humanitarian and technical functions on an international scale, have given full admission to the Western-affiliated sectors of the divided nations, but have excluded the Communist-affiliated sectors.**[1] This is so regardless of how humanitarian or how technical the aims of the agency: All three Western-affiliated sectors are members of the World Health Organization (WHO) and of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), while all three Communist-affiliated sectors are excluded. Since it has been a matter of general agreement that membership in these agencies should be universal (indeed, WHO has passed a resolution requiring universality of membership), the criteria that have been applied in accepting the membership of the Western-affiliated sectors and rejecting membership of the Communist-affiliated sectors should be subjected to careful examination.

* The writers would like to thank Professor Louis B. Sohn of the Harvard Law School for his helpful comments and suggestions.

** *Note*: Since this article was written, East Germany has been admitted to UNESCO.

[1] The major specialized agencies of the United Nations with which we are concerned include the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the International Development Association (IDA). We have excluded discussion of agencies such as UNICEF which are considered organs of the UN proper, and of minor agencies or those not directly affiliated with the United Nations system.

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The problem of membership of the divided nations in the international agencies of the UN system has lain dormant for some time. The recent seating of the Peking government in the United Nations, followed by its assuming the membership role of China in several of the international agencies, however, indicates that the problem may soon be raised more overtly. Although the divided nations present a different issue from that involved in the China question, China will now undoubtedly take the initiative in seeking membership for its neighbors and allies, the North Korean and North Vietnamese Governments. Certainly, also, this issue cannot be avoided in dealing with the membership issue of any new administrative agency, such as the proposed Seabed Organization. Unless some means are found to resolve the issue, membership of governments of the divided nations in a new organization may be barred by deadlock. The problem of the divided nations is thus not one of purely academic concern, or of concern only to those nations themselves. It may be of great consequence to the functioning of the international system itself in the immediate future.

Theories of Membership

Constitutional problems are very important to the functioning of an international organization, for the way in which they are resolved may determine the effectiveness of the institution in carrying out its substantive functions. Among these problems, that of membership may be paramount. Of course, the relationship of the membership problem to the effectiveness of the organization will be determined by the functions and objectives of the particular organization itself. For example, nearly universal membership is needed to make a health organization effective, for if it is to control the spread of communicable diseases and the outbreak of epidemics, it will face extreme difficulties if large segments of population are excluded. On the other hand, overly broad membership may be dysfunctional in some of the organizations, particularly if many of the member nations do not feel concerned about the problems with which the organization is designed to deal. Uninterested in the functions of the organization, they might convert it into a forum for propaganda and obstruct and undermine its effectiveness.

Universality versus selectivity. Two general principles for membership have been recognized for international organizations, namely, the principle of universality and the principle of selectivity.[2] Universality

[2] Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (New York 1964), 79.

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itself could be either compulsory or voluntary. Generally, the international agencies have aimed at a principle of voluntary universality. Members of the United Nations who choose to participate have been free to do so, either in the original formation of the agency or by joining it later; nonmembers may be admitted by a two-thirds vote of the Conference or Assembly of the organization.[3] These provisions, of course, vary slightly among the different organizations. Compulsory universality has not been adopted, for it would tend to undermine the purpose of the organization in view of the fact that voluntary cooperation and compliance are essential to the carrying-out of organizational objectives. On the other hand, provisions for voting on new members allow some discretion on the part of the membership in the event they perceive that a particular nation may hinder the effective functioning of the organization. That purpose seems to have been largely overridden by the present near-universality of the United Nations, however: Most of the nations who want to join an organization may become a member automatically by virtue of being a member of the United Nations. Thus, the membership provisions that permit UN members to join the agencies automatically, but allow agency members a discretionary vote on admission of non-UN members now serve little purpose other than to bar membership to governments of the divided nations.

The degree of universality or selectivity needed for the most effective operation of the agency may be related to the function of the organization itself. The United Nations, designed to deal with international political disputes, originally tended toward selectivity on the basis of the "peace-loving" tendencies of prospective members. Over the years, however, it has gravitated toward the principle of universality. UN Secretary-General U Thant noted in his 1964 report on the work of the United Nations that the continued progress toward universality which has been made appears desirable to open up all parts of the world to the influence of currents of world opinion;[4] and the first Secretary-General, Trygvie Lie, pointed out that maximum breadth of membership is necessary if the United Nations is to settle disputes, moderate attitudes, and solve problems which create the conditions of war and insecurity—in short, to handle the issues with which the organization was designed to deal.[5] Today, as we have noted, membership in the

[3] Stephen S. Goodspeed, *The Nature and Function of International Organization* (New York 1959), 401.

[4] *Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1963–15 June 1964* (General Assembly, *Official Records* [19th session], Supplement 1A), 11.

[5] Trygvie Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (New York 1954), 100-103.

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United Nations has nearly reached the goal of universality, the major exceptions being the recent "expulsion" of Taiwan and the nonmembership of the three divided nations, Germany, Korea, and Vietnam. (Switzerland is a nonmember by choice, and some diminutive nations such as Monaco, with a population of 23,000, and Liechtenstein, with a population of 18,000, have not joined.) Thus, the United Nations itself has adopted a policy of universality because such a membership policy is seen as being important to the fulfillment of its functional goals.

Functionalism versus technical objectives. The issue of universality versus selectivity has been perceived in terms of the effectiveness of the particular organization in a technical sense—that is, its relation to the specific technical functions of the agency. It has also been debated in terms of the perceived overall purposes of international organizations. Thus, while some see the technical effectiveness of an organization as its primary goal, others view international organizations as fulfilling the political goal of increasing international cooperation—a means to integrate international society, increase communications, and eliminate the causes of war. The latter view is referred to as "functionalism."

> The argument runs: Nations at present may fail to agree and cooperate on the solution of political problems, but to attempt to solve these problems first is to put the cart before the horse. One must begin in areas where nations already agree. If nations cooperate in these areas, ties among them will multiply, and eventually perhaps they can even solve their political problems. Making progress where progress can be made will help to create the foundations for an international community. Only after this foundation is sufficiently stable can we create the kind of framework within which political problems can be solved successfully.[6]

Since the functionalist approach emphasizes working together in order to achieve an atmosphere of cooperation, universality would appear to be desirable under this approach regardless of the degree to which universality may contribute to the technical effectiveness of the organization, since it will, *ipso facto*, contribute to the effectiveness of the organization in achieving the political goal of interaction and cooperation.

Membership as privilege or sanction. A third view, which also reflects a vision of an underlying political purpose in international organizations, is that membership policies may be used selectively, as a sanction to force countries to comply with international law and inter-

[6] A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York 1958), 443.

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national obligations, or as a reward for such compliance. In this view, a selective policy for admission to membership, like the sanction of expulsion, may be used not only to further the technical purposes of the organization but to "induce compliance with international obligations more general in character."[7] In this view, a policy of selectivity might be desirable even if it conflicted to some extent with the technical effectiveness of the organization.

The Relationship Between Membership in the UN and Membership in the Specialized Agencies

There is no complete overlap between UN membership and agency membership, despite the relationship of the agencies to the UN "parent" organization. Many nations that are members of the UN have not chosen to join some of the agencies, perhaps because they feel that those agencies are not carrying out functions significantly related to their own interests, or because they feel that the cost of membership may be greater than any anticipated benefit. On the other hand, some nonmembers of the UN have joined the agencies, often prior to later UN membership, or while being barred from membership in the UN because of political deadlocks in the Security Council.

Membership in the UN as a means to membership in the specialized agencies, and vice-versa. Most of the specialized agencies provide for the automatic admission of UN members upon application for membership in the agency. Thus, UN membership carries with it the privilege of membership in the agencies regardless of other considerations. On the other hand, membership in a specialized agency does not carry with it any automatic qualifications for membership in the UN. Nonetheless, some relationship has been indicated between membership in a specialized agency and qualification for "observer status," a form of *de facto* participation in the United Nations, and the right to participate in UN conferences and UN subsidiary bodies, such as UNCTAD and UNICEF.

Although none of the governments of the divided nations have become members of the United Nations, the three Western-affiliated governments of these nations have been granted observer status. Observer status "is based on usage, not legal prescription," and has no official function in the UN Charter.[8] It gives the government no voting rights,

[7] Louis B. Sohn, "Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization," *Harvard Law Review*, LXXVII (June 1964), 1401.

[8] A. Glenn Mower, Jr., "Observer Countries: Quasi Members of the United Nations," *International Organization*, XX (Spring 1966), 266-83.

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nor any right to participate in debate unless invited to do so where the debate concerns the nation it represents. Observers do, however, make contributions to the UN budget for the special bodies in which they participate, and are provided with the communications and publications facilities of the UN. They also take advantage of its nonformal functions, including cocktail-circuit diplomacy. In addition to the Western-affiliated governments of the divided nations, observer status has been granted to the Holy See, Monaco, and Switzerland.[9] Other nations have held observer status in the past, prior to obtaining full membership in the United Nations. The Republic of Korea was the first government of a divided nation to receive observer status, in 1949. The Republic of Vietnam and the Federal Republic of Germany both followed in 1952.

Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld explained the criteria for observer status in 1960: "I have been following a line which seems to be the only possible one, that is, to accept Observers when such an arrangement is proposed in cases where the country in question is recognized diplomatically . . . by a majority of United Nations members."[10] However, none of the three Western-affiliated governments of the divided nations had received diplomatic recognition by a majority of UN members at the time of acquiring observer status.

A further criterion for observer status, according to the Office of Legal Affairs, is full membership in one or more of the specialized agencies affiliated with the UN.[11] Thus, the Communist-affiliated governments of the divided nations are excluded from observer status because they are not recognized by a majority of UN members, nor are any of them members of any of the specialized agencies.** Admission to the UN being subject to Security Council veto, the path of least resistance into the international system therefore appears to be acceptance to membership in one of the international agencies.

Although only the Western-affiliated governments have been able to achieve observer status in the UN and to be admitted to membership in the specialized agencies, observer status has not been a prerequisite to membership in the agencies. Thus, while South Korea became a member of FAO and WHO in 1949 (the same year it acquired observer status), West Germany was admitted to FAO in 1950 and to ILO, UNESCO, WHO, and GATT in 1951, prior to achieving

[9] *Ibid.*, 267.

[10] UN Secretariat, Office of Public Information, *Press Releases*, XVIII (1960), press conference of April 21, 1960, p. 14.

[11] *United Nations Juridical Yearbook, 1962* (Provisional edition), 236.

** See *Note*, p. 479.

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observer status in 1952; Vietnam was admitted to ILO, FAO, and WHO in 1950, and to UNESCO, UPU, and ITU in 1951, prior to attaining observer status in 1952.[12] There is therefore no need for the Communist-affiliated governments to achieve observer status prior to being admitted to the specialized agencies; but they may use admission to a specialized agency as a step toward observer status and an opening wedge to participation in the international system.

General Assembly efforts to influence membership policies of the agencies. On occasion, the General Assembly has attempted to influence the membership policies of the specialized agencies. Thus, in 1946, the Assembly passed a resolution that the "Franco Government of Spain be debarred from membership in international agencies established by or brought into relationship with the United Nations."[13] This recommendation was revoked by another resolution in 1950.[14] One argument for revoking the resolution was that the specialized agencies should be free to decide the admission of new members on the basis of the expected contribution of the prospective member to the agency.[15] However, the same General Assembly session passed a resolution—number 396 (V)—with special reference to the divided nations, requesting that the specialized agencies take into account in their membership and credentials policies the "attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question." As we shall see, this resolution was later invoked by Italy and Japan in support of their argument that East Germany should not be admitted to WHO in 1968. The 1950 resolution was worded as follows:

> 396 (V). Recognition by the United Nations of the representation of a Member State.
>
> *The General Assembly,*
>
> *Considering* that difficulties may arise regarding the representation of a Member State in the United Nations and that there is a risk that conflicting decisions may be reached by its various organs,
>
> *Considering* that it is in the interest of the proper functioning of the Organization that there should be uniformity in the procedure applicable whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations, and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations,

[12] Vietnam was not formally divided until 1954. For dates of admission to the various agencies, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–49* (New York 1950); *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950* (New York 1951); *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951* (New York 1952). [These are hereafter cited as *UN Yearbook*.]

[13] UN General Assembly, *Official Records,* First Session. Resolutions 63-64 (A/64/Add.I) (1946).

[14] Sohn (fn. 7), 1403.

[15] *Ibid.*, 1404.

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Considering that, in virtue of its composition, the General Assembly is the organ of the United Nations in which consideration can best be given to the views of all Member States in matters affecting the functioning of the Organization as a whole,

1. *Recommends* that, whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case;

2. *Recommends* that, when any such question arises, it should be considered by the General Assembly, or by the Interim Committee if the General Assembly is not in session;

3. *Recommends* that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question should be taken into account in the other organs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies;

4. *Declares* that the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question shall not of itself affect the direct relations of individual Member States with the State concerned;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the other organs of the United Nations and to the specialized agencies for such action as may be appropriate.[16]

Thus, while withdrawing a *mandatory* resolution regarding membership in the specialized agencies, the General Assembly promulgated another, *recommendatory*, resolution concerning representation in them.

Qualifications for Membership in International Agencies

In considering candidates for membership in the specialized agencies, two types of criteria are generally applied, beyond ascertaining whether the candidate has complied with the procedural requirements for application. The first of these are *legal* criteria: Does the candidate legally qualify, under the terms of the constitution? The second are *policy* criteria: Will the admission of the candidate contribute to the effectiveness of the organization in fulfilling its purposes?

The legal issue: statehood as a prerequisite for membership. In most cases, only "states" may be members of international organizations: "Membership in international organizations is usually open only to states recognized as 'sovereign' by the governments of other states. This

[16] UN General Assembly, *Official Records*, Fifth Session, Supp. No. 20 (A/1775), Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the period 19 September to 15 December 1950 (New York 1950), 24-25.

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means, in practice, that representation in almost all international bodies is limited to national governments that control the affairs of their respective countries."[17] Thus, the prospective member must have achieved the status of statehood. But what is a "state"? While a *nation* is an empirical entity, a *state* is a legal entity. Article 1 of the Inter-American Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo 1933), which reflects the generally accepted legal criteria of statehood, defines a state as "a person of international law [that] should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other States."[18] In discussions on prospective membership in the specialized agencies, several other criteria have been suggested by the participants —e.g., recognition by other states, recognition by the United Nations, admission by other specialized agencies, "representativeness" (as expressing the "sovereign will" of the people in the territory under governmental control), effective political control, and independence from external control. Some or all of these factors may be presented as evidence of statehood, but are not of themselves qualifying characteristics of statehood.

Recognition of a state by other states has been repeatedly raised in discussions on membership in the specialized agencies, and repeatedly dismissed as not relevant to the issue of whether a government in fact represented a "state." The existence of a state as a state is independent of whether or not it is recognized by other states.[19] As pointed out in Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention, "The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states."[20] In a persuasive memorandum to the Secretary-General, one analyst pointed out the illogic of connecting the recognition by individual states with membership or representation in an international organization: "Since . . . recognition of either State or government is an individual act, and either admission to membership or acceptance of representation in the Organization are collective acts, it should appear to be legally inadmissible to condition the latter acts by a requirement that they be preceded by individual recognition."[21] The same analyst, however, points out that the problem of linking recognition with admission or acceptance

[17] Philip E. Jacob and Alexine L. Atherton, *The Dynamics of International Organization: The Making of World Order* (Homewood, Ill. 1965), 20.

[18] As quoted in William W. Bishop, Jr., *International Law: Cases and Materials*, 2nd ed. (Boston 1962), 210.

[19] L. Oppenheim, *International Law: A Treatise*, 5th ed. (New York 1937), 120.

[20] As cited in Bishop (fn. 18), 283.

[21] Louis B. Sohn, ed., *Cases on United Nations Law* (Brooklyn 1967), 107-8.

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of credentials would be solved if the United Nations itself were capable of recognizing a country, as that would be a collective act.[22]

The General Assembly did in fact grant a form of recognition to the Government of the Republic of Korea when it passed Resolution 195 (III) on December 12, 1948, by a vote of 48 to 6, with one abstention. The resolution did not recognize the government as the government of all Korea, but said that the General Assembly:

> (2) *Declares* that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea), having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea;
>
> . . .
>
> (9) *Recommends* that member states and other nations, in establishing their relations with the Government of Korea, take into consideration the facts set out in paragraph (2) of this resolution.[23]

This recognition by the General Assembly was used as an argument on behalf of South Korea's legal status in its application to WHO in 1949, the first specialized agency to which the R.O.K. was admitted. Thus, while recognition by individual states is largely irrelevant to the legal status of a state, recognition by the UN may at least be used as evidence of statehood. Under all the constitutions of the specialized agencies, UN *membership* takes the effect of being conclusive as to the statehood of the particular member.

Effective control over the territory and population, combined with freedom from external control, are two important factors in determining the ability of a government to participate actively in international relations, and thus go to determine whether qualification (d) of the Montevideo Convention is fulfilled. Whether or not a government has effective control over a given population in a given area and whether or not it is free from external control are essentially questions of fact upon which evidence may be presented and weighed to determine whether the legal status of statehood has been achieved.

The policy issue: behavior characteristics weighed as criteria for membership. Although statehood is a legal prerequisite for membership in a specialized agency, it does not follow that proof of statehood is in

[22] *Ibid.*, 108.

[23] *UN Yearbook, 1948–49*, 290.

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itself sufficient for membership. Admission does not follow automatically once the judgment has been made that the applicant is legally qualified for membership. The very fact that the constitutions provide for *voting* on the application implies that policy considerations may be taken into account in reaching a decision. These policy considerations include judgments as to whether or not the applicant will contribute to the effectiveness of the organization. This leaves room for a considerable difference of opinion, as the members are still free to perceive of "effectiveness" in terms of the technical objectives of the organization, functionalist objectives in general, or sanction-privilege objectives.

Whether or not the prospective member will contribute to the organization's effectiveness will often be determined by judgments as to the applicant's past behavior, specifically as this behavior is conceived of as evidence of its capacity or willingness to carry out the objectives of the organization. Thus, an argument against the admission of Albania to UNESCO, for example, was its refusal to comply with a decision of the International Court of Justice. This was seen as evidence that Albania was unwilling to carry out the objectives of UNESCO. One of the arguments against the admission of Muscat and Oman to WHO was that, because of internal upheaval in the country, it would be incapable of carrying out the objectives of the organization.

These different criteria have been raised, argued, and considered in the context of admission of governments of the divided nations to the specialized agencies, but no clear distinction has ever been made between the legal and policy arguments. Furthermore, the weight which has been given to the various arguments in the outcome of membership applications cannot be ascertained, since the voting does not demonstrate adherence to particular criteria.

Membership of the Divided Nations in the Agencies

By 1967, at least two of the three Western-affiliated governments of the divided nations had been admitted to each of the specialized agencies, and all three were members of most. South Vietnam was absent only from GATT and IMCO, South Korea was absent only from ILO, and West Germany had become a member of all fifteen of the major organizations.

Applications have been made by East Germany to several of the

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specialized agencies, and have been denied.** North Vietnam and North Korea have not sought membership. Prior to its "temporary" division by the Geneva Agreements of 1954, the State of Vietnam was admitted to several of the specialized agencies. These agencies included FAO, UNESCO, ILO, WHO, ITU, UPU, ICAO, and WMO. (The last accepted Vietnam as a part of "Indochina.") In view of the fact that "Vietnam" is a member of these agencies, North Vietnam may not apply for separate membership without confirming the legitimacy of the South Vietnamese Government as successor to the membership in these organizations. Therefore, its only course of action would be to challenge the representation of Vietnam rather than to seek separate membership. In fact, North Vietnam has apparently not sought to do either, waiting instead until it has successfully unified Vietnam under a single government. Until recently, North Korea's official policy has been to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the United Nations or any of its related agencies, and hence North Korea has not sought admission. North Korean hostility toward the UN stems from the United Nations' recognition of the Republic of Korea in 1948, the General Assembly's labeling of North Korea as an aggressor, and the UN involvement in Korea prior to, during, and since the Korean War. Since the seating of the People's Republic of China, however, North Korea's position has softened, and with the recent move toward reconciliation with the South, it may begin making efforts to join the international system.

Some of the most heated debates in connection with the admission of the governments of the divided nations to the specialized agencies have taken place in WHO; we shall therefore confine our discussion to the debate in that agency, with some additional illustrations from UNESCO.

The WHO constitution provides for states which are not United Nations members, and which were not observers at the 1946 organizational conference, to become members by submitting an application and having it approved by a simple majority vote of the World Health Assembly.[24] Since most other organizations require a two-thirds majority vote, nonmembers of the UN seeking access to the international system generally concentrate their first efforts on admission to WHO. Furthermore, WHO has been the agency most openly dedicated to the principle of universality, since protection of the world's health is most

** See *Note*, p. 479.

[24] "Constitution of the World Health Organization," *UN Yearbook, 1946–47*, 794.

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easily facilitated by universal membership. In 1961, WHO passed a resolution confirming its commitment to the principle of universality:

> WHA14.35 *Universality of WHO Membership*
>
> The Fourteenth World Health Assembly,
>
> Recalling the provisions of the Preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organization, that the health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest co-operation of individuals and States;
>
> Recalling the provisions of Chapter III of the Constitution, concerning membership, and in particular Article 3, which states that membership in the World Health Organization is open to all States;
>
> Considering that fuller development of the activities of the Organization would be promoted by participation in the work of the Organization by additional States which are eligible but not represented in it; and
>
> Considering that a number of new states are being created, above all in Africa, and will become eligible for membership,
>
> INVITES all States which are or become eligible in accordance with Chapter III of the Constitution, but which are not represented in the World Health Organization, to consider applying for membership in the Organization.[25]

Applications of the Western-affiliated sectors of the divided nations. The Republic of Korea was the first government of a divided nation to seek admission to a specialized agency, and it made its first application to WHO in 1949. The procedure for admission at the time was for the Assembly to refer the application to a Committee on Constitutional Matters, which in turn referred it to a working party for consideration. The working party decided not to recommend the Republic of Korea for admission, "in view of the fact that the Republic of Korea (South) does not yet command a sufficient degree of recognition amongst the international community of states."[26] The full committee, however, rejected the position of the working party and recommended admission to the Assembly. The application was subjected to heated debate in the committee as well as in the plenary Assembly session, much of it centering around the problem of Korea's recognition.

Predictably, it was the Communist members which opposed the

[25] World Health Organization, *Official Records of the World Health Organization*, No. 110, *Fourteenth World Health Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Verbatim Records, Committees Minutes and Reports*, New Delhi, 7–24 February 1961 (Geneva 1961), 14 [hereafter cited as *WHO Official Records*].

[26] *WHO Official Records*, No. 21 (2nd Assembly, June–July 1949, Geneva 1949), 312. Tenth meeting of the Committee on Constitutional Matters.

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admission. Yugoslavia pointed out that the R.O.K. had received diplomatic recognition from only 7 of the 64 member nations of the UN. Canada, however, countered that even though it had not itself given the R.O.K. diplomatic recognition, it had been one of the majority in the United Nations who had supported it for UN membership, and that membership had been blocked only by the Security Council's veto. The United States pointed out that the General Assembly Resolution 195 (III) had declared that the R.O.K. Government was a lawful government, and that this "indicated clearly that South Korea was an independent nation having effective control over its internal administration and competent to conduct its own foreign relations."[27] Australia noted that the General Assembly resolution on South Korea had been passed by a vote of 50 to 6, and the Philippines stated that it was not necessary that "a certain number of nations should recognize a State before admission."[28] All of these points, of course, were made to the question of whether the Republic of Korea was a "state" eligible for membership—i.e., whether it was legally qualified.

Bulgaria, Poland, and Albania argued that this question itself—the legal status of the Republic of Korea—was not within the scope of WHO's competence to decide, but was a political question which should be decided only by the United Nations itself.[29] The United States pointed out that the United Nations *had* made such a decision, however, through Resolution 195 (III): "Korea is functioning as an independent State with effective internal governmental institutions and is competent to conduct its own foreign affairs. Diplomatic recognition of Korea has been accorded by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, China, Brazil, Chile, and by the Vatican. Furthermore, the resolution of 12 December 1948, passed by an overwhelming majority in the Assembly of the United Nations affirms this fact. That resolution expressed the opinion that Korea is a nation eligible for membership."[30]

Aside from the legal issue, it was generally agreed that the policy question led to the conclusion that all nations should be admitted. The United States noted that "such action is in accord with the declared policy of the World Health Organization of having as wide a membership as possible." And Liberia made a plea which represents the classic universalistic position: "Korea should be admitted on the basis that it is a nation which has many people in it; and probably many of them are sick and might have diseases which may spread to other parts of the world. Now why should we reject, on political grounds,

[27] *Ibid.*, 313. [28] *Ibid.* [29] *Ibid.*, 121-24. [30] *Ibid.*, 122.

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a nation which has applied to us for membership? Why should we now try to establish a frontier for diseases? Diseases know no national boundaries."[31] Eventually, the Republic of Korea was admitted by the adoption of the following resolution:

> The Second World Health Assembly
> *Resolves* that the request for admission to the World Health Organization presented by the Government of Korea (South) [fn] be accepted.
>
> [fn] See Resolution 195 (III), 12 December 1948, of the General Assembly of the United Nations.[32]

The resolution was notable for the fact that it clearly referred to the fact that admission was being given to *South* Korea, and it specifically referred to the General Assembly's resolution defining the status of the Republic of Korea.

The admission of Vietnam to WHO in 1950 presented different legal questions, for Vietnam was not then a divided nation. However, the status of the country was called into question because of the political relationship between Vietnam and France at the time. It was argued that, because France was responsible for conducting some of its affairs, it was ineligible for membership as a sovereign state. However, the Netherlands pointed out that a requirement of full sovereignty would bar the membership of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in view of the Benelux agreement between them which surrendered a portion of their sovereignty. Belgium argued that, since Vietnam was largely free to conduct its own affairs and was fully capable of carrying out the obligations of WHO, it should be admitted to membership. India pointed out that for the limited purpose of implementing the measures advocated by WHO, Vietnam was sufficiently independent. Vietnam was then admitted to WHO.[33]

The application of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1951 presented similar questions, since Germany was still under Allied occupation. Under an agreement with the occupation forces, a number of restrictions on the Federal Republic had been removed in 1949, but it did not obtain full sovereignty until 1955. Because of the absence of Soviet-bloc countries from WHO at this time—they had temporarily withdrawn—Germany's admission was challenged only by Israel. The same year, however, the applications for both Vietnam and Germany were challenged in UNESCO, on the grounds that they were not sovereign states. At that time, the United Kingdom suggested that

[31] *Ibid.*, 125.
[32] *Ibid.*, 54. Resolution WHA 2.99 Admission of Korea (South).
[33] *WHO Official Records*, No. 28 (3rd Assembly, 8–27 May, 1950, Geneva 1950), 441-45.

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the agency adhere to a standard of two requirements to meet the qualifications for membership: (1) a state should have sufficient independence to enable it to conduct its foreign affairs in its own name, and (2) it should be completely independent in the sphere of activity covered by the specialized agency.[34] Czechoslovakia challenged the admission of both Vietnam and the Federal Republic of Germany, arguing that "the basic requirement for admission to any international organization was that the country concerned should be an independent sovereign state."[35] Even the Philippines noted that the admission of Germany should be deferred until a peace treaty had been concluded. Both Germany and Vietnam were admitted, however. Thus, by 1951, the Western-affiliated governments of the divided nations had become active participants in the international system.

Related applications. Although East Germany sought membership in several agencies under provisions which allowed "Germany" to adhere to the organizations without submitting an application, its "adherence" was rejected. In 1968, East Germany finally launched an all-out effort to gain admission to WHO. Prior to that time, however, some other cases that had come up for consideration by WHO had added new precedents for admissions qualifications.

The first of these related cases was the application for the admission of Mauritania in 1961. Morocco, already a member of WHO, claimed that Mauritania was an integral part of Morocco and had been separated only by the French; that Mauritania was thus not a state but a puppet controlled indirectly through neocolonialist means by the French and incapable of actually conducting its own international relations. Admission of Mauritania, it was argued, would permanently divide Morocco. Morocco asserted that this was a political issue, not within the competence of WHO, and must be deferred pending decision on Mauritania's political status by the United Nations.

The argument centered around the question of whether Mauritania was a state within the meaning of the WHO constitution, and thus eligible for membership. Morocco insisted that it could not be viewed as a state, since it was a territory of Morocco with "600,000 inhabitants of the same race, religion, language, culture and tradition" as Morocco.[36] Guinea argued that the decision should be postponed until the

[34] United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Official Records*, Twelfth Session, Santiago, Chile, 20 February–21 March 1951 (New York 1951), 258.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] *WHO Official Records* (fn. 25), 345. Fourth meeting of the Committee on Administration, Finance and Legal Matters.

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UN decided the political issue. Saudi Arabia spoke in favor of deferring the consideration of Mauritania until the UN had reached a settlement of the dispute in order to "save WHO from pronouncing itself upon an exclusively political issue. The existence itself of the applicant was still the subject of a dispute that had been submitted to the sole international body competent to settle that matter—namely, the United Nations. . . . On the present occasion the Committee [of WHO] was being asked to perpetuate a division—an obviously hazardous thing to do."[37] The delegate from Norway, however, turned the "political issue" argument to the opposite purpose, arguing that all political aspects should be ignored and Mauritania admitted without reference to them: "The statesmen who had set up the United Nations had wisely decided to separate the political organization from the scientific and technical ones, so that the experts could pave the way for the atmosphere of peace and harmony which the politicians were trying to achieve. His delegation had always insisted on the technical and nonpolitical character of WHO and, on that basis, he considered membership in the Organization should be open to all countries which wished to join."[38] Madagascar pointed out that Mauritania was recognized by more than half the members of WHO, and that furthermore it was the Government of Mauritania, rather than the Government of Morocco, which was responsible for the administration of health services to the people in that area. Israel noted that no "State or group of States had the right to confer sovereignty upon or deny it to an established State. . . . But whatever the political position of any government in regard to Mauritania, it would no doubt be generally recognized that its admission to WHO would be consistent with the aims of the Organization. Surely the decisive consideration must be that admittance to membership could not fail to help improve health conditions."[39]

Despite the fact that Mauritania raised theoretical issues very similar to the questions which would arise later in connection with the application of East Germany (and also of North Korea, both of which were created as a result of foreign occupation), it is interesting that both the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Korea voted in favor of admission of Mauritania, as did the United States, while the Republic of Vietnam abstained. Of the Soviet-bloc countries, Romania and Cuba voted against admission, and the remainder abstained. The vote total was 54 for, 15 against, 22 abstaining, and 8 absent.[40] The overwhelming decision in favor of Mauritania's admission seemed to indicate that WHO was willing to admit an applicant even though its

[37] *Ibid.* [38] *Ibid.*, 344. [39] *Ibid.*, 347. [40] *Ibid.*

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status as a state was questioned, even though this very issue was being debated by the United Nations, and even though a question had been raised as to its capacity to carry on international relations independently.

The following year, 1962, the question of what was a state for the purposes of admission was again raised when application for admission was made by the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. This time, Iraq raised the issue (with which the Soviet Union agreed), that the Sultanate was not a state because its foreign relations were conducted by the United Kingdom. The U.K. pointed out in rebuttal that political issues were not within the competence of WHO, and that the Sultanate was in need of the technical help in developing health services which WHO could provide. Yugoslavia urged that consideration of the application should be deferred until the United Nations had reached a resolution of the issue, and Cuba pointed out that the political status of the Sultanate was not sufficiently clearly defined to warrant its membership in WHO. The Committee adopted a resolution deciding to postpone consideration of the application, and this resolution was endorsed by the Assembly.[41]

Application of East Germany for membership in WHO. In 1968, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Syria, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia proposed the admission of the German Democratic Republic to the Assembly of the World Health Organization.[42] Supporters of the East German application had prepared extensive arguments in support of the proposition that the G.D.R. was a state and in an effort to demonstrate the contributions that the admission of the G.D.R. could make to the increased effectiveness of WHO.

The Soviet Union addressed itself primarily to the question of whether the German Democratic Republic was a state:

> The application of the German Democratic Republic for membership in WHO is a normal reflection of the historic changes that in fact occurred in Europe a long time ago. For almost twenty years there have been in the centre of Europe two States, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, with their own parliaments, their own governments and their own central and local authorities. Both these States have extensive international connexions and play an important role in contemporary international life. The existence of two German States is an indisputable fact and of course needs no sanction

[41] *WHO Official Records*, No. 119 (15th Assembly, 8–25 May 1962), Part II (Geneva 1962), 350-52.

[42] *WHO Official Records*, No. 169 (21st Assembly, 6–24 May 1968), Part II (Geneva 1968), 67-68.

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from any external forces. For all the differences in their social and economic systems, and in their foreign policies, each of these States is an entity in international law and a legal successor to the former German State. The German Democratic Republic is a historical and political fact. In it full State power is exercised, independently of any other State, over a defined territory in the interests of a defined population.

. . .

According to the Constitution of WHO, States may become Members irrespective of the nature of their social systems or of the ideologies predominant in them and also irrespective of the number of countries which have recognized them. It is this that enables WHO to act as an instrument for fruitful cooperation between States and it is from this that its international authority is derived.[43]

Supporting the Soviet argument as to the legal existence of the East German State, Romania added:

One of the ways and means by which the Organization could be strengthened should be a constant effort to reflect faithfully the realities of the modern world and the changes taking place in it, while strictly abiding by the principles of modern, international law.

. . . [T]o tackle this problem realistically and effectively the only basis is to recognize the historical realities arising from the Second World War and in the first place the existence of two German States, the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. The logical conclusion follows that both German States should participate in the activities of our organization and that these two States, in other words the whole German people, must be given wide opportunities of making an active contribution to the Organization's efforts with a view to achieving its aims and, at the same time, of benefitting from the results obtained by the Organization.[44]

Cambodia argued that since there are two German states, both should be admitted to help make the membership universal, and Mali agreed, "pending unification of the two Germanies."[45]

Poland introduced the argument concerning East Germany's potential contribution to the effectiveness of the organization, making three points in favor of the G.D.R.'s admission: (1) WHO should be universal in membership in order to be effective, and therefore should accept any country willing to fulfill its duties to WHO; (2) the G.D.R. could be of great assistance to WHO in fulfilling its functions because of the high development of its public health services, research work, and training centers; (3) because of its economic development, the G.D.R. could contribute significantly to the financial resources of WHO and thus could assist the organization in carrying out its functions in the world community.[46] Czechoslovakia added that the G.D.R.

[43] *Ibid.* [44] *Ibid.*, 71. [45] *Ibid.* [46] *Ibid.*

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wishes to cooperate with WHO and has demonstrated its capacity to make important contributions, and Mongolia pointed out that East Germany had in fact been assisting it in the development of its health services, and could do the same for others. The U.S.S.R. maintained that since East Germany was the tenth most economically developed country in the world, its exclusion would be financially detrimental to the effectiveness of the organization. Furthermore, "It is precisely in WHO that it is necessary in the first place to put into effect the principle of its special humanitarian and universal role as an organization serving humanity and acting to preserve human life. Universality is no longer a matter dependent on the goodwill of one State or another but an objective and natural necessity, determined by international relationships and the universal tasks facing us in all spheres of life and above all in public health, tasks which can only be solved by the co-operation of all peoples and States. . . ."[47]

Opponents to the admission of East Germany concentrated their arguments around the proposition that East Germany was not a state, and that the debate as to its legal status was a political issue with which WHO was not competent to deal. The Federal Republic of Germany submitted that East Germany was not a state: "The Federal Republic of Germany has been recognized as a sovereign and independent State by all the four powers which were victorious in the Second World War, including the Soviet Union. This is not so in the case of Eastern Germany. That is the basic difference between the legal position of the Federal Republic of Germany and that of Eastern Germany."[48] Furthermore, West Germany added, the admission of East Germany would perpetuate the division of Germany and hence determine the outcome of a political issue, something beyond the competence of WHO. In support of the West German position, the United States asserted:

> The so-called German Democratic Republic occupies a portion of German territory which is known as East Germany. It is a regime which has been imposed upon, and not chosen by, the population of East Germany. There has never been a free election to reflect the will of the people of that area. The great majority of the world community has refused recognition of this so-called German Democratic Republic. No specialized agency of the United Nations has admitted it to membership or to any form of active participation whatever. . . . The attempts to establish the so-called German Democratic Republic as a separate State are essentially political moves to influence an ultimate European settle-

[47] *Ibid.* [48] *Ibid.*, 66.

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ment. Such attempts, which are contrary to the interests of the German people, can only make a European settlement more difficult.[49]

The United Kingdom supported the position that East Germany is not a state, on the grounds that the Government of the U.S.S.R. was "responsible for the conduct of the affairs of that territory."[50]

"There are in the United Nations system proper," added the United States, "perfectly adequate forums for debating political questions such as those which underlie the application which we are now considering. It is for a political forum to debate and find a solution to the very serious problems surrounding an eventual European settlement."[51] Guatemala supported the position that it was a question for the United Nations to solve, while Argentina pointed out that "the World Health Assembly is a forum above all for the discussion of technical, not political matters." Both Italy and Japan raised the issue of General Assembly Resolution No. 396 (V), passed in 1950, calling on the specialized agencies to take into account the attitude adopted by the General Assembly "whenever more than one authority claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State. . . ."[52] (This resolution had not been raised in previous debates over admission of divided nations, and was not clearly applicable, since Germany is not a "Member State" of the United Nations, and since the General Assembly has adopted no "attitude" toward Germany.)

A roll-call vote was taken on the resolution for the admission of the German Democratic Republic. The total vote was 19 for, 59 against, 27 abstaining and 19 absent. Thus, the application of the German Democratic Republic for admission to WHO was rejected.

Competence of the Specialized Agencies to Decide the Membership Issue

In seeking a realistic approach to the problem of the divided nations in the specialized agencies, several issues need to be resolved. One is the constantly recurring question as to whether the specialized agencies are competent to decide the membership issue. Another is the question of the statehood of the divided nations. A third factor that needs consideration is the impact of exclusion of some of the divided nations on the agencies' ability to fulfill their functions in the international system.

Again and again in the debate over membership, the parties opposing a particular admission have asserted that the question as to whether

[49] *Ibid.*, 69. [50] *Ibid.*, 73. [51] *Ibid.*, 69.
[52] UN General Assembly (fn. 16), 24-25.

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or not an applicant is a state is a political issue not within the competence of the specialized agency to determine. Nonetheless, the agencies have repeatedly confirmed their competence over the issue by admitting governments from divided nations and others whose status has been challenged. Have these agencies all exceeded their authority?

The "political question." The specialized agencies were designed to deal exclusively with technical problems within their specific field of competence. It is widely agreed that these technical problems can best be handled if political issues can be avoided. Since the United Nations proper was designed for the purpose of settling political disagreements, and the specialized agencies for the purpose of dealing with essentially nonpolitical problems, the assertion that a particular issue is a political question raises serious concern as to the competence of the specialized agency to handle it.

The specialized agencies are, however, competent to decide whether or not to admit a candidate for membership to their organizations. The constitution of each provides for such admission and specifies the general procedures to be followed (i.e., if the candidate is a nonmember of the United Nations, admission is generally by a two-thirds vote of the Conference or Assembly of the organization). These constitutions specifically provide that only "states" may be eligible for membership. A state is a *legal* entity (as opposed to a "nation," a "country," etc.). Whether a prospective member is in fact a state is therefore a legal and not a political question. Agencies may thus legitimately refer the questions to their own legal committees or legal counsel for determination. Where they cannot arrive at a meaningful legal conclusion because of the lack of agreement as to the legal interpretation of the term "state," they are free to request an opinion from the International Court of Justice; in fact, this was done in 1930 by the International Labor Organization in the case of the Free City of Danzig.[53]

The argument that the question of statehood is a political question only tends to confuse the issue. As has been seen in debates over admission to membership in WHO, it may lead either to the conclusion that the candidate may be admitted without reference to whether or not it is a state (though it would clearly be an abuse of constitutional powers to admit a nonstate), or to the opposite conclusion that the

[53] Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 26 August 1930, Series B, No. 18, as quoted in Louis B. Sohn, *Legal Problems of International Administration: Constitutional and Administrative Problems of International Organizations* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968), 29.

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issue of membership may not be considered at all if a member raises the question as to whether the applicant is a state.

The agencies have repeatedly affirmed their capacity to determine the issue of statehood by admitting to membership those whose status as a state has been called into question, thereby determining by implication that the applicant was in fact a state. (As has been seen, the admission of a candidate to one of the specialized agencies has then been used as evidence of statehood in applying to other agencies, as well as in achieving observer status at the United Nations.)

The argument put forward by Italy and Japan in the debate over East Germany's application for membership in WHO—that, in the specific case of the divided nations, the specialized agencies are precluded from deciding on the qualifications for membership in their organizations by General Assembly Resolution 396 (V)—is likewise specious. In the first place, Resolution 396 (V) refers only to member states of the United Nations. None of the divided nations are member states. In the second place, in admitting the Western-affiliated governments, the specialized agencies have repeatedly decided qualifications for membership of applicants from the divided nations. It would be unreasonable to construe the resolution as barring consideration of the Communist-affiliated governments only, especially in view of the fact that the General Assembly has adopted no attitude which may be applied with reference to them.

The question as to whether an applicant is a state qualified for membership in the specialized agencies is clearly not a political question that must be referred to the United Nations, but a legal question within the competence of the specialized agencies to the extent that they are capable of interpreting their own constitutions.

Latitude of discretion in admission to membership. The answer to the question as to whether or not an applicant is a "state" eligible for admission does not determine the outcome of the membership question. In the membership debates, opponents of a particular applicant have repeatedly tended to act as if a concession that the applicant has achieved the status of statehood will predetermine the outcome of its admission. Where the organization has maintained a strong policy attitude in favor of universality, this may in fact be the practical result. But it is not the required result. The very fact that the constitutions of all the specialized agencies provide for a system of voting on the question of membership for nonmembers of the UN means that the members are free to exercise their discretion in voting in accordance

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with the extent to which they feel the prospective member will contribute to the effectiveness of the organization. They are also free to define effectiveness in line with their view of the means to achieving the objectives of the organization.

The Question of Statehood of the Divided Nations

The assertion, in the preceding section, that the question of statehood is a legal question was not intended to imply any conclusions as to the legal qualifications for statehood of any of the governments of the divided nations. The admission of all three of the Western-affiliated governments to almost all of the specialized agencies may be seen as presumptive evidence—perhaps even conclusive evidence—of statehood. But are not East Germany, North Korea, and North Vietnam states as well?

If one state, which government? To date, much of the debate in international circles over the divided nations has been based on the assumption that each nation can be only one state, that one state can have only one government, and that therefore the requirement must be to select the one "legitimate" government. Individually, states have tended to extend diplomatic recognition to only one government in each of the divided nations, although there are several exceptions: the Soviet Union and several East European governments recognize both Germanies, India recognizes both Vietnams, and so forth. Collectively, through the specialized agencies, they have accepted the membership of only one of the governments. Where recognition has clearly been prompted by political motivations only, the question as to which government was genuinely "legitimate" has not presented a serious difficulty. For those seeking objective criteria, however, the decision is far more difficult. In fact, no criteria of choice seem equally applicable to all three Western-affiliated governments or to all three Communist-affiliated governments.

One might conceivably choose to accept the government that exercises effective control over the greater part of the population of the nation. This would clearly favor the Government of West Germany, with its population of 61,194,600, over the Government of East Germany, with 17,074,504. It would also favor the Government of South Korea (31,460,000), over the Government of North Korea (13,900,000). However, it would favor the Government of North Vietnam (19,000,000), over South Vietnam (16,124,000).

Perhaps one might choose to accept the government most widely

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recognized by other nations—though this would lead to circularity, recognition by one state depending on recognition by other states. Here again, West Germany would clearly lead East Germany by more than three to one in recognitions, and South Korea would lead North Korea by nearly three to one. But again, South Vietnam has been recognized by fewer countries than has North Vietnam.

In fact, the assumption upon which this search for objective criteria rests—that only one legitimate government exists within a single nation—has created a serious dilemma which need not exist. Although a *state* may have only one government, a *nation* may be divided into several states.

Two states in one nation? A state is a legal entity; a nation is an empirical entity. The two are not the same. As J. L. Brierly has pointed out:

> A state should not be confused with the whole community of persons living on its territory; it is only one among a multitude of other institutions. . . . Nor should a state be confused with a nation, although in modern times many states are organized on a national basis, and although also the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, as in the title 'United Nations,' which is actually a league of states, and even in the term 'inter*national* law'; a single state, e.g., the Indian Republic, may include many nations, or a single nation may be dispersed among many states, as the Poles were before 1919.[54]

One definition of "nation" is: "A people connected by supposed ties of blood generally manifested by community of language, religion, customs, etc."[55] Clearly, Germany, Korea, and Vietnam are single nations by this definition, as well as by the self-identity of their people. But this does not preclude the possibility that two states may now exist within the territory of what was once both a single nation and a single state. As Brierly has observed, "A new state comes into existence when a community acquires, with a reasonable probability of permanence, the essential characteristics of a state, namely an organized government, a defined territory, and such a degree of independence of control by any other state as to be capable of conducting its own international relations. Occasionally a new state has been formed in territory not previously under the rule of any state. . . . But generally in modern times a new state has been formed by the division of an existing state into

[54] J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace* (New York 1963), 126-27. See also Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, *The World Community in Transition*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia 1956), 2-3.

[55] *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass. 1953), 559.

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more states than one."[56] Thus, it is quite reasonable to argue that the divided nations may have developed, over periods of separation ranging from nineteen years in the case of Vietnam, to twenty-eight years in the case of Korea, into two separate states. Recognition of this fact would not, and does not, imply a recognition of separate nationhood, nor does it imply a desire that the national division be perpetuated.

Evidence of statehood. To assert that two states have come into existence is, of course, not to conclude that they actually have. Statehood, it must be reiterated, is a legal status independent of recognition by other states, which exists when certain characteristics are present: (1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) an organized government; and (4) effective independent control over its international relations. All of these characteristics are empirically verifiable.

No actual dispute exists today over the first three characteristics. It is recognized that East Germany, North Korea, and North Vietnam (as well as West Germany, South Korea, and South Vietnam), do in fact possess defined populations, defined territories, and organized governments. As evidenced by the discussion on the application of East Germany to WHO, the dispute centers around the question of the existence of independent control over international relations. It has been generally assumed that this factor cannot be empirically verified. Yet, extensive studies of the organization, policies, and behavior of a government may provide clear evidence as to the degree of independence it exercises over its own affairs. Indications of repeated unsuccessful efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to influence and control the actions of the Government of North Korea, for example, can only lead to the conclusion that the Soviet Union does not exercise control over the policies of North Korea.[57] It is also obvious that the U.S.S.R. does not control the actions of North Vietnam, and Soviet control over East Germany is not considerably stronger than that exercised over the other East European countries (which have been admitted to the specialized agencies).

Obviously, it is not the function of the specialized agencies to undertake extensive studies to determine the degree of independence of an applicant. Yet, since the decision of a specialized agency as to whether or not the applicant is qualified for membership by reason of its status as a state does have important implications for the capacity of the applicant to participate in the international system, the agency is under

[56] Brierly (fn. 54), 137.

[57] See Joungwon Alexander Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," *World Politics*, XXII (January 1970), 237-51.

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an obligation to examine the evidence available before rendering a decision. Furthermore, there is some obligation to be consistent in reaching a conclusion on this legal issue (as opposed to the policy issue involved in determining how to vote on membership once state status has been determined). A greater degree of proof of independence of external control should not be required of new applicants than has been required of previous applicants, nor of new members than of existing members.

Impact of the Exclusion of the Divided Nations on the Functioning of the Agencies

Admission of a state to membership in an agency is recognized to have an effect on the functioning of that agency. For that reason a certain degree of discretion is allowed, through the exercise of voting, to permit the members to determine whether the applicant will contribute to or detract from the effectiveness of the agency. The exclusion of a state from the agency, whether by failure to admit or by subsequent expulsion or forced withdrawal, will also have an impact—either beneficial or detrimental—upon the effectiveness of the agency.

Impact on the technical effectiveness of the agency. As we have noted previously, the impact of admission policies on the technical functioning of the agency will depend on the particular function of that organization. It is a two-way effect, for members both benefit from the work of the agency and contribute to it. The excluded member is therefore not the only one affected by the exclusion: So long as people travel and communicate across national boundaries, the citizens of member states may be as inconvenienced by the nonmembership of another state as the citizens of the nonmember state itself. Planes carrying international mails can be hijacked from Japan to North Korea, or from Hong Kong to North Vietnam, or from France to East Germany, and procedures are needed to recover the mails in the absence of membership in agencies regulating air and mail traffic. Epidemics can spread from North Vietnam into Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma, or from North Korea into China, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union, or from East Germany to Czechoslovakia, Austria, West Germany, France, and so forth, and means are required to prevent the spread of disease from nonmember nations. Most agencies have therefore recognized that universality of membership is of major importance to the technical functioning of their organization. As WHO indicated in accepting occupied West Germany, Vietnam under the French Union,

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and Mauritania while its political status was still being debated in the UN Assembly, the need for membership in the health organization may be so important to all the people in the world as to permit WHO to accept a minimum of independence in foreign relations so long as there is independence in the technical area. Thus, as recommended by the United Kingdom in 1951, the standard should be *sufficient* independence to enable them to conduct their foreign affairs in their own name and *complete* independence in the sphere of activity covered by the specialized agency.

Impact on functionalist goals. Functionalism, as previously defined, is a belief that international cooperation to solve common problems in technical areas will eventually lead to the capacity to cooperate in political areas. Functionalists perceive that international cooperation will be advanced by eliminating some of the basic problems that cause political conflict (e.g., hunger, poverty, disease), by creating new patterns of organization that will create habits of cooperation, and by whittling away some of the functions of national organs—thereby making inroads into the hostile barriers of sovereignty. The functionalist solution requires universality to be effective. These goals may be overambitious; but institutions do create patterns of behavior, and they do require participants to adjust their behavior in order to be effective within the given setting. The very fact that, in the admission processes of the specialized agencies, the representatives of the Soviet bloc have adapted to the need to argue the precepts of international law rather than political propaganda or Marxist theory indicates that the institutions have had an impact upon the approach of these countries to international relations.[58] The same institutional structure could have an equally auspicious impact upon the behavior patterns of governments like that of North Korea, which have quite intentionally flaunted international law because they have had no access to institutional means through which to make use of it. So long as they are excluded from the international process, they have no incentive to cooperate on its terms. Thus, the exclusion of these isolated entities tends to undermine the ultimate purposes of functionalist goals.

Impact on the legitimacy of the international structure. Since it has no effective means of enforcement, the international system is workable only to the extent that states are willing to cooperate voluntarily within it. They are willing to cooperate when they perceive the system as legit-

[58] See arguments made by the Soviet Union and Romania in the Twenty-first World Health Assembly on behalf of East German admission, *supra.*

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imate. But the very legitimacy of the system rests on the perception that generalized standards will be applied evenly and that the system will not be manipulated to serve the ends of a particular state or group of states. Thus, the seating of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, for example, may have enhanced the view that the international system can operate meaningfully, inasmuch as a large majority of members have long felt that its exclusion was not legitimate.[59]

There are legitimate legal reasons for excluding a candidate from an agency (i.e., because it is not a state); but the policy arguments behind exclusion as a sanction seem no longer meaningful in view of the fact that almost every candidate except the government of a divided nation may become a member of almost any specialized agency simply by virtue of being a member of the United Nations. A sanction that can be applied against only about half a dozen governments in the world is not only very ineffective as a sanction for use in the international system, but is so deficient in generality as to lack the appearance of legitimacy. To the extent that exclusion of certain governments from an agency appears to be being used as a political sanction rather than to advance the goals of the agency in the international system, the impact upon the international system may be to undermine its effectiveness by undermining the appearance of legitimacy. As one writer has said, "If international institutions should constantly be abused for achieving partisan aims of a particular state or group of states, a temporary victory today might result in the crumbling of the whole structure tomorrow."[60]

[59] Urban Whitaker, "Chinese Representation in the United Nations," unpublished research memo, April 1961, based on private interviews with delegates to the UN; cited in Sheldon Appleton, "The United Nations 'China Tangle,'" *Pacific Affairs*, xxxv (Summer 1962), 160-67. Procedurally, the seating of China instead of its admission as a new state may have been unfortunate in view of the fact that the Republic of China on Taiwan continues to exist and to possess the characteristics of continuing statehood. See Joungwon Alexander Kim, "A Way Out of the 'China Problem'?" *World Affairs*, cxxx (October, November, December 1967), 180-85.

[60] Sohn (fn. 7), 1424.

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GRATUITY OR TYRANNY:
The Korean Alliances

By ASTRI SUHRKE*

THE debate over the "tyranny of the weak" has been revived by recent developments in Vietnam and the continuing confrontation in the Middle East. Although some observers conclude that improved understanding among the large powers has weakened the power of the smaller allies, others maintain that the weaker states continue to show amazing intractability. A clarification of these questions should start with an examination of some of the concepts that can fruitfully be applied to a case study with some potential for comparative analysis.

What is described as tyranny of the weak may simultaneously be viewed as a gratuity extended by the larger power to its smaller client. Rather than a tyranny, it is the logic and values of the policies of the larger power that permit the smaller state to influence the alliance in its favor. These views partly reflect different perspectives—what appears to the large power to be tyranny may well be seen as a limited gratuity by the smaller state—but both represent a *reductio ad absurdum* of the bargaining that takes place in most alliances between small and large powers. In the following study I will examine this interaction in the two unequal alliances that embrace North and South Korea. What are the sources of bargaining power of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) vis-à-vis their larger allies? How do the smaller states obtain rewards within their alliances, and how do they resist unwanted interference and control from their larger partners? To what extent is bargaining in inter-allied relations regarded as necessary by the members? Do the structural and ideological differences between the two alliance systems affect the relative bargaining power of the two smaller states and their capacity for maneuvering? Finally, what are the unique elements in the Korean case that must be taken into account in comparative studies?

I. General Considerations

The general literature on unequal alliances and the following case study of Korea suggest some broad observations about factors affecting

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the tactics, options, and bargaining power of the smaller partner in an alliance.[1] The list is not exhaustive, but it includes the concepts most central to the Korean case.

Obtaining support. The initial commitment of a large power to a smaller state may reflect any of the following considerations: a desire to control the activities of the smaller state, a desire to deny its territory to an adversary, a wish to support the "legitimacy" of a particular government, and an attempt to impress third parties by maintaining that particular alliance. Conversely, the smaller partner's bargaining power stems from the same considerations; that is, from the underlying interdependence that characterizes even quite unequal alliances. It can threaten the larger ally's desire for control in several ways—for instance, by attempting to trigger him into an unwanted conflict or by seeking a separate accommodation with the common adversary. To make the smaller state desist from such moves, the larger ally may feel obliged to offer certain rewards or concessions. On the other hand, if the smaller state is a loyal and contributing ally, it may be rewarded for its compliance and support. Finally, the smaller state can bargain from weakness by stressing its fragile position which—unless it is remedied—may undermine the alliance itself.

The three lines of tactics indicated for the smaller ally—stressing his unreliability, contributions, and weaknesses—are not mutually exclusive. They represent different aspects of one and the same composite role.[2] For tactical purposes, a smaller ally can be both contributing and unreliable, as Chiang Kai-shek has demonstrated.[3] However, the smaller ally tends to be cast in a given, mixed role which is determined by his own and the larger ally's perception of the smaller state's actual

[1] There is an endless argument over the definition of a small state, and whether the behavior of a small power is fundamentally different from that of a larger one. This study skirts the definitional question, but maintains that the small ally moves within certain general restraints and options. How this works out in practice will vary greatly from one case to another. Most recent works on small states include David Vital, *The Survival of Small States* (London 1971); August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland, eds., *Small States in International Relations* (Stockholm 1971); Trygve Mathisen, *The Functions of Smaller States in the Strategies of the Great Powers* (Oslo 1971); Marshall R. Singer, *Weak States in a World of Powers* (Riverside 1972); Omar de Rayemaker, "Signification de l'appartenance à une alliance pour les petits pays," *Chronique de politique étrangère*, XXIV (January 1971). George Liska's works, *Nations in Alliance* (Baltimore 1962) and *Alliances and the Third World* (Baltimore 1968), remain very useful.

[2] Cf. Karl J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, XIV (September 1970).

[3] The Generalissimo offered the United States troops and bases on Taiwan while simultaneously threatening to "liberate" the mainland. His threats were occasionally welcomed by the larger ally, and were deliberately stressed by the Eisenhower Administration in 1953 to induce China to accept a Korean armistice. In that context, the smaller ally's policy was not a trigger tactic.

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weaknesses and strengths, the past record of inter-allied relations, and the nature of the security threat. Within this role, the smaller ally can manipulate certain features for bargaining purposes, but sudden changes in the role composition must correspond to external and internal developments in order to be credible. (Envisage the government of New Zealand suddenly stressing an image of unreliability towards the United States.)

The role of the weak ally is implicit in an unequal alliance. The small state need not stress its weakness to obtain support, but it may exaggerate its frailty to obtain particular forms of aid. This is especially effective when the larger ally has a vested interest in maintaining the regime which contracted or supports the alliance. In that case, "the donor of aid tends to become in some degree the client."[4]

It would seem that the smaller ally could, by his own volition, initiate tactics of unreliability and/or contribution towards the alliance. The extreme recourse of the unreliable ally is to threaten a pre-emptive attack, either for bargaining purposes to obtain aid in other alliance matters, or as an end in itself. Yet, the "trigger" is an ambiguous and extremely risky policy for the small state and is in practice rarely invoked explicitly. The reliable and contributing ally, on the other hand, plays for lower stakes, but specific contributions can yield substantial rewards (e.g., American compensations to smaller Asian allies in return for their dispatch of troops to Vietnam). It has been argued that a weak nation which originally contributed a uniquely valuable asset to the alliance gains "a status completely out of keeping with the actual distribution of material power."[5] Such assets are not necessarily analogous to a bank account that yields continuous and generous interest rates. If the contribution was part of the initial transaction of establishing the alliance, it has already been rewarded; it can be used to obtain further specific support only if it can be credibly withdrawn. Unique assets tend to be real estate (which is not easily replaced); withdrawal would mean at least a partial rejection of the alliance.[6] The risks and consequent limitations of this tactic are similar to those in the "trigger" role.

[4] Charles B. Marshall, "Alliances with Fledgling States," in Arnold Wolfers, ed., *Alliance Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore 1959), 221.

[5] Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice," in Wolfers (fn. 4), 190. Morgenthau specifically mentions Iceland's position in NATO. This seems an unfortunate example since Iceland does not have significant political standing in the alliance despite its contribution to NATO bases. On the contrary, Iceland is not represented on some of NATO's committees, and its government does not wish to alter this.

[6] A smaller ally may want to dissociate himself from the alliance to enhance his diplomatic flexibility or to accommodate the adversary. This is a different bargaining situation in that the rewards are not expected to come from the existing alliance.

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The smaller ally has other means of influencing the larger ally without running the risks inherent in policies leading to withdrawal from the alliance or conflict with the common adversary. One well-known tactic is to exploit internal dissent within the larger state. This requires some familiarity with the political processes of the larger power and a willingness to take the risk of associating oneself with the political fortunes of particular domestic factions in the larger state.[7] The risks and benefits of this option would seem to be incremental (e.g., more or less economic or military aid) rather than fundamental (e.g., maintaining or abrogating the alliance). But bargaining over such incremental changes is often the daily, important business of alliance partners. As will be seen from the case study, both North and South Korea have utilized this tactic, although for North Korea it was increasingly a question of responding to Sino-Soviet disagreement; it therefore constituted inter-allied rather than intra-ally dissent.

The smaller ally can also exercise some leverage on the larger ally when the latter has decided to reduce his commitment, yet wishes to retain the essence of the alliance. This is the opposite of the so-called "investment trap" which suggests that the larger power must make continuous commitments to protect its prior investment. The view that an original commitment carries its own momentum of ever-increasing involvement has been sharply criticized,[8] but this does not negate the difficulties of a partial disengagement. The "partial liquidation" mechanism encourages the smaller ally to press for maximum compensation in return for a reduced commitment from the more powerful government—unless, of course, the smaller partner wishes to terminate the alliance rather than accept its altered form.

Resisting intervention. The basic dilemma of the smaller ally is to obtain sufficient support without *undue* interference from the larger ally.[9] (Interference directed against local political rivals is usually welcomed.) The smaller government may accept a certain amount of control by the larger state in its domestic and foreign policy as an inevitable and legitimate price for support. If, on the other hand, it wishes to prevent certain forms of intervention, it can resist from positions of both strength and weakness.

[7] Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy*, No. 2 (1971), stresses the rewards of this tactic.

[8] Daniel Ellsberg, *Papers on the War* (New York 1972), 42-131.

[9] "Interference" and "intervention" are here used interchangeably to mean an act aimed at the political structure of the target nation, and one which departs from the existing policy of the intervening nation. Cf. James N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXII, No. 2 (1968).

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To assume a position of strength, the smaller partner must maintain internal order, fulfill alliance obligations, and isolate domestic conditions from the external functions of the alliance. This requires above all a united body politic in which competing domestic factions, potentially vying for allied support, are kept weak and inarticulate. The smaller state's vulnerability to allied control is further reduced by diversification of its foreign economic and diplomatic relations. To attain a position of strength, then, is essentially a matter of long-term policy. To demonstrate its weakness, on the other hand, the government can argue that it is simply too frail to absorb allied demands and control. For instance, allied suggestions for domestic reforms can be countered with the argument that the government is too weak to initiate change, that this might endanger the existing regime, cause instability and chaos, and eventually weaken the united front against the common adversary. These risks of intervention are inherent in the situation in the same way that support for a weak ally is an implicit function of an unequal alliance; they therefore lend themselves to manipulation by the smaller partner. There are, however, two major provisos to this option. The weak government must be sufficiently loyal to the alliance to raise the costs of its own expendability. Second, it must be strong enough to control competing domestic factions so that the larger ally cannot easily, and with reasonable certainty of the consequences, intervene to replace the existing regime.

The mistrust factor. Unequal alliances are generally marked by an atmosphere of mutual mistrust that is created by the differences in the foreign policy perspectives of the small and the large allies.[10] For the small state, the alliance is a major foreign policy concern among relatively few. The larger state will judge it in relation to a number of commitments and interests. Essentially, the small state fears that it may be expendable—which to the larger state would mean the loss of an ally, but which to the smaller government would be a national defeat. The mistrust factor assumes a definite shape when competing alliance systems are superimposed on a regional conflict where two smaller adversaries face each other against the backdrop of large-power support. Major changes in the local balance of power tend to activate latent mistrust as the larger and the smaller allies struggle to fit the new

[10] This is stressed by most students of small states: Robert Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York 1968), 26, 61; Anette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States* (Chicago 1959), 181; David Vital, *The Inequality of States* (London 1967), 29-30; Anders Sjaastad, *Smaastater i Studiet av Internasjonal Politikk* (Oslo 1970), 35-36; Erling Bjöl, "The Power of the Weak," *Cooperation and Conflict*, No. 3 (1968), 159.

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developments into their different foreign policy perspectives. Changes in relations among the large powers that point to détente and improved understanding will also increase the smaller ally's discomfort. The government of the weaker state is inclined to mistrust its larger ally for seeking an agreement with the other large power, in the belief that it may be at its own expense, or for trying to deal with the local adversary in an independent manner. There has recently been evidence of this in such diverse conflict centers as Vietnam, Korea, the Middle East, and Germany. The important question is how the mistrustful smaller government will respond. In the Korean case, mistrust of this kind had positive consequences by encouraging the smaller allies to explore the possibilities for rapprochement which already were suggested by the local balance of power.

II. The Two Koreas

Some general comments on the two alliance systems will serve to preface the detailed events discussed below.[11] The alliances of the two Korean states went through several phases, some of which coincided. Each was chagrined by the lack of large-power support for a forceful unification of Korea, but neither was able to change the determination of the United States, China, and the Soviet Union to accept the *status quo ante* in 1953. During the subsequent rehabilitation period, each of the two Koreas emphasized external aid and internal consolidation. The primary objective of the alliances, from their point of view, was to gain large-power support for their existence as separate and functioning governments. Each also hoped that by its alliance, it would prevent unification of Korea on the other's terms. Conversely, each government wanted allied support for unification precisely on its own terms; however, this became an increasingly unrealistic aim as the large powers consistently refused to make a decisive change in the status quo.

Both alliance systems were marked by a high degree of interdependence in the 1950's. This was partly a historical legacy from the Soviet-American division of Korea after World War II which created certain obligations on the part of the large powers to support what in effect were their own creations. The Korean War enhanced the symbolic value of the two Koreas to the United States and the Soviet Union, and brought in China as a new alliance partner. The actual expenditure in man-

[11] In addition to the sources cited, the case study of Korea is based on interviews with officials in the U.S. Department of State, scholars who recently visited North Korea, and South Korean scholars.

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power, equipment, and prestige during the war created additional ties which stressed the importance of the smaller allies to the larger powers. The smaller states, in turn, did not consider alternatives to the alliances—such as neutrality, non-alignment, or accommodation with the adversary—to be realistic options. The allies were tied up in a web of interdependence.

By the 1960's, each alliance started to follow a separate course. North Korea has had the dual advantage of being geographically close to its allies and, after 1958, of not being a host to foreign troops. This suggested a credible allied commitment during a severe conflict without conspicuous elements of control by the larger power in times of peace. The North increasingly stressed independent, nationalist policies toward its allies, but was anxious to retain verbal support and military-equipment aid. The corollary of this was an independently managed strategy to unify Korea, based on persistent propaganda, negotiation offers, and sporadic guerilla infiltration. Although formal defense treaties with the Soviet Union and China were signed in 1961, the alliance complex in the 1960's was marked by detachment, pluralism, and reciprocal efforts to avoid intimacy.

In the South, the Seoul government tended to reverse the policy priorities of Pyongyang. The South Korean political and bureaucratic apparatus had not been subject to the same degree of pervasive allied control which the DPRK had experienced under Soviet administration of the northern zone. Consequently, concern with large-power control and influence tended to take second place. The overriding aim of successive South Korean leaders was to maintain guarantees of security and support from the larger ally, as demonstrated by the continued presence of American troops. It is not difficult to explain this preoccupation of the South with security. In comparison with the North, the republic had a fragmented body politic, lagged behind the DPRK in economic growth for some time, feared that the United States was a distant and perhaps temporary ally, and was deeply disturbed by memories of what had followed the withdrawal of American troops in 1949. The South generally felt defensive vis-à-vis the North despite its population advantage of more than two to one. The government expanded economic and diplomatic relations with other nations in the 1960's, notably with Japan, but the alternatives to a close alliance with the United States seemed too painful to contemplate.

Obtaining support—South Korea. It has been argued that the outbreak of the Korean War was a successful trigger action by Syngman

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Rhee, but the events remain unclear.[12] A more conclusive study of the trigger tactic can be made by examining President Rhee's efforts to prevent an armistice in 1953.

This was certainly a desperate moment for Rhee. The immense wartime destruction of Korea had not brought his life-long goals of Korean independence and unification any closer. The armistice signalled an indefinite division of the country. The time seemed opportune for a catalytic action. The United States had a *de facto* commitment to the ROK by virtue of its physical participation in the hostilities and its wartime rhetoric. The domestic American debate on alternatives to a stalemate in Korea increasingly favored an armistice, but doubt and continued opposition remained in some circles. There was also a reservoir of American military power which could be tapped if political considerations permitted. Finally, there were American troops at the front line which lent some automaticity to a South Korean triggering action. The UN Commander in Chief, General Mark Clark, retrospectively summarized Rhee's options:

> Prior to the truce signing he could unilaterally release the Korean anti-Communist POW's (he did); he could offer a separate ROK proposal to the Communists (he did not); he might announce ROK refusal to comply with the provisions of the armistice if signed (he did); he might withdraw ROK forces from the UN command (he did not); he could sanction riots and demonstrations against the truce (he did); after the truce he might refuse to withdraw ROK troops from the Demilitarized Zone (he did not); he might refuse to permit Indian troops into Korea to implement the Armistice (he did); and he might initiate an attack upon the enemy in violation of the truce (which at this writing [1954] he has not done but which he still has the capability of doing).[13]

Rhee's most dramatic option was to remove ROK troops from the UN command. This might invite a communist attack on the weakened line, or, if ROK troops were used for unauthorized offensive operations, would provoke communist retaliation. The armistice would be postponed (or violated if already signed), involving the possibility that American troops would be engaged. On the other hand, offensive operations by the ROK forces alone would be suicidal, and the United

[12] This view is elaborated in Jan Lönn, *Nordkorea. Mot välfärd under krigshot* (Stockholm 1972). Rhee's reputation for unreliability was punished rather than rewarded in the years preceding the Korean War. Rhee's insistent threats of "marching north" made the United States hesitant to build up ROK armed forces for fear of a pre-emptive attack on the North. Army levels were envisaged as only 65,000 men, one-tenth of the present strength. Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968), 149.

[13] Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York 1954), 16; parentheses in original.

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States might well refuse to continue extensive operations in the Korean peninsula. The situation was ambiguous; Rhee just might take the chance. He had repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to act unilaterally, including his release of the POW's, and General Clark took Rhee's threats seriously enough to warn the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Rhee's threats failed to achieve his maximum objectives—unification of Korea, immediate removal of Chinese troops from the North, and conclusion of a defense pact with the United States *before* the armistice. The Eisenhower Administration declared that these items were not negotiable. It is possible, however, that Rhee increasingly focused on lesser objectives, and that his triggering tactics should be seen as a salvage operation to make the best of an undesirable but inevitable armistice. This has been suggested by several observers, who also conclude that the settlement concerning American postwar aid to South Korea was largely determined by Rhee's successful bargaining, including his virtuoso performance in the role of the unreliable ally.[14] A closer examination suggests that Rhee's posture was more visible than effective at the time of the negotiations. His unilateral release of the POW's, for instance, while intended to embarrass the United States, was actually welcomed in some Administration circles as a move to embarrass the communists without endangering the armistice talks.[15] More fundamentally, the settlement was largely a gratuity extended by the larger ally. It flowed from the Administration's perceptions of American strategy and interests in the Far East, and Rhee's exertions to influence these perceptions seem to have had only marginal importance.

Negotiations between the United States and South Korea on postwar aid were largely concluded in a period of four months before the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. The United States promised the ROK a mutual defense pact, a three-year economic aid program estimated at one billion dollars, military aid to build up the ROK army to twenty divisions, and a pledge of UN assistance in the event of renewed aggression. It is important to note that American officials, and not Rhee, took the initiative in formulating the terms of compensatory support to the ROK. These proposals were not substantially modified in the course of negotiations.[16] The proposals seemed logical and rea-

[14] David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York 1964), 424-28; Robert J. Donovan, *Eisenhower: The Inside Story* (New York 1956), 121.

[15] Washington officially disavowed itself from Rhee's action, but news of the release was favorably received in some quarters. General Clark had earlier suggested similar steps, and the Administration had during the previous summer authorized the release of 27,000 POW's, reclassified as civilians. Clark (fn. 13), 72-75.

[16] The economic aid program grew out of a study commissioned by President Eisenhower in April 1953, which suggested a three-year program of one billion dollars. Early

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sonable to Washington for several reasons regardless of Rhee's actions. The armistice was not expected to solve the Korean problem in any fundamental way. A strategy of bargaining from military strength had been vindicated, it was believed, in that threats of widening the war had made the communists accept a cease-fire. Consequently, the truce must be buttressed by various forms of military and political power. The specific measures contemplated in Washington carried forward existing efforts to strengthen South Korea's economic and military capacity, conformed to American policy in other Asian countries, and derived from the evolving New Look strategy of the Eisenhower Administration. The New Look presumed increased reliance on America's nuclear deterrence and mobile conventional forces; weaker allies would be assisted to build up manpower requirements for defense; and mutual security pacts were to link these elements together. The proposed treaty with South Korea had been preceded by the ANZUS Pact and the bilateral defense treaty with the Philippines, and was regarded as another step in the development of regional security arrangements in Asia.[17]

These broader considerations of American interests produced a set of specific proposals which were offered to Rhee. The structure of the situation—the mechanism of "partial liquidation," South Korea's weakness, and the unresolved problems left by the truce—practically insured that South Korea would receive significant support. It is, of course, correct that American officials believed the proposals would placate Rhee and induce him to accept the armistice. But Rhee's *continued* objections did not significantly affect the terms of the American proposals.

Rhee's posture of unreliability nevertheless had consequences—some negative, some ambiguous, and some that were probably of long-term value to his leadership. First, it raised his domestic stature. Second, in relation to the United States, Rhee assumed an almost larger-than-life image of a man who would not yield easily; a man who finally but reluctantly had given in to U.S. pressures and was thereby forced to com-

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in April, General Clark was authorized to expand ROK armed forces to twenty divisions on the grounds that augmentations should take place before the conclusion of an armistice which might formally freeze existing force levels (as it did). General Clark had taken the initiative to request such authorization. A bilateral security pact was initially suggested by Generals Clark and Herren and conveyed to Washington the same month. Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington, D.C. 1966), 436-59.

[17] *Executive Report*, No. 1, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 83rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C. 1954).

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promise his life-long aspirations for unification and a perpetual fight against communism. This psychological offensive tended to place the United States in the position of owing something to Rhee, rather than vice-versa. It earned him considerable sympathy in conservative American circles and grudging respect in others.

Another main consequence of Rhee's unreliability was the Administration's increased desire to control the smaller ally's freedom of action. The Mutual Defense Treaty limited the scope of allied obligations, precluding American support for ROK operations across the DMZ.[18] ROK forces remained under UN/U.S. operational control. The control features may have offended Korean nationalist sentiments, but it is questionable whether they decisively influenced domestic developments or the foreign policy of South Korea. (UN/U.S. control did not prevent the army from overthrowing the constitutional government in 1961. The coup group ignored American protests and simply withdrew ROK army units from allied command.) In foreign affairs, Rhee continued to suggest a forceful unification of Korea, but his capacity to pursue this policy was limited by considerations other than allied control and objections. The strategy had failed once, and at a tremendous cost which left the country with pressing problems of political consolidation and economic rehabilitation. The ROK army was still quite weak in Rhee's time, and the chance of obtaining allied military assistance in a triggering action waned as the large powers developed a mutual understanding on the desirability of maintaining the status quo. The Park government (1961-), to a greater extent than Rhee, sought to base its domestic legitimacy on economic development rather than on the political goals of unification. The armed forces of the South were greatly strengthened in the 1960's, but elaborate defense structures on both sides of the DMZ made a conventional attack by either party appear very costly. Infiltration on a smaller scale, of the type pursued by the North, was a more feasible alternative for the South, and in this respect allied control may have been a restraining factor.

Although President Rhee's ability to extract support from the Eisenhower Administration was dwarfed by the influence exercised by the United States in determining the armistice settlement, a comparison between Rhee and later South Korean leaders casts a different light on Rhee. From this perspective, the aging President has usually been portrayed as a skillful manipulator; his successors never quite measured up to him. They never commanded the following in the United States

[18] Similar clauses were attached to the defense treaty with Taiwan, but were not included in the ANZUS Pact and the treaty with the Philippines.

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that Rhee had in his time, but neither did they have starting points that were as favorable in terms of the structure of the bargaining situation. The negotiations between the Nixon Administration and President Park Chung Hee in 1970–71 are similar enough to the earlier ones to pursue this comparison.

The Nixon Administration had decided to reduce authorized American troop strength in South Korea from approximately 60,000 to 40,000 men. President Park strongly objected, but he was in a poor position to resist. South Korea's actual strides towards economic and military strength had already led to major reductions in American aid.[19] Moreover, the Nixon Administration did not view the remaining U.S. forces in South Korea primarily as a deterrent, but as a source for bargaining with the DPRK and its allies to further reduce tension in the peninsula. The mechanism of "partial liquidation" and the argument of weakness had consequently lost some of their previous force. From the American point of view, South Korea had gained strength, and the conflict situation had progressively stabilized in the seventeen years following the armistice. What could President Park have done to convince the United States that troop reductions would be de-stabilizing and that South Korea would require a huge aid program to keep the republic and the alliance afloat? Threats to withdraw from the alliance would have been utterly incredible. He could conceivably have maximized his nuisance value by threatening a pre-emptive attack, staging public demonstrations, and withdrawing ROK troops from Vietnam. On the other hand, a triggering tactic would not have been very credible in view of Park's earlier attitude towards forceful unification and the stabilization of large-power involvement in Korea. Unreliability might, in fact, hasten rather than prevent American withdrawal.[20] Possibly for these reasons, Park did not demonstrate his intransigence as forcefully as Rhee had done. In all other respects, the negotiations for a compensatory settlement followed the pattern of the 1953 talks.

President Park cultivated an image of reliability rather than unre-

[19] For figures on American economic and military assistance to the Republic of Korea from 1949 to 1970, see *Hearings, American-Korean Relations*, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 92nd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C. 1971), 15-16.

[20] The Nixon Administration did not entirely discount the possibility that South Korea might exploit a border incident for the purpose of preventing American troop reductions. Although the reductions were announced in advance of the talks as a non-negotiable item, American officials patiently discussed the matter with President Park for seven months. Partly as a precautionary move, the remaining U.S. forces were moved down from the DMZ so as to prevent any "automatic" involvement in a conflict.

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liability towards the United States. This was handsomely rewarded in a particular bargaining situation when South Korea had an opportunity to contribute in an area considered more important by the larger ally than by the smaller ally. President Park's skillful handling of Korea's contribution to Vietnam earned him a favorable domestic reputation for striking a good bargain with the United States.[21] In return for sending troops to Vietnam, the Seoul government received financial and military assistance from the United States beyond the regular aid program. Two aspects of the "contributing role" should be noted, however. The opportunities to render special contributions are relatively rare, and rewards tend to be tailored to the specific contribution. There was no apparent spillover effect in other areas of inter-allied bargaining, such as the reduction of U.S. forces in South Korea.

Resisting intervention—South Korea. As he aged, President Rhee became increasingly worried that his political rivals would seek American aid in trying to oust him. He feared that Korea was in danger of losing its independence to the Americans as well as to the communists.[22] In theory, the United States had an opportunity to intervene discreetly. The local opposition party (the Democrats) had by the mid-1950's grown into a formidable political force, and open American support for the Democrats might have undermined Rhee's power. South Korea's extreme dependence on American aid also gave the United States some leverage to institute reforms. Motives for intervention were not lacking: Critics in the United States and abroad argued that political suppression and economic corruption under Rhee made nonsense of the democratic pretensions of the alliance, impaired the chances of a successful holding operation in the South in the long run—not to mention an eventual unification of Korea on terms favorable to the allies—and wasted economic aid.[23] In practice, however, the Eisenhower Administration never seriously interfered to effect local reforms. Direct intervention—always fraught with difficulties and open

[21] Kim Se-Jin, "Korea's Involvement in Vietnam and its Political and Economic Impact," *Asian Survey*, x (June 1970). Details of the bargain are revealed in *Hearings, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad*, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 91st Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C. 1970), 1539-49.

[22] Joungwon Alexander Kim, "A Comparative Study of the Role of a Leader in Political Development: Syngman Rhee in South Korea and Kim Il-song in North Korea," unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Johns Hopkins University 1967), 469-74. Rhee recalled that towards the end of the Yi dynasty, competing internal factions had sought external aid and thereby contributed to the loss of Korean sovereignty.

[23] Most of the criticism and suggestions for reform were presented in the so-called Conlon report. *United States Foreign Policy. Asia*, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C. 1959).

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to criticism—seemed of questionable value in the case of Syngman Rhee's Korea. It was feared that reductions of aid would merely aggravate economic and political instability, while the manipulation of local political forces might invite chaos and expose the South to communism. The weaknesses of South Korea's economic and political life favored non-intervention. Moreover, the main threat to South Korea in the short run was external rather than internal, which made it easier to focus on purely external aspects of the alliance. Despite his unreliability, Rhee could be counted on to resist communism.

The Eisenhower Administration's perceptions of allied interdependence clearly worked in Rhee's favor, but his own contributions to a non-intervention policy should not be underestimated. Rhee simply refused to discuss any reforms. He ignored American economic experts, froze out one zealous U.S. Ambassador, put the American Embassy in Seoul under police surveillance to track down contacts with the opposition party, and used the South Korean Embassy in Washington to plead his cause to pressure groups and mass media. Rhee's earlier investment in a reputation for intransigence paid off; few American officials in South Korea regarded his nuisance measures lightly. On the contrary, it was concluded that even limited pressures (e.g., reduction in aid) would not make him yield. Reforms could be instituted only if Rhee were removed, and this was considered counterproductive to efforts to strengthen South Korea. It was also certain to raise an outcry by those groups in the United States which regarded Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek as positive symbols in America's Far Eastern policy.

By exercising his limited strength, the smaller ally raised the costs of intervention. The United States had a choice of intervening drastically or not at all, and the Eisenhower Administration was firmly resolve against the former option.[24] Non-intervention in this case was not entirely a gratuity willingly extended by the large power, nor was it fundamentally a result of the smaller state's ability to tyrannize the alliance. It was a unique combination which disappeared with Rhee's downfall in the spring of 1960 and the end of the Eisenhower Administration a few months later.

Rhee's successors were more willing to discuss domestic politics with American officials. This enabled the United States to exert indirect influence without raising the specter of open intervention. Nevertheless, it demonstrated its readiness to intervene at the time of General Park

[24] The Eisenhower Administration did, however, express its sympathy with the violent student uprising against Rhee in April 1960, and thereby possibly influenced Rhee's decision to step down.

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Chung Hee's coup. The Chang government (1960-1961) had worked closely with the United States in instituting economic reforms and restoring civil and political rights; it had seemed a welcome relief from the difficulties of the Rhee era. This, at least, was the opinion of embassy officials who issued a strong protest note to the group which felled the Chang government in May 1961. President Kennedy initially hesitated before pursuing this policy. The Bay of Pigs fiasco was still a fresh memory and a protest note might touch off another ill-fated intervention. In the end, the Kennedy Administration declared that recognition of Park's regime and continued aid were conditional upon a promise to return the country to an elected, civilian government.[25]

It was a relatively easy intervention with limited effects. Park Chung Hee was reluctant to resist American demands while still consolidating the coup. He promised to reintroduce the National Assembly and subsequently won the presidential elections in civilian clothes. The Kennedy Administration was in a fairly good position to press its demands. The fear of imminent chaos following a change of regime in South Korea, which had prevailed under the Eisenhower Administration, had been somewhat dispelled by the successful transition from Rhee to an interim government and then to Chang. Charges of interventionism could be countered by arguments that the coup was unconstitutional. Intervention carried few risks and some benefits to an administration attempting to displace the Dulles-Eisenhower image of supporting anti-communist dictators.

Bargaining for support and resisting intervention—North Korea.[26] In the case of North Korea, control and support from the larger ally were inextricably connected during the period of its virtual integration in the Soviet socialist system after its formal independence in 1948. With the removal of Soviet troops in 1948, Soviet control and support flowed through the party and the bureaucracy in Pyongyang where "Soviet-Koreans" (Soviet-supported officials) held key posts. Obtaining support in what might properly be called alliance matters—security guarantees, economic and military aid—was thus linked with the internal political issues and party processes in North Korea to a much larger extent than

[25] Henderson (fn. 12), 186. One source maintains that the UN/U.S. commander in South Korea, General Magruder, had prepared a contingency plan to use ROK forces against a coup. Kim Se-Jin, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill 1971), 77-125. This is denied by American officials who were with the Seoul embassy at the time. They note, moreover, that Pentagon spokesmen were less critical of the coup leaders than were State Department officials.

[26] The section on North Korea is rather inconclusive due to the scarcity of information and the welter of different interpretations by various observers.

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was the case in the South. Kim Il Sung's efforts to separate control from support were, in effect, attempts to divorce domestic politics from foreign policy; they also coincided with his desire to remove competing factions and consolidate his own position in the party. By the second half of the 1950's, Kim had achieved considerable success in both fields. North Korea's relations with her allies had moved closer to "the traditional alliance patterns . . . in a nation-state system,"[27] and Kim had emerged as the major leadership figure.

Most North Koreans resented the limited assistance given by the Soviet Union during the war. Their sense of betrayal was heightened when, in June 1951, the Soviet Ambassador to the UN expressed his interest in an armistice. Kim Il Sung, then leading one of several competing factions in the Korean Workers' Party, reacted by turning this resentment against the Soviet-supported factions in the top echelons of the party. Many of these were Koreans holding Soviet citizenship and membership in the CPSU. In November 1951, the most prominent Soviet-Korean, Ho Kai Ui, was criticized and demoted from his position as Vice Chairman of the party. The Soviet Union had little choice but to accept these developments. Protests would alienate ascendant factions further, while a reduction in military-equipment aid or economic assistance might jeopardize the war effort. Moreover, by then China had troops in North Korea and represented a competitive source of support and influence.[28]

The difference between South Korean and North Korean reactions to allied "betrayal" during the war was partly determined by the different structures of large-power support and control. Both of the smaller allies utilized local resentment against the armistice as a leverage to influence the policy of their larger partners. While Rhee sought to extort further support in pursuit of the war, Kim took the opportunity to curb the pervasive controls exercised by the larger ally in his own country. Both men were probably regarded as "unreliable" by the larger ally, but Kim was in no position to pursue catalytic options on the battlefield. There were no Soviet troops in the North, and the Chinese had already intervened on a significant scale. Moreover, a bid for increased large-power involvement in the war would strengthen the case for direct control by the larger allies in the DPRK. This was precisely what Kim Il Sung was trying to prevent. In addition to reducing the legacy of the Soviet occupation after World War II, Kim's

[27] Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean People's Democratic Republic* (Stanford 1966), 41.

[28] Joungwon Alexander Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," *World Politics*, XXII (January 1970), 242-44.

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faction had forestalled a possible Chinese drive for control at the end of 1950. A prominent Yenan-Korean, a military commander who was a veteran of the Long March in China, was expelled from the Korean Workers' Party just before China moved her "volunteers" into North Korea.[29]

Party politics in the DPRK continued to provide an arena for attempts by the larger allies to exercise control, and for Kim's efforts to resist. The "classic" example occurred in 1956, when Kim's domestic opponents—both the Soviet-supported Koreans and the Chinese-supported Yenan faction—seized upon Soviet criticism of Kim's economic policies and his refusal to heed the doctrine of "collective leadership" with the aim of forcing Kim's resignation. By this time, however, Kim had built up a considerable domestic following because of his agricultural reorganization program and the concomitant changes in the local government structure. The new cadres owed their position to Kim, and he used their support to out-flank and out-vote his adversaries in the party. A joint delegation of high-ranking Chinese and Soviet officials traveled to Pyongyang, apparently with the aim to persuade Kim not to expel the leaders of the opposition factions; in a spirit of compromise, Kim apparently agreed. But his adversaries gradually disappeared over the next two years, whatever Soviet or Chinese protests there may have been.[30]

These events show that—regardless of actual Sino-Soviet intentions to interfere—Kim had raised the threshold for intervention through his own domestic strength and political skills. Unlike Rhee, who posed an obstacle to interference by making the Eisenhower Administration choose *which leaders* to support, Kim increased the costs of intervention by making it necessary to employ *non-political* means in order to replace him. And, unlike Rhee, Kim successfully exploited cautious large-power attempts to intervene. The personal fears of foreign domination which beset Rhee toward the end of his regime were turned into a national ideology in North Korea, capsuled in the slogan *chuch'e* (self-determination or nationalism). Factionalism and large-power intervention were, with some justification, portrayed as cause and effect, and as a traditional Korean disease which inevitably led to loss of in-

[29] Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and Sino-Soviet Behavior," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Communist Strategies in Asia* (New York 1963).

[30] The account of the Sino-Soviet mission to Pyongyang is based on the report of a North Korean defector. Paige (fn. 29), 239, accepts it as factual. Two South Korean observers express some skepticism: Kim (fn. 28), 248—although he confirms the visit in some detail in his dissertation (fn. 22), 530; and Byung Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy of North Korea* (New York 1969), 15.

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dependence. *Chuch'e* thus served to legitimize Kim's centralized exercise of power at home and his independent policy toward North Korea's allies in the following years. The result was a dual protection against future interference; allied support to competing factions would have to be more conspicuous than in 1956 in order to establish control, but this would conflict with the growing acceptance of *chuch'e*.

Kim further sought to prevent external control by reducing the need for allied support. Successful implementation of the Three-Year Plan (1954–1956) and the Five-Year Plan (1957–1961) made North Korea more independent of allied aid and trade. By 1960, general state revenues from foreign aid were estimated to be a mere 2.6 per cent, in contrast to 33.4 per cent in 1954.[31] As the DPRK became increasingly self-reliant, only drastic economic sanctions by the larger allies—such as termination of Soviet oil supplies or Chinese coking coal—would be possible tools of political persuasion. But such measures might ultimately be self-defeating by risking the viability of the communist regime itself, as Glenn Paige maintains.[32] As in the case of South Korea, the capability of the large powers to intervene in the internal affairs of their smaller partner was limited by their interdependence.

The notion of interdependence was undoubtedly an important factor behind the generous aid extended to North Korea. It has been estimated that per capita foreign aid to the DPRK from 1953 to 1961 approximately equalled that received by the ROK.[33] It seems reasonable to believe that similar negotiation patterns prevailed. Initial pledges of aid were linked to North Korea's acceptance of the armistice in 1953.[34] More fundamentally, China and the Soviet Union probably regarded aid to the war-devastated country as a legitimate obligation which furthered their own interests. North Korea was a socialist outpost against encroaching hostile forces; it had contiguous borders with both China and the Soviet Union; its political system was an administrative offspring of the Soviet Union; and historical ties with Korea preceded the involvement of both powers in the most recent war (both China and Russia had lost out to Japan in the competition for influence in Korea at the turn of the century). This suggests that at least the principle of allied support to North Korea was in the nature of a gratuity, although

[31] American University, Foreign Area Studies, *Area Handbook for North Korea* (Washington, D.C. 1969), 386.

[32] Paige (fn. 27), 242-43.

[33] Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., *North Korea Today* (New York 1965), 61.

[34] Soon Sung Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies 1950–1965," *World Politics*, XIX (January 1967), 222.

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specific items were obviously open to bargaining. When Kim's leadership was challenged in 1956, for instance, Kim himself was in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to negotiate aid for the Five-Year Plan.

Kim's ability to attract allied support and curtail interference was complicated and not necessarily enhanced by the Sino-Soviet split. On the one hand, it would seem that the smaller ally could judiciously distribute its verbal support to the contending parties according to its need for rewards, while competition between the large powers could be exploited to prevent either ally from exerting undue influence. On the other hand, disagreement between the larger allies might weaken the united front against the common adversary, and there was always the risk that support for one ally would be punished by the other. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data to demonstrate the effects of the latent Sino-Soviet rivalry in the early 1950's with respect to North Korea's bargaining power. More data are available concerning events after the split deepened in the early 1960's; they indicate that Sino-Soviet differences were a mixed blessing for the smaller ally.

North Korea initially stayed aloof from the disagreement. This produced no major alteration in the pattern of Soviet and Chinese support. Both countries signed formal defense alliances with the DPRK in 1961. The previous year, both allies had agreed to aid with North Korea's forthcoming Seven-Year Plan, as they had done with previous plans. The initial Soviet pledge was somewhat lower than earlier commitments, conforming to the steady downward trend in aid from the immediate postwar rehabilitation program. China's contribution, equivalent to 105 million dollars, was the largest loan offered to the DPRK in the postwar period, but the terms had shifted from earlier *grants* (in goods) to *loans*.[35]

Between 1962 and 1964, the DPRK openly sided with China. North Korean relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated *pari passu* with the development of Soviet "revisionism" as evidenced in Soviet behavior in the Sino-Indian war, Khrushchev's retreat in the Cuban missile crisis, and the growing Soviet-American détente. China's uncompromising attitude was, at the time, considered more in harmony with Pyongyang's assessments of an inevitable struggle with the American-led forces. The consequences of taking sides in inter-allied disputes, regardless of North Korean motives for doing so, were sobering. The Soviet Union responded by terminating almost all economic and military aid to the DPRK. This, along with inadequate

[35] Figures are based on American University (fn. 31), 367-70; Koh (fn. 30), 60; and Philippe Richer, *Chine et le tiers monde* (Paris 1971), 362-68.

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Chinese compensations, led the North Korean leadership to question the wisdom of its policy. Implementation of the Seven-Year Plan had slowed down. The new military program of intensified guerilla activities against the South had met with difficulties. Pyongyang showed fears of becoming isolated in the communist world and started to consider a return to its previous policy of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet split. By 1965, the Soviet Union was also ready to resume cordial relations. Khrushchev's successors had concluded that the escalation of the war in Vietnam and the persistent Sino-Soviet disagreement required moves to restore Soviet credibility in Asia. Kosygin visited both Hanoi and Pyongyang in February 1965 and agreed to supply modern military equipment. The DPRK and the Soviet Union further announced that economic and cultural exchanges between the two countries would be increased.

The Sino-Soviet split, in sum, made it possible for North Korea to draw support from both of the larger powers as long as it did not take a firm stand with one of them against the other. It secured a minimum of support from both allies, and provided the opportunity to reverse course and zigzag between the two larger powers (as North Korea has done since 1965). Nevertheless, the Sino-Soviet disagreement offered Kim limited possibilities to bargain for maximum support: he was, in a sense, given room to maneuver mainly at his own expense.

The Soviet decision, between 1962 and 1964, to withhold all aid to North Korea except for a few technical-assistance projects, points to certain conditions which favor limited sanctions within the alliance. Although the larger power's readiness to intervene is ultimately circumscribed by its own need for the smaller ally, it may conclude that the smaller partner is sufficiently strong to absorb sanctions without jeopardizing the alliance: They will not imperil the smaller state's existence, but may still have some punitive or corrective effects. North Korea's rapid economic development may thus have facilitated the imposition of Soviet sanctions. By the same token, the Kennedy Administration had threatened to cut off foreign aid to the newly established government of General Park which represented an economically stronger South Korea than did that of Syngman Rhee.

The mistrust factor. The persistent stalemate in the Korean conflict was a testimony to the relative security enjoyed by the two Koreas. In the late 1960's, the status quo was increasingly secured by the local balance of forces as the two sides achieved a rough parity in their military capabilities. Both depended on their larger allies for supplies and re-

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inforcements, but the alliance acquired a political rather than a direct military function in support of the status quo. It may seem paradoxical that this was precisely the time when the smaller allies showed a growing mistrust of their larger partners. Each of the Korean governments was anxious on two accounts. First, each feared that the other might provoke a conflict in pursuit of unification, and doubted whether the larger ally would give adequate aid to maintaining the status quo. Second, in each case the smaller ally feared that the larger powers would agree among themselves to impose "a final settlement" on Korea. These fears were not new. They had been a regular feature of the alliances since the Korean War. The North Koreans remembered that China had not regarded the crossing of the 38th parallel by the UN forces as a *casus belli*, and that the Soviet Union had given only limited assistance to the war effort. Both Koreas had been reluctantly persuaded by the larger powers to accept the armistice settlement in 1953. In the 1960's, these memories were revitalized by several developments. The smaller allies were becoming stronger, the tension on the peninsula seemed stabilized, and the larger powers improved their own mutual understanding. From the point of view of the larger powers, the situation suggested a relaxation of the alliance systems. The smaller allies, however, were inclined to focus on other trends which cast some doubt on these developments. They were reluctant to dismiss this margin of doubt which—from their perspective—might mean the difference between national survival and defeat.

President Park Chung Hee hesitated to place his full confidence in the significant economic development of South Korea in the 1960's and the concomitant strengthening of the armed forces. When the United States announced partial troop withdrawals in July 1970, it was implored by the weaker ally not to overestimate the strength of South Korea. The stabilization of tension on the peninsula was far from complete: As recently as 1966–67 the North Koreans had reached a new pitch in their guerilla campaign against the South. It was feared that the troop reductions signalled a full military disengagement which would be hardened by the geographical distance between the United States and Korea as time went by.

In the North, Kim Il Sung's *chuch'e* policy was both a cause and an effect of allied mistrust. North Korea's independently managed politico-military strategy against the South was designed to reduce the need for direct large-power support and prevent a recurrence of such pervasive allied controls as had existed before 1950. Although this policy was a deliberate trade-off between degrees of independence and allied

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support, it served to create further mistrust in the alliance system. In order to dissociate themselves from a conflict provoked by "adventurist" North Korean policies, Moscow and Peking occasionally declared that their defense treaties with the DPRK only applied to an attack upon the North. The Soviet Union did not show much support for its erstwhile ally during the *Pueblo* incident or later, when North Korea shot down an American reconnaissance plane. These attitudes were hardly calculated to inspire confidence in Pyongyang at a time when North Vietnam was being heavily bombed (as North Korea had been), when South Korean troops gained combat experience in South Vietnam, and when its own guerilla campaign against South Korea encountered difficulties.

Both Seoul and Pyongyang increasingly suspected that their larger allies would seek a fuller agreement concerning their policies toward Korea. The Soviet-American détente developed despite the Vietnam war. To this was added the Sino-American rapprochement at the beginning of the 1970's, and evidence of mutual large-power interests in controlling the Vietnam conflict. The larger allies had already reached some tacit understanding of their respective roles in Korea. It is questionable whether further cooperation would necessarily be detrimental to the smaller allies. In fact, it seems that Seoul and Pyongyang were not primarily worried about specific, undesirable consequences that might spring from a rapprochement among their larger allies;[36] rather, their fears focused on the general possibility that this might occur. The essence of their mistrust was uncertainty—uncertainty that they would be properly consulted and uncertainty that they could make their views prevail over those of the larger powers.

The smaller allies responded in two ways. First, they tried to cut across the alliances and deal independently with the large powers. South Korea relaxed trade regulations in 1970 to permit trade with "non-hostile communist countries" (i.e., the Soviet Union), and ROK spokesmen expressed moderate views on China at the meeting of the Asian and Pacific Council in June 1972. The DPRK has promoted trade and people-to-people exchanges with Japan since the mid-1960's; in 1972 it held out prospects for similar developments in relations with the United States. These moves constituted a mild form of accommodation intended to blunt the sharp edges of previous adversary relationships

[36] One possibility which undoubtedly worried Park's government was that further American troop reductions from the South would be negotiated among the United States, North Korea, and the latter's allies in a *quid pro quo* manner. Cf. Morton Abramowitz, *Moving the Glacier: The Two Koreas and the Powers* (London 1971), 21-22.

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and to prevent the other Korean government from monopolizing relations with a given large power on behalf of all of Korea.

Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung also started to explore opportunities for a mutual accommodation. In August 1971, less than a month after President Nixon announced his visit to Peking, the two governments declared themselves ready to begin talks on the unification of divided families. Secret political talks followed, which concluded in June 1972 with a virtual non-aggression pact and the establishment of regular machinery for continued bilateral talks between the two Korean governments. The détente was inspired in part by fear that the larger powers might conspire to seek a "final settlement" of the Korea question. In a pre-emptive move, the two smaller allies sought to reduce local tension and explore each other's views on coexistence. Mistrust of the large powers alone, however, was not sufficient to turn almost twenty years of local hostility into a cautious but promising détente. Internal developments in both North and South Korea had gradually produced a balance of political, economic, and military strength between the two states. Unification by force was an extremely costly option in view of the military strength of both North and South Korea. Unification was still a political imperative for the DPRK, but as the North Korean guerilla campaign failed to produce significant results, the remaining possibility seemed to lie in discussions with the established authorities in the South with the eventual aim of unification. The Seoul government, which in the past had rejected all offers of negotiations with the North as a Trojan horse for communist infiltration, was more confident of its own economic and political strength toward the end of the 1960's. The Republic of Korea, it was felt, might be able to hold its own during extended political contacts with the DPRK.[37] These conditions made it easier to respond to alliance developments by exploring a local settlement. Neither side showed unlimited confidence, however, and the early talks proceeded with some friction.

III. Conclusion

Stanley Hoffman once remarked that "the great power does not really have to ask whether it ought to mortgage its independence; the alliances it negotiates may well restrict its freedom of action but do not force it into dependence."[38] Once an alliance is established, however, the felt need to maintain and support the smaller ally restricts

[37] Astri Suhrke and Charles E. Morrison, "The Koreas: Bargaining from Balanced Strength," *World Today*, XXVIII (November 1972).

[38] Stanley Hoffman, *The State of War* (New York 1968), 138.

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the larger power in a sense which represents a "second-order dependence." This need will, of course, vary over time and from case to case; these variations constitute the changing basis of the smaller ally's bargaining power.

The Korean alliances were marked by a high, although declining, degree of interdependence which affected the large and the small ally in rather different ways. Due to the larger power's dependence on the alliance, the smaller ally was practically assured of significant material aid. Support was largely a gratuity extended by the large power according to its interpretation of alliance obligations and their relevance to overall strategy. The smaller state was relatively powerless to influence the level and composition of aid. Even vigorous bargaining and threats of drastic action did not seem to have much effect.[39] The smaller ally had limited ability to manipulate aid policies for the same reason that prompted the larger power to give aid—its dependence on the alliance. Extreme tactics which theoretically were available to the smaller state, such as triggering a conflict or seeking an accommodation with the adversary, were either risky, ambiguous, or self-defeating.

The larger power's tendency to intervene in the domestic affairs of the smaller state was influenced by its own dependence on the alliance (which suggested intervention) and the reliability of the smaller partner (which reduced the need for control). Within these limits, the smaller ally was in a relatively good position to resist attempts by the larger ally to interfere. He could, and did, raise the costs and risks of intervention to a point where the larger power was faced with a choice between intervening and endangering the alliance, or not intervening at all.

There were important structural differences between the two alliance systems. North Korea was geographically close to its allies, the South was not; North Korea had two allies while the South had one; and the two alliances had different ideological-administrative characteristics. This made Pyongyang and Seoul inclined to set different policy priorities with regard to relative independence versus relative security. Yet, it did not seem to affect the major sources of bargaining power which both of the smaller allies could exploit. The triangular shape of the Northern alliance made it possible for the DPRK to diversify channels of support and control, but open disagreement between China and the Soviet Union complicated its policies without yielding a clear,

[39] The smaller ally may have felt compelled to demonstrate its intransigence primarily for domestic reasons; we are here concerned with the results of, rather than the motives for, "unreliable" behavior.

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net advantage. It can further be argued that the North could more easily defy allied control because its strategic proximity to China and the Soviet Union made an allied security commitment credible regardless of North Korea's independent policies. However, North Korea's ability to reduce allied control must in large part be attributed to the successful mobilization of indigenous economic and political forces. North Korea's geographic position stimulated the search for an independent policy, but it certainly did not ensure its success.

Despite the peculiarity of the Korean scene, the concepts of bargaining tactics formulated in this case study seem applicable to any unequal alliance. For one thing, they make it possible to compare the behavior of two smaller states in somewhat different alliance systems. The three basic roles—the weak, the contributing, and the unreliable smaller ally—derive from the structure of interdependence in the alliance. Since interdependence is present to varying degrees in all alliances, the analysis could be extended *mutatis mutandis*. Initially, comparative studies might focus on alliance systems with similar patterns of interdependence. For instance, the ability of the Vietnamese governments to influence past and present peace agreements in Indochina would seem to be an interesting comparison. Analysis of another divided country—Germany—might highlight the significance of power differentials within the alliance in determining relative bargaining positions. It is useful, at this point, to summarize the main aspects of interdependence that affected the bargaining positions of the two Koreas. First, the country was divided by the large powers which bequeathed their respective administrative systems to the two states after World War II. Second, the moral and political obligation of the larger powers to protect their respective protégés was heightened by subsequent hostilities. The smaller allies acquired new symbolic and strategic value in the contest between the large powers. Third, the local balance of power appeared unequal for some time. This kept tension alive and reinforced the alliance systems. Fourth, the smaller states were not part of a regional subsystem of other small and medium-sized powers. This made the alliance systems more salient, but it also simplified transitions to new patterns of international relations in the area. Finally, the interlocking dependencies gradually eroded and gave way to new policies which cut across the previous alliance systems. Recent developments in Korea suggest that in the future the alliances themselves may be negotiable. This would create quite a different bargaining situation for the smaller states, not unlike that of the non-aligned nations. Whether or not this is more advantageous for the smaller states, however, remains a much-disputed question.

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ENDEMIC AND PLANNED CORRUPTION IN A MONARCHICAL REGIME

By JOHN WATERBURY*

> Recent experience in the so-called underdeveloped countries has most vividly brought home the fact that corruption is not a mass of incoherent phenomena, but a political system, capable of being steered with tolerable precision by those in power.
>
> —*J. J. Van Klaveren*[1]

> Even if the sovereign was willing to relax the links of personal dependence, he would never go so far as to renounce the riches which, in his view, are but a part of his own, just as their possessors are but a part of all those who belong to the dynasty: the possessor, in effect, acquired his riches thanks only to the dynasty and in the shadow of its authority.
>
> —*Ibn Khaldoun*[2]

CORRUPTION may be defined in a legal or normative sense, and in some societies the two definitions may be coincident. In the legal sense, corruption is self-regarding behavior on the part of public functionaries that directly violates legal restrictions on such behavior. Normatively, a public functionary may be considered corrupt whether or not a law is being violated in the process. A legally corrupt person may arouse no normative reprobation; a person judged corrupt by normative standards may be legally clean. What is common to both definitions is the notion of the abuse of public power and influence for private ends. It can safely be assumed that any society or political system manifests some level of one or the other, or both of these forms of corruption.

We may consider this level (while begging the question of how to measure it) as the amount of free-floating, endemic corruption in a system. In general, analysts of corruption have portrayed it as mostly unwanted (although sometimes convenient), and most often un-

* This study was stimulated by two periods of field research in Morocco. The first, from 1965 to 1968, resulted in my book, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study in Segmented Politics* (New York and London 1970). The second period, winter and spring 1970, was devoted to an interview-study of ninety high-ranking bureaucrats, in conjunction with a cross-national study of bureaucratic and political elite cultures under the supervision of S. J. Eldersveld of the Department of Political Science of the University of Michigan.

[1] From a "Comment," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, VI (January 1964), 195, as cited in J. S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (June 1967), 417.

[2] G.-A. Bousquet, *Ibn Khaldoun: les textes sociologiques et économiques de la Mouqaddima* (Paris 1965), 171.

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planned. It has been seen as a concomitant phenomenon accompanying the politico-administrative process, but only marginally instrumental in the maintenance and vitality of that process. The real or perceived saliency of corruption in the developing countries has generated some rethinking of the functions of corruption in both political and economic development. Again, because of the difficulty of measuring something that may be legally and morally condemned, we cannot be sure if the degree or level of corruption in various developing countries is really higher than in economically advanced nations. Perhaps, because in many developing countries cultural norms are more tolerant of corruption as legally defined, and because the laws themselves are so out of touch with cultural expectations and actual administrative practice, corrupt behavior, as judged by the outsider, is far more open than in advanced nations where such behavior is masked by legal subterfuge and the complexity of the deals.

Whatever the difficulties of measuring and comparing levels of corruption, the contemporary experience of the developing countries has provoked considerable speculation as to whether or not corruption may ultimately prove beneficial to economic growth and political development. Three authors, who will receive greater attention further on, have pointed out that corruption may promote national integration, capitalist efficiency, capital formation, administrative flexibility, and a shift toward popular democracy.[3] Those speculations must be tested against empiric evidence, and in this essay evidence will be drawn from contemporary Morocco.

Beyond that, the analysis will be carried a step further. Not only must we consider the possibility that corruption may have certain beneficial effects on the development process, but, however we appraise these effects, it may be that corruption is far more than an accompanying phenomenon of the political process. It may be seen as a planned, cultivated, and vital element in assuring the survival of a regime. As the case of Morocco would tend to demonstrate, corruption is not simply an aspect of politics but has displaced and dwarfed all other forms of politics.

Thus, in Morocco, free-floating corruption is manipulated, guided, planned, and desired by the regime itself. Although the terms may not

[3] Nye (fn. 1); Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption," *American Behavioral Scientist*, VIII (November 1964), 8-15; James C. Scott, "The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XI (June 1969), 315-41. I regret that in the preparation of this article I was unable to consult James Scott's recent *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1972).

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fit with precision, the Moroccan monarchy can be seen as a patrimonial regime with strong rationalizing tendencies. The elements of rationalization manifest themselves in at least two ways. First, the growing central bureaucracy is increasingly subject to rational criteria of organization, recruitment, and training. Bureaucrats, in terms of education, exposure to outside currents of thought, mental outlook, and career expectations, are *somewhat* removed from the traditionalistic, clientelistic, and particularistic ethos of the patrimonial regime.[4] Moroccan bureaucrats tend to identify with an exogenous cultural referent that leads them to condemn morally corrupt behavior which, for the rest of society, may be corrupt in the legal sense only. Second, although they condemn corrupt practices, a very substantial part (again the phenomenon defies precise measurement) of the bureaucrats are involved in them. But because of their outlook and their skills, they have brought about some rationalization of the system of patronage and of corruption itself. They are willing participants in a particular regime's system, and are in some ways its accomplices. Their participation has a price which comes in the form of illicit rewards. There is, then, a notion of contract at play here, one that is defined almost entirely in terms of participation on the one hand and payoffs on the other. This represents a straightforward, rational transaction.

The patrimonial aspects of the regime[5] are quite obvious and will be dealt with in detail further on. Suffice it to say for the moment that the monarchy underscores its supremacy within the system by constantly spawning new relations of dependency between itself and various sectors of the society. Dependency is maintained by manipulating access to various kinds of administrative prebends. These may, of course, be seen as part of the distribution system, but they are not subject to criteria of state planning, rational development priorities, or organizational performance. Instead, they are subject to bargaining, threats, influence-trading, and, above all, the judgment and sometimes the whim of the man who has his hand on the tap.

The fact that the Moroccan regime is a monarchy highlights the patrimonial characteristics of the regime, but guided or planned corruption need in no way be confined to monarchies. Keeping in mind that manipulation of a spoils system may be not only useful to a regime but crucial to its survival, we may refer to Ann Ruth Willner's portrayal of Sukarno.

[4] Cf. James Bill, "Modernization and Reform from Above: The Case of Iran," *Journal of Politics*, XXXII (February 1970), 19-40.

[5] See Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. by Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Ill. 1947), 313-29.

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> President Sukarno successfully assumed lifetime tenure, an impressive array of titles, and a style of life that included the entourage, regalia, and rituals customarily maintained by traditional Javanese monarchs. . . . Significantly, he did not maintain his position of supremacy by direct control of a tightly organized and disciplined political, bureaucratic, or military apparatus, commanding either overt or implicit instruments of coercive pressure at his direction. Rather, his strength derived from his adroit command of various strategies of manipulation, negotiation, and bargaining; from bestowal and withdrawal of approval; from appointments and emoluments, and from psychological exploitation of his knowledge of the probable responses of his chief lieutenants and subordinates, their lieutenants and subordinates, and other leaders and contenders for power and position.[6]

It may be that any head of state who wishes to remain in power indefinitely, i.e., permanently, is pushed towards the elaboration of a neo-feudal patronage system. In Mexico, the PRI has avoided one-man rule, but has nonetheless created the problem of the dynastic survival of what James Wilkie calls the "Revolutionary Family." Regime maintenance has come to be founded on an elaborate system of state patronage, the benefits of which are disbursed under the budget heading *erogaciones adicionales*; in any year these may account for 15-23 per cent of all budgeted expenditures.[7] It must be emphasized that the phenomenon under examination goes beyond mere pork-barrelism and is essential to the maintenance of the regime. In the context of United States politics, the closest analogies are to be found in the city-boss systems where, again, relations of dependency are created and maintained through the discriminatory use of the power and privileges of public office. The vote is simply a convenient way to reaffirm these ties and to measure their extent as well as their cost within the boss's arena.[8]

Characteristics of Endemic Corruption in Developing Countries

To reiterate an earlier point: Any political system, regardless of the nature of its regime, manifests some level of corruption; in turn, this may be incorporated into the lifeblood of those regimes that predicate their survival upon its use. It has already been intimated that corrup-

[6] Ann Ruth Willner, "Neotraditional Accommodation to Political Independence: The Case of Indonesia," in Lucian Pye, ed., *Cases in Comparative Politics: Asia* (Boston 1970), 249. Cf. Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton 1971), esp. 100-102. The systemic parallels between Morocco and Iran are extraordinarily, although not coincidentally, close.

[7] James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1967), 5-9.

[8] For a relevant analysis, see James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (December 1969), 1142-58.

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tion may best be seen as a variant of the broader phenomenon of patronage. Patronage is founded upon asymmetrical relations between a powerful person or group of persons and their clients, who seek protection, favors, and rewards from the patrons. At the same time, to an important extent the patron is powerful as a result of the size or nature of his clientele, and is able to protect and reward his supporters because he uses them to strengthen his hand in bargaining for scarce resources.[9] A patron, of course, need not be a public official; he can attract clientele on the basis of his wealth or his control of or access to scarce resources such as jobs, or land, or arms. However, when a patron occupies a public position or extracts favors from those in public positions, patronage and corruption overlap.[10]

In developing societies, which are characterized by material scarcity, both real and perceived, the asymmetry in relations between the powerful and the less powerful is particularly pronounced. Scarce resources are relatively more scarce, and the power derived from controlling them is more extensive and inescapable. The few resources at the disposal of the poor and the powerless can be easily lost or destroyed, and awareness of this fact heightens a general sense of vulnerability and potential disaster, and sets in motion myriads of clients in search of patrons. There is no real escape from the quest until and unless the contextual scarcity is overcome. Networks of dependency, or what Andreski more vividly calls "relations of parasitism," are continually regenerated: "Once a society is pervaded by parasitic exploitation, the

[9] For some excellent discussions of what has become the subject of a great deal of study among anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists, see Jeremy Boissevain, "Patronage in Sicily," *Man: Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, I (March 1966), 18-33; René Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," *Comparative Politics*, IV (January 1972), 149-78; Lemarchand, "Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-building," *American Political Science Review*, LXVI (March 1972), 68-90; Alex Weingrod, "Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, X (July 1969), 376-400; James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *American Political Science Review*, LXVI (March 1972), 91-113; Richard Sandbrook, "Patrons, Clients, and Factions: New Dimensions of Conflict Analysis in Africa," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, V (March 1972), 104-19.

[10] For a useful discussion of the overlap between patronage and corruption, see Edward Van Roy, "On the Theory of Corruption," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XIX (October 1970), 86-110. Scott calls attention to the same overlap when he proposes ". . . that corruption may be viewed as a process of political influence such that similar practices may violate community norms at one place and time and not at another" (fn. 3), 317. I do not concur in the relevance of the distinction between "patron," a person who controls resources, and "broker," a person who controls *access* to resources—a distinction made by both Scott (fn. 9), 96-98, and Lemarchand (fn. 9), throughout. It would seem to me unlikely that any given patron would fail to combine some aspects of both functions, and, after all, connections are resources, as is the number of clients.

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choice is only to skin or be skinned. A man may combine the two roles in varying measure but he cannot avoid them: he cannot follow Candide's example and till his garden, relying on hard work for his well-being, because he will not be left alone: the wielders of power will pounce upon him and seize the fruits and tools of his labour."[11]

It has often been observed that the search for protection from nature, violence, and the exactions of arbitrary and predatory governments was a constant theme of social life in so-called traditional societies. Although today the vagaries of nature and the extent of communal violence may be more subject to technological control than they were in the past, the application of technology has become a quasi-monopoly of new state systems. The poor of the Third World may have exchanged one kind of vulnerability for another. The introduction of Mexican wheat may lead to increased yields, but the peasant must somehow obtain credit from the state agricultural credit bank and hope for the best in a market pricing system partially or totally determined by the state. The need for intercessors, protectors, and patrons is no less great now than it was in the past. Moreover, the contemporary power and penetration of the modern state apparatus has in many instances been achieved without any modification of the degree of real or perceived material scarcity. Competition for privileged access to state services or relief from impositions has come to dominate political life; the scope for corrupt patronage has expanded with the state itself.[12]

It has frequently been the case that in polities where class structures range from fragile to nonexistent, access to political power has been the surest means to wealth (rather than the reverse which, according to Marx, was characteristic of the development of capitalist structures). The very notion of a prebend presupposes the use of office as a means to acquire property. In patrimonial and neo-patrimonial systems, passing on access to public office (if not the office itself) from generation to generation has been a more dominant and rational motive than

[11] Stanislav Andreski, *Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America* (New York 1969), 11; see also Lemarchand (fn. 9), 75, n. 27, citing Ronald Cohen; Scott (fn. 9), 101.

[12] Boissevain (fn. 9), develops this theme with reference to Sicily, suggesting that Catholicism, a saint-oriented religion, gives an other-worldly impetus to the quest for intercession. It may be that saints are part and parcel of belief systems emerging out of situations of real material scarcity. Islam, while hostile to saints, has been forced to tolerate saintly cults most everywhere it has spread. For more on the interrelation of scarcity, state power, and patronage, see Lemarchand and Legg (fn. 8); A. Vingradov and J. Waterbury, "Situations of Contested Legitimacy in Morocco: An Alternative Framework," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, XIII (January 1971), 32-59.

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acquiring wealth; in such systems, wealth has usually been subject to the destruction, confiscation, or other predatory actions of the state.

In the contemporary period that motive has been reinforced in many ways. Frequently the governments of the developing countries maintain arbitrary and predatory practices that involve the destruction of resources of real or imagined enemies. Moreover, the technological and administrative means to achieve these ends have been greatly expanded in the twentieth century. At the same time, relatively well-organized and penetrative state bureaucracies have come to intervene in and control large areas of the economic life of their societies. Not only do these bureaucracies regulate and sanction ever wider spheres of social and economic behavior, but they influence and determine the allocation of desired resources on a hitherto unprecedented scale. It is little wonder then that, for the ambitious, access to public power has become more than ever the key to material success as well as to the formation of clientelistic support.[13] For the average citizen, reaching some sort of *modus vivendi* with a state system that affects nearly all aspects of one's life has become a daily chore.

In brief, historical precedent and conditions, combined with the logic of contemporary bureaucratic expansion in the developing countries, have fostered the growth of extensive amounts of systemic corruption.

For the most part it is corruption in the legal sense only, for while the politics and abuses of patronage may be disliked by the masses, they are not regarded as illicit; in effect, they are seen as a fact of life that one cannot avoid and that had best be mastered. "Corruption," Huntington posits, "is behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends."[14] But self-regarding or client-regarding activities of public officials do not deviate from accepted norms. Something of the attitudinal ambivalence involved here is revealed by certain findings of a recent mass survey in India. Forty-two per cent of an urban and 48 per cent of a rural sample thought that the majority of civil servants was corrupt. At the same time, 76 and 89 per cent, respectively, of the same samples stated that they would prefer to work for the government as compared with the private sector: "The expectation of dishonesty and corruption in government is high in

[13] William J. Siffin emphasizes this process with regard to Thailand. See his "Personnel Processes of the Thai Bureaucracy," in Heady and Stokes, eds., *Papers in Comparative Administration* (Ann Arbor 1962), 207-28.

[14] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968), 60.

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India and, paradoxically, for the same people who see government service as prestigeful. Government service is apparently seen in two separate images, from two distinct value positions. It is both corrupt and prestigeful."[15] On the basis of this statement, I would suggest that the paradox is more apparent than real, and that the corrupt and prestigeful images of the bureaucracy are in fact reconciled within an ethos founded on asymmetrical relations of dependency and vulnerability.[16] Power and privilege are simultaneously resented and coveted by those who do not have them.

The tolerance of corruption at all levels is predicated upon the basic cynicism of the people with regard to their government. No one is dupe in this game where services and influence are marketable commodities and where buyers and sellers use all their wiles to strike a bargain.

> When, as a supplicant, the peasant tries to bribe a clerk, or to establish a dependent relationship with an official in the idiom of a family relationship or of a courtier at the king's palace, he is in fact trying to coerce the clerk or the official by including him within his own moral community. He is trying to transform the transaction, which he knows is one of exploitation, into a moral relationship, *because it is in his interest to do so.* In just the same way, when the campaigning politician addresses him as "brother," the peasant sees this as an act of hypocrisy, and looks behind the facade of symbolic friendliness for the hidden interest.[17]

As regards transactions inherent in administrative corruption, we are dealing with the distribution of and payment for services and dispensations. For the masses of supplicants, paying for the service (brib-

[15] See S. J. Eldersveld and others, *The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy* (New Delhi 1968), 31-33 (citation from p. 33).

[16] It may be hypothesized, although I have seen no systematic test of the hypothesis, that in many developing countries corruption fails to arouse mass moral indignation because the notions of public and private spheres are not highly developed. That is, when we speak of the use of public power for private ends, it is assumed that we can define what is private, and that public power is subject to universalistic criteria. It is also assumed that there is a kind of multiple role specialization whereby a bureaucrat is a "public" figure for eight hours a day and a "private" citizen the rest. In fact, it is common for bureaucrats in developing countries to carry role-playing to extremes by insulating themselves rigidly in the impartiality and rule-conscious role of the public official in order to stave off the importunities of clients who want to force them into the role of dispenser of particularistic favors. Variations on this theme are explored in Fred Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston 1964); Hahn-Bee Lee, "Developmentalist Time and Leadership in Developing Countries," *CAG Occasional Papers* (Bloomington 1966); and José A. Silva Michelena, "The Venezuelan Bureaucrat," in *A Strategy for Research on Social Policy* (The Politics of Change in Venezuela), I (Boston 1967), 86-119.

[17] F. G. Bailey, "The Peasant View of the Bad Life," *Science and Culture* (Calcutta), XXXIII (February 1967), 31-40 (emphasis in original).

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ing) is not reprehensible in itself; but when the market value of services becomes too high, moral indignation is aroused. In Morocco, for instance, some evidence suggests that the inflation in the price of corruption has become onerous and resented. Passports and work permits are too highly priced, price-control brigades shake down retailers too often and for too much, entrance "fees" for state examinations have been greatly inflated, and so forth. It is at this point that the indignation of the masses over the excessive prices of needed services may mesh with the professed indignation of the educated elites who condemn corruption regardless of its costs.

Finally, we may note that pervasive administrative corruption at the lower echelons of the bureaucracy is particularly favored by the low level of literacy in many developing countries, as well as by the personalized rendering of administrative services. Where literacy is at a premium, there are very few routine operations that can be performed anonymously between the citizen and the functionary. One must line up, find someone to fill out the forms, locate the intermediary who knows the right office, and then bargain one's way to some sort of solution. The process is on a face-to-face basis, with several possible services to be purchased along the way.[18]

The Costs and Benefits of Corruption in Morocco

With virtually no exceptions, the kinds of endemic corruption set forth in the preceding pages are to be found in Morocco. Is it possible to establish some sort of balance sheet as to their costs and benefits to the Moroccan polity and society?

Both Leff and Nye have suggested a number of possible benefits resulting from corruption. Regarding economic development, Nye argues that corruption may encourage capital formation where taxation would inhibit it. Further, illegal purchases of administrative favors may help cut red tape and overcome the rigidity of administrative practices. Finally, corruption may promote efficient entrepreneurial behavior. Leff joins Nye in emphasizing this point. In situations of what he calls "market corruption," the highest bribe wins the contract or favor, and it may be that the most efficient capitalist is the one who can muster the highest bribe; ergo, corruption rewards efficiency.[19]

We may summarize some of the other advantages, particularly as

[18] See the graphic description of one such process in Richard Patch, "The La Paz Census of 1970," *American Universities Field Staff Report* (West Coast Latin American Series, Hanover, N.H., 1970), 7-10.

[19] Leff (fn. 3); Nye (fn. 1).

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presented by Nye, as follows: corruption (implicitly on a broad scale) may tend to overcome elite cleavages by means of the unobtrusive and clandestine redistribution of spoils. It is perhaps this "function" that Scott has in mind in his remarks about Thailand: "What distribution [of corruption] takes place is intended to cement the ties that bind particular military-civil cliques together and prevent defection to other potential 'coup-groups.' "[20]

In addition, corruption permits access to the distribution system to groups and minorities that might otherwise be frozen out. Ironically, corruption is thus seen as overcoming certain discriminatory practices and as promoting national integration. Along these same lines, corruption—particularly when viewed as a facet of broader patronage networks—may mitigate potential ethnic or class conflict by diverting the attention of spokesmen from the exploitation of grievances to the distribution of spoils.[21] A third political and integrative benefit may derive from the use of corruption to create supporting institutions such as political parties, and to grease the wheels of electoral politics. Moreover, it may be, as Scott argues, that electoral corruption indicates a real spread of popular democracy when a regime can no longer control elections through violence, threat, or fraud, and must pay for votes rather than extract them by force.

We may now try to determine how Morocco scores on some of these dimensions, but a preliminary remark is in order. It is illusory to think that we can actually measure the costs and benefits of corruption in Morocco or in any other country. The reason is simple. Either one is dealing with a country in which some level of corruption is apparent or with a country in which, at least for the sake of argument, no corruption is apparent. On the one hand, a discussion of the benefits of corruption would oblige the observer to make a purely hypothetical guess as to how the system would function without corruption, and on the other, how a noncorrupt system would function with corruption. One can convincingly and legitimately analyze only what actually is going on and what the costs and benefits seem to be. It is very difficult to suggest what the costs and benefits of some hypothetical process might be. The only way out of this bind would be to find (or simulate) two or more governmental systems sharing the same cultural environment and basic socioeconomic configurations

[20] Scott (fn. 3), 335; see also Weingrod (fn. 9).

[21] Boissevain (fn. 9) sustains this point with regard to Sicily; see also Ernest Gellner, "Patterns of Rural Rebellion in Morocco: Tribes as Minorities," *European Journal of Sociology*, III, No. 2 (1962); Lemarchand (fn. 9), 68.

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and political regimes, one of which is "corrupt" and the other "clean," and then compare the functioning of the two systems in terms of costs and benefits. Unfortunately, no two such comparable units come to mind.

MARKET CORRUPTION ENCOURAGES CAPITAL FORMATION AND ENTREPRENEURIAL EFFICIENCY

Leff's hypothesis regarding the positive effect of corruption upon capital formation is too simplistic and naive. The amount of capital the bidder is able to offer depends on far more than efficiency. The highest bidder may be—and in the Moroccan context frequently is—a talented speculator who made a killing in urban real estate or in import-export. In general, the indigenous native bourgeoisie has accepted and cultivated relations of dependency with the state bureaucracy and semipublic authorities. It is a parasitic bourgeoisie that lives off privileged access to state-controlled resources or the differential application of state regulations. At the same time, individual entrepreneurs may specialize in serving as intermediaries between the Moroccan State and various foreign private investors. Whatever deal they are able to arrange entitles them to a percentage of the investment: As brokers they take a "commission" but invest nothing except their time and influence.[22]

It is true that the biggest bribes in Morocco can be and probably are offered by the French industrial establishment (*patronat*) of Casablanca and other Moroccan cities. It is also true that the *patronat* represents the most efficient industrial and commercial enterprises in the country. Their payoffs, in the form of protection money to avoid discriminatory application of regulations, and in placing influential Moroccans on their boards of directors with high salaries, may be seen as promoting efficient capitalist endeavor. But the relationship is blurred by the existence of protected markets or industries, and the fact that various enterprises (banks, vehicle assemblies, breweries, cement factories, sugar refineries) are branch operations of metropolitan enterprises rather than independent establishments that must sink or swim on their own.

[22] Many Moroccan entrepreneurs combine elements of the Marxist notion of "comprador" as well as the more graphic expletive of "Lumpen-bourgeoisie" used by André Gunder Frank in *Lumpen-bourgeoisie et lumpen-développement*, Maspéro, Cahiers Libres 205-206 (Paris 1971). Omar Ben Messaoud, former attaché in the Royal Cabinet and go-between between Pan American and the Moroccan Ministry of Finance, is exemplary of the Moroccan bourgeoisie, although his arrest indicates that he overplayed his hand. See Waterbury, "The Coup Manqué," *American Universities Field Staff Report*, North African Series, XV, No. 1 (1971).

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A not unusual scenario involving some of the themes mentioned above might unfold as follows. *X*, *Y*, and *Z* are prominent Moroccan businessmen with connections in the Palace and, more often than not, close relations or friends in the Ministry of Finance. They approach a thriving French textile plant and propose that they be allowed to acquire a certain proportion of the company's stock, let us say 15 per cent of all outstanding shares. It is understood that they will pay nothing for the shares, but that dividends will accrue in their names until they are equivalent to the value of the shares on the day of "purchase." The company can use those dividends as they accumulate, and, depending on the bargain, include interest in the purchase price. In the meantime, *X*, *Y*, and *Z* will have been "elected" to the board of directors with salary. Without investing a penny, the three entrepreneurs can each pick up a salary and eventually a share of the company's assets. The more influential they appear to be, the more often they can repeat this gambit. In return for what is essentially protection money, they do favors for the company, such as arranging duty-free importation of machinery or keeping the labor inspector from closing the place down for violation of safety regulations.

It should also be noted that Leff's analysis of market corruption does not take into account the use of illegal payments in an ongoing process that Fred Riggs has called "strategic spending."[23] To summarize Riggs's argument, an individual's surplus earnings—be he public official or private entrepreneur—are disbursed in tributes and gifts to safeguard his power position and to maintain his ability to extract tributes and gifts in turn. Wealth is not power; rather, it is spent in the quest for power. As a result, Riggs concludes, strategic spending keeps surplus resources from productive investment and hence leads to "negative development."

In Morocco, and elsewhere, strategic spending may be perfectly legal, but more than likely it will involve trading in privileges and favors dependent upon persons in public office. Private groups may pay protection, good will, or access money as a strategic device, and hope for administrative favors in return. In addition, considerable strategic spending goes on within the administration, including falsified accounts, manipulation of personnel and promotion, differential application of watch-dog and auditing procedures, cost-plus contracting where the work is performed by a public agency, and so forth. All these operations may be carried out as tributes and loans among bureaucratic clans and political power-holders.

[23] Riggs (fn. 16), 141-42.

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This kind of trading, rather than constituting market corruption, seems designed to insulate the participants in a protective web of obligations and expected services that makes every man at once a creditor and a debtor. In an administration whose upper reaches are subject to the whims of the ruler, the unpredictable redistribution of prebends, and the vagaries of clan-infighting, strategic spending leads to some minimal degree of predictability of social security. No one really has much incentive to break away from the web, for, while he may escape his debts, he will also abandon his claims to what is owed him. Investments in this web bear no interest, and some degree of stability is bought at the price of productivity. Finally, flight into the private sector solves nothing: to the extent that it is dependent on the administration, the refugee's web of obligations will follow him.

The notion of protection payments warrants further attention, for it bears directly upon entrepreneurial activity and capital formation. The kind of corruption that is under discussion is a negative transaction between some branch of the administration (and by implication, the regime itself) as one party and any designated interest as the other. In return for political loyalty or apoliticism, the regime offers *not* to apply discriminatory practices. In 1966, for example, an important sugar importer and newspaper owner received word that his connections with a leftist party were well known and unfavorably viewed in higher circles. It was suggested that these connections be terminated lest his warehouses be closed for various violations or his applications for import licenses be turned down. In such a transaction nothing is exchanged; both parties agree to conditions guaranteeing that neither will engage in activities harmful to the other.[24]

Because there is some tendency in Morocco's political system for the Palace to view any successful entrepreneur as politically dangerous (he could buy clientele, influence, and a political power base) there is also a tendency to break or domesticate such men, to reassert the links of dependency essential to the regime's survival. Most actors are aware of the possibility of discriminatory sanctions, and this awareness or general expectation is more important than the actual frequency with which sanctions are applied. Anticipatory reaction to this threat motivates entrepreneurs to make short-term speculation and protection payments

[24] In this instance, sanctions were applied. The businessman's newspaper was temporarily closed down by order of the Minister of Interior, just long enough for the shipping companies that published their schedules in it to transfer their advertising and notices to another newspaper. The "leftist" newspaper went out of business. Its publisher, after having mulled over his fate for a while, was put at the head of an important state investment body.

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and to shun strategies of long-term investments. In conclusion: corruption in the Moroccan system does little to contribute to entrepreneurial efficiency or capital formation.

CORRUPTION PROMOTES ADMINISTRATIVE FLEXIBILITY

In one respect, the flexibility hypothesis would seem to apply in Morocco. Corruption does, to some extent, promote flexibility in *intra*-administrative procedures. These involve skirting, manipulating, or violating civil-service rules for all matters regarding living, promotion, salaries, benefits, expense accounts, and so forth. One quasi-legal device is the contract system (*contrat fonctionnel*). Access to various levels of the civil service is nominally determined by educational and training qualifications. When Morocco first became independent, there was a severe shortage of Moroccans who could meet French educational standards for various posts. To overcome this, ministries were allowed to negotiate bilateral contracts to meet staffing needs. The same kind of contract could be renegotiated to promote the contractee to a higher post. However, even after the initial shortages were overcome, the practice of using discretionary contracts continued, for they provided a means by which a minister or *directeur* could reward his clientele with coveted posts. In this way the *contrat fonctionnel* became an integral part of the patronage system while at the same time eroding some of the rigidity inherent in the civil service code.

It could be argued that the possibility to milk an office or market administrative services helps attract talented personnel to the administration—personnel that might otherwise be discouraged by the very low salaries paid at all levels. This judgment would apply particularly to the middle and upper reaches of the civil service. Each ministry or agency may contain an internal prebendary system by which service payments at one level are disbursed to the personnel involved while a certain percentage is passed on to the next level. In addition, some ministries or directors within them may be particularly well placed to extract large-scale tributes: Public Works, contracting for road and dam construction; Education, contracting for school construction; and Commerce, contracting for licensing, market inspection, weights and measures, import permits, and so forth. All of these ministries offer a vast potential for kickbacks and protection money. The administrative "entrepreneurs" who seek out appointments as ministers or in key directions all know the relative ranking of these agencies. The prebend is known in the trade (with no offense to David Easton) as the *caisse noire* or "black box." The biggest and most coveted black box is that of

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the Ministry of Finance which extracts tribute from all other ministries and agencies through the budget and auditing process and the control of the civil-service payroll, *and* from the non-governmental sector through fiscal control. The Minister of Finance and his clients have a finger in every pie and can exact a heavy price for their vital services.[25]

To an important degree, a parallel, non-official, and illegal system of payments and incentives has developed, providing a possibility for high material rewards that the official salary structure precludes. Perhaps talented Moroccans would shun administrative careers without the parallel system. Corruption, it could be argued, serves in this instance to maintain a façade of austerity while at the same time attracting quality personnel to the administration. Yet to the extent that this is true, the benefit is cancelled by at least two major costs. First, budget austerity was originally designed to stabilize the salary structure in the public sector and free state resources for productive investment. For all intents and purposes that objective has been abandoned. Second, the civil-service code was designed to bring stability and predictability to administrative careers, an element notably lacking to date. Moreover, talented personnel is wasted by immersion in the game of manipulating the quasi-illicit procedures that have developed to improve career prospects and earnings. Without reallocating state resources, civil-service salaries could probably be raised across the board and promotion practices standardized without reallocating state resources. But for reasons of political control, the King has been reluctant (at least until July 1971) to put an end to these civil-service games precisely because the ambitious civil servant becomes so preoccupied with them that he has little time left over to think about the "system" as a whole.

The flexibility hypothesis seems misplaced as regards corruption arising between civil servants and the citizenry. In fact, corruption in the form of taking and offering bribes is directly linked to the maintenance of red tape. A service charge is to be expected in every instance that an administrative regulation is applied. The service charge does not permit the payee to *avoid* the regulation, but rather guarantees —sometimes—that the civil servant will expedite the payee's case. The Royal Gendarmerie inspects trucks and cars for faulty headlights or

[25] There are so many operations going on within the Ministry of Finance that it is hard to know which are the most profitable. One steady source of income to the Ministry's black box comes from the processing of all governmental claims for overtime payments. A fixed percentage of whatever total is approved by Finance for a given agency is retained for Finance's black box. A threat that Finance can always use vis-à-vis other ministries is to refuse to budget their unfilled slots; as much as 25 per cent of all funded slots in the civil service may go unfilled, allowing one man to draw two salaries. Finance holds the key to this practice.

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tires: a flat fee is charged whether or not there is a violation; Moroccans who work in Europe need passports and renewals: a service charge is required before the wheels grind. Virtually any piece of paper issued by local authorities requires a fee or the promise of further services: birth certificates, work permits, death and marriage documents, affidavits that one is destitute, that one has a sick child requiring medical attention, that one has school-age children, that one is an army veteran entitled to a pension, that one is a cripple—all of these have a price. Add to these building permits, trading licenses, property deeds, water rights, zoning regulations, taxes, building and work inspection, and price controls, and it is clear that administrative corruption touches all aspects of the citizen's life, whether rich or poor. The underpaid civil servant renders his career somewhat more palatable, but he is being bribed to perform his normal duties rather than to cut through red tape.

CORRUPTION MITIGATES ETHNIC OR CLASS CONFLICT BY DIVERTING ATTENTION TO THE SPOILS SYSTEM

The mitigation of class conflict is indeed a consciously sought-after objective of the Moroccan spoils system. However, the notion of level is important here. Corruption runs throughout the administration, and the most humble Moroccan can nourish the hope that his son may someday, with a modicum of education, accede to the lower echelons of the civil service. Thus, the opportunity of social mobility may operate against alienation from the system along class lines. Yet, to the extent that this is true, spoils and corruption are not the key elements. The status and salary associated with civil-service employment would be sufficient in themselves to attract the offspring of the poor.

But if it is implied that entire classes or segments thereof can be co-opted through systems of corruption, the situation is far different. On the one hand, the regime has actually been creating a dependent *kulak* class through the illegal sale of land taken over by the state from the French. The sales have gone on since 1956, linking the material well-being of officials of the Ministry of Interior, army officers, and the rural nobility to the survival of the regime. To some extent, the formation of this quasi-class may serve as a buffer between the growing numbers of landless peasants and the traditional rural land-owning groups. At the same time there is little the regime can do to avert the increase of the landless peasantry and its derivative, the urban unemployed. If there are remedies to the growth of these groups, they do not lie in the

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expansion of the spoils system. Co-optation through spoils on a class basis may be possible, if at all, only in those developing societies that have exceptional resource bases, such as Iran.

While conventional class cleavages can be partially bridged by corruption, this same phenomenon contributes to the development of an administrative class. In Morocco, the state is by far the largest employer in the country. Civil servants at all levels are relatively privileged and relatively resented. There is a strong tendency for the citizenry to talk in terms of "us and them." While administrative corruption is regarded as normal, it is nonetheless disagreeable and serves to reinforce the cleavage between the masses and the administration.

At the uppermost levels of the civil service, where corruption takes place on a major scale, ethnicity, class, and participation in the spoils system tend to overlap. The merchant-bourgeois elite, drawn disproportionately from families from the city of Fez (hence the appellation *Fassi* for this group) represented, before 1912, a relatively well educated and skilled group that had an initial edge in acceding to privileged positions in the administration and the market economy developed by the French during the Protectorate (1912–1956).[26] The essential point here is that a particularist elite category—the Fassi—overlaps with a nascent class category, the indigenous *haute bourgeoisie*. These groups have taken over the lion's share of high-level administrative posts. At the same time they dominate the private and semi-private sectors of the economy (if one leaves aside the French *patronat*) which depend on the favors and protection of the state. They have, to say the least, privileged access to those public officials who can grease the wheels. Thus, administrative and entrepreneurial elites are really wings of the same group. Not only is there much back-scratching and evidence of joint ventures between the two wings, but also a constant coming and going of personnel. A civil servant, let us say in the Ministry of Industry and Mines, can facilitate the success of an enterprise whose directorship may subsequently be his reward. Of course, these kinds of transactions also take place with regard to the French *patronat*, but there, relations are not so chummy and room to maneuver is somewhat more restricted. After the attempted coup d'état of July 1971, there was much talk that the rebel officers had wanted to clean up the "Fassi Mafia"; to view this group in such terms does not distort reality.

The conclusion that can be drawn here is that high-level corruption

[26] See Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study in Segmented Politics* (New York 1970), chaps. 5 and 6.

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has taken place to some extent in a socially closed circuit. Market corruption may allow outsiders to buy their way into the circuit, but it is no easy task. In sum, corruption in Morocco may have contributed to the stratification of resources within a particularist bourgeois elite.

CORRUPTION AFFORDS ACCESS TO THE ADMINISTRATION FOR MINORITIES THAT MIGHT OTHERWISE BE EXCLUDED

The French *patronat*, either by numbers or by nationality, is a minority that has bought its way into the system. The most obvious, although dwindling, Moroccan minority is that of the Jews. Despite the fact that the Six-Day War of 1967 and the attempted coup d'état of July 1971 accelerated the rate of Jewish emigration, we can make some generalizations about Jewish integration in the system since 1956. Like the Fassi, the Jews enjoyed educational advantages not shared by most of the Moroccans. Under the Protectorate they had become prominent in commerce, manufacturing, insurance and banking, the free professions, and the administration. Several Jews have been, and still are, highly placed civil servants (although only one ever rose to ministerial rank). Quite clearly they traffic in influence and favors as much as anybody, but they must be more careful than the Muslims. A Jewish businessman may have to be more circumspect in offering a bribe, or perhaps pay a higher price. When on the receiving end, the Jewish civil servant may find that he cannot refuse a bribe. Either way, he must play the game while running a higher risk of discriminatory denunciation.

The reason is simple and reflects the peculiar dependency relationships that have long defined the Jews' room for maneuver within the dominant community. Jewish patronage networks are always partially interwoven with Muslim networks, and any Jewish participant must have his Muslim umbrella. In a very real sense, "the umbrella of umbrellas" for the Jews is the King himself who has made efficient use of this protected minority, holding them in thrall by the fear of what his removal would mean to them.

Still, it is impossible to say whether or not the Jews have better access to the system through corruption than they would have without it. Their integration is founded on traditional dependency, supplemented by the modern business, technical, and managerial skills they are able to offer their protectors. What is clear, however, is that the weighing of costs and benefits in this respect is irrelevant because in the coming years the Jewish minority will have *dis*-integrated itself from the system and moved elsewhere.

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CORRUPTION IN ELECTORAL POLITICS MAY INDICATE THE SPREAD OF POPULAR DEMOCRACY

Constitutionally, Morocco is a multi-party system. Up to 1965, when King Hassan suspended Morocco's first elected parliament, there was at least an outside chance that a competitive multi-party system might actually emerge. But during the 1960's the Palace made a concerted and successful effort to drain all important sources of patronage and spoils away from the parties. By 1970, with a quasi-monopoly on patronage sources, the Palace had achieved its objective of keeping up a "liberal" multi-party regime in which the parties could not really compete but only participate. Since 1963 various rounds of local and parliamentary elections and referendums have demonstrated, if anything, only that the carrot may be cheaper than the stick: It is probably less expensive to buy votes than to extract them by force. In Morocco's non-competitive electoral process, material inducements such as distributing PL 480 American wheat can buy an election for the regime without its having to stuff the ballot box.[27] The incidence of electoral corruption in Morocco says nothing one way or another about the vitality of popular democracy in that country.

Planned Corruption in Morocco

The elements of corruption in the Moroccan system that have so far been described are to be found in all political systems. But only under some regimes are they the ingredients of regime survival and an essential source of its cohesion. Several of the strategies of the utilization of corruption and patronage by the monarchy have been alluded to in the preceding pages. It is now time to try to pull them together.

All systems must provide rewards for those who agree to participate in them. Participation implies something less than the acceptance of the legitimacy of the regime on the part of the participants. Whether or not they actually believe in its legitimacy is not essential to its survival; what is essential is that they continue to play the game. In this sense participation is equivalent to acquiescence; the regime can maintain control of the political arena if strategic groups acquiesce.

The rewards of acquiescence vary from regime to regime. Prestige, power, high salaries, and the satisfaction of serving national or ideo-

[27] At the time of writing, Morocco was awaiting new parliamentary elections in the wake of the attempted coup of July 1971. It may be that the opposition parties will participate in the elections, and, because the King needs their participation, the elections may be relatively unrigged. But the parties do not have many material rewards to attract voters; they must rely on the appeal of their programs and the rewards they can offer *if* they win a majority of Parliament.

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logical goals may all be involved. But Morocco, as a monarchy, cannot easily handle rewards in the same way as non-monarchist nation-states. To the extent that Morocco is a partrimonial system and the King is ruler for life, rewards, promotions, and demotions within the administrative and military spheres are dependent upon the will of the monarch. Only in this way can he assure his relevance to the system. In general, the King's degree of political control varies directly with the level of fragmentation and factionalization within the system, and inversely with the level of institutionalization among political parties and administrative agencies. The King must always maintain the initiative through the systematic inculcation of an atmosphere of unpredictability and provisionality among all elites and the maximization of their vulnerability relative to his mastery of the situation. With their political and material fortunes always in doubt, he is in a position to exert and maintain the asymmetrical lines of dependency and protection that the elites seek to establish. If at any time (as when the rebel officers struck) the King's mastery is questioned, then the asymmetry of the relations disappears, and his relevance to the system is immediately called into question.

With specific regard to the civil service, what the King has sought to avoid is a psychological disposition among strategic elites that would lead to the notion of a meritocracy. High-ranking bureaucrats must not believe that they have earned their positions; there must always be the recognition that were it not for H.M.'s favor, they might never have made it.[28] Conversely, they must always be aware that they may rapidly fall from grace despite their professional qualifications. In successfully nurturing this disposition, the King has maintained the initiative; all elites are preoccupied with trying to anticipate or trying to react to the King's moves. Seldom do they have the confidence, and almost never the resources, to take initiatives themselves. They are constantly reminded of their vulnerability by the unpredictable and sometimes arbitrary interventions of the King into the administrative sphere. Rapid and unexplained demotions and promotions and inscrutable policy decisions leave any high-ranking bureaucrat fearful for his future. The participants in this system are thus reduced as much as pos-

[28] So too, senior army officers, most of whom served in the French army at the time King Hassan's father, Mohammed V, was sent into exile by the French authorities in 1953. That these officers wound up in command of the Moroccan armed forces after 1956, rather than being tried as traitors, is attributable only to the will of the Moroccan monarchs. Both Mohammed V and Hassan II never let them forget that fact—which is all the more testimony to their desperation in trying to overthrow Hassan II in July 1971 and again in August 1972.

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sible to the role of competent (rational) and obedient (patrimonial) executors of the Royal Will. If they find this too demeaning, they can try to find another game. The King once remarked in an interview, "If one day all my ministers resigned, I would say to my chauffeur, be minister."[29]

Quite clearly, inculcating the mental disposition among the elite that maximizes royal control of the game limits the kinds of rewards the King can offer to his clients. He cannot offer them career stability; nor can he offer them significant influence over the policy-making process. He cannot offer them the satisfaction of devoting themselves to a coherent doctrine of government or of development. Finally, he cannot offer them even the satisfaction of developing and implementing specific programs. Career instability and policy impotence go hand in hand, and Moroccan bureaucrats are aware of this pairing. Even though they may have a sincere interest in the programs of their agencies, there are no institutional guarantees that they will be around long enough to have any effect upon them.[30] Personnel turnover may be no more rapid in the Moroccan administration than in any other,[31] but Moroccan civil servants are aware that, in their case, turnover *could* be extremely rapid. Most of them, at the level of *chef de service* and above, feel at the mercy of the discretionary powers of promotion and transfer vested in the minister and, by derivation, in the King—against which there are no institutional defenses.

The compensation offered to the Moroccan participant is access to the spoils system. Above all else, access is subject to the arbitrary manipulation of the Palace, and hence is supportive of patrimonial ties. At whatever level—the policeman who takes a bribe or the minister who builds a chateau on $13,000 a year—access is a privilege which is *not earned* or *merited*. It is a privilege whose ultimate source is always known and which can easily be revoked. Finally, it is a privilege which is always to some degree illicit. The participant runs the risk of exposure by rivals or superiors, of scandals, and of the confiscation of the fruits of his acquiescence and participation. Moreover, it is somewhat degrading to compete for material reward in this way, and success in the competition is not something of which the participant can feel

[29] From an interview in *Réalités*, No. 250 (November 1966).

[30] Interviews with ninety high-ranking bureaucrats revealed that only a few ventured to predict what job they would have a year hence. It is not pure hyperbole to note that one of those who did predict was shot and killed at Skhirat a year later. It is also important to note that the rebel officers were allegedly partially motivated by their unhappiness with unstable careers and political marginality.

[31] Over a period of twelve months, 25 per cent of an initial sample of 160 high-ranking bureaucrats changed posts at least once, some of them three times.

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proud. The participant becomes the accomplice of the system. What holds it together is not necessarily loyalty to its master; rather it is the commensal sharing of its spoils. Everyone the master deems of strategic importance is invited or cajoled to join the feast. When the privileges are revoked, the erstwhile participant has no recourse. He must simply keep his silence, for what he knows of the system's corruption he learned through participation in it. The strategy is not foolproof, as the attempted coup of 1971 indicated. The King published the inventory of the rebel officers' ill-gotten gains within forty-eight hours of the coup attempt. It was a hollow gesture, because fear of exposure was supposed to have kept the officers from acting in the first place. But even if the temple had crashed down upon the King's head, he would have had the last word: Few Moroccans would ever have accepted the rebel officers as undefiled builders of a new order; they would still have been seen as self-seeking accomplices of the *ancien régime*.

The preoccupation of all sectors of the elite with governmental spoils has made competition for access to the administration the major form of politics in the country. From the point of view of the Palace this development is not only desirable but planned; the politics of patronage are essentially non-ideological. The competition is not among "isms" or programs, a realm in which the monarch is relatively weak and vulnerable, but among patronage groups who vie for material advantage, a process in which the monarch-boss is indeed supreme. De-politicization of the administration (for it was highly politicized from 1956 to 1961) is bought in this manner. Individuals and groups can re-politicize the system only at the risk of police repression ("leftist" plots and subsequent trials were staged in 1963 and 1971; in-between, Mehdi Ben Barka was kidnapped and assassinated) and in face of the artfully manipulated threat that the army would intervene if the politicians became too active. Much to the King's surprise the army did intervene, apparently out of disgust for the patronage system and its own inglorious role in it; but, having survived the intervention, the King is still able to argue that if civilians do not like his game, they will like the army's even less.

In the absence of some major breakdown in the system, the old rules still obtain. Administrative patrons, rotating in and out of various offices, build their own nest eggs in terms of material resources or favors and obligations that they can cash in on later. The politico-administrative ethos that has emerged in the 1960's is strikingly similar to that of the old Sultanate before 1912. The Sultan turns over a prebend to a "trusted servant" who then farms it as intensely as possible, gaining

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title to the usufruct but not to the farm itself. An atmosphere of every man for himself and every clan for itself emerges that precludes large-scale coalition-building or politicking in the bureaucracy. Various clans, to the extent that they have any political coloring at all, represent only marginal policy options: *X* is pro-American, *Y* pro-French; *Z* wants six dams instead of eight, and *Y* wants to introduce hybrid corn, etc.

Whatever the participant amasses he is permitted to keep; but that too is a privilege, not a rule. The artful administrative patron can accumulate, through his office and strategic spending, enough resources to sustain him through thick and thin. The fall from grace is seldom draconian, for the King does not want to alienate ex-participants.[32] Inasmuch as there has been a tendency to maximize the numbers of participants (accomplices) by encouraging the rotation of personnel in and out of the administration, the regime might, by employing harsher methods, risk creating a large class of disgruntled ex-participants. Therefore, title to usufruct is seldom revoked.

Very few Moroccans have any illusions about the game: certainly not the King or the participants, nor, for the most part, the masses. It is for this reason that, although the term "patrimonial" has been used, it is somewhat misplaced: loyalty is not a crucial element in the Moroccan system. There is a general level of cynicism running throughout—the cynicism of the non-participant masses who fall back on the traditional reflex, "government has ever been thus"; the cynicism of the participants who partake of the system individually while refusing any responsibility for it; and the cynicism of the King who plays on the weakness and greed of his subjects.

In this system, corruption serves only one "positive" function—that of the survival of the regime. Resources are absorbed in patronage and are drained away from rational productive investment. Morocco remains fixed in a system of scarcity in which the vulnerable seek protection and thus regenerate the links of dependency and patronage that perpetuate the system. The dilemma for the ruler in such a system is whether, in the short term, his survival can be made compatible with rational administration and economic development, or whether, in the long term, it can be made compatible with planned corruption.

[32] Since the attempted coup, some ministers have been actually been put on trial for corruption—up to then an unheard-of punishment. At the same time, a minister who was fired in the fall of 1970 amid rumors of malfeasance has been made Minister of Interior.

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SIZE AND FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR: A Test of Two Models

By MAURICE A. EAST*

THE categorization of states according to size has long been a part of world politics. Rothstein notes, for example, that the formalization of the categories of great and small powers occurred as a result of the signing of the Treaty of Chaumont in 1817.[1] Recently, the concept of size has received an increasing amount of attention as a factor affecting foreign policy. One manifestation of this is the renewed interest in the foreign policy behavior of small states.[2] In his pre-theory of foreign policy, Rosenau includes size as one of three "genotypic" variables assumed to exert a major influence on foreign policy.[3] In addition, empirical studies have shown size to be an important factor underlying variations in the international behavior of nation-states.[4]

The research design underlying the present study has been influenced by the study of foreign policy of small states and by recent developments involving the use of events data analysis in foreign policy research. More specifically, the focus of this study is on the similarities and differences in the foreign policy behavior of small and large states.

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[1] Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York 1968), 12-13.

[2] Recent books focusing on small size and foreign policy behavior include David Vital, *The Survival of Small States* (Fair Lawn, N.J. 1971); August Schou and Arne O. Brundtland, eds., *Small States in International Relations* (New York 1971); Jacques Rapoport and others, *Small States and Territories: Status and Problems* (UNITAR Studies, New York 1971); V. V. Sveics, *Small Nation Survival: Political Defense in Unequal Conflicts* (Jericho, N.Y. 1970).

[3] James N. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. B. Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill. 1966), 27-92.

[4] See R. J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and Their Behavior," *World Politics*, XXI (January 1969), 226-41; Jack Sawyer, "Dimensions of Nations: Size, Wealth, and Politics," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXXIII (September 1967), 145-72; Stephen A. Salmore and Charles F. Hermann, "The Effects of Size, Development and Accountability on Foreign Policy," Peace Research Society (International) *Papers*, XIV (1969), 15-30.

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I will begin by presenting a discussion of large and small state models of foreign policy behavior, and will then analyze foreign policy events data generated by the CREON Project (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) which provide some evidence for assessing the validity of the two models.

Although the literature presents a description of the way small and large states differ in their foreign policy behavior which is far from consistent,[5] a generally perceived model of small-state behavior in foreign affairs can be abstracted. This conventional model generally assumes that small states are characterized by one or more of the following: (1) small land area, (2) small total population, (3) small total GNP (or other measure of total productive capacity), and (4) a low level of military capabilities.

Based on these defining characteristics, small states are traditionally depicted as exhibiting the following foreign policy behavior patterns when compared to large states:[6]

(a) Low levels of overall participation in world affairs;
(b) high levels of activity in intergovernmental organizations (IGO's);
(c) high levels of support for international legal norms;
(d) avoidance to the use of force as a technique of statecraft;
(e) avoidance of behavior and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states in the system;
(f) a narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities;
(g) frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international issues.

Underlying these behavior patterns attributed to small states, there seems to be a major implicit assumption: small-state behavior is the result of the same general processes of decision-making that are found in larger states. For example, the above patterns correspond quite closely to what might emerge from the application of a "rational"

[5] For an excellent discussion of the inconsistencies in the literature regarding the relationship between power and aggressiveness, see Stephen A. Salmore, *Foreign Policy and National Attributes: A Multivariate Analysis*, unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Princeton University 1972), 40-68.

[6] The abstraction of these foreign policy behavior patterns is based on wide reading in the general literature of international politics and foreign policy. Among the more revealing sources are the following: Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York 1967); Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (Garden City, N.Y. 1966); A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York 1968); George Liska, *Alliances and the Third World* (Baltimore 1968).

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model of foreign policy to the situation facing any state with limited resources and a limited international potential.[7] In virtually every pattern indicated above, small states exhibit a low-profile course of action, minimizing their perceived risks and their expenditure of scarce resources such as manpower, military capabilities, and hard currency. In addition, it is often assumed in the literature that the foreign policy actions of small states are the results of decisions arrived at by a decisional unit which has been monitoring world affairs relatively closely, has an adequate information base from which to operate, and has a long-range policy perspective.[8] Paraphrasing Rothstein, the conventional model assumes that small states are nothing more than or no different from large states writ small.[9]

However, if one begins by making the opposite assumption—that there is a fundamental difference between the foreign policy processes of large and small states—it is possible to construct a plausible alternative model of small-state behavior. Starting with the definitional characteristics of small states, it can be assumed that the total amount of resources available for allocation by the political systems of small states is relatively small. Even though the demands made upon the political systems of small states may also be proportionately smaller, it can further be assumed that the "economic surplus" in small states is smaller than it is in larger states. (Economic surplus as used here is an imprecise measure of the amount of resources available for redistribution anywhere in the system after all of the minimal requirements for maintenance of the system's essential structures have been met.) Moreover, the cost of governing peoples has increased dramatically in the post-World War II era.[10] The result of all these factors is that, compared to large states, small states have a smaller proportion of an already small resource base to devote to the international sector.

If these assumptions are correct, one can hypothesize that there are likely to be some important differences between large and small states

[7] In this instance, the term "rational" is used to imply the minimizing of costs and the maximizing of impact by operating under the same assumptions and rules that might apply in a large, developed state. It is this "rationality" that will be questioned below.

[8] Although it would be difficult to point to an author who explicitly espouses these assumptions, much of the discussion of small states within a strategic perspective implies as much. There is discussion of strategic roles, long-range and short-range alliance objectives, etc. See especially Liska (fn. 6) throughout.

[9] Rothstein (fn. 1), 1.

[10] For similar arguments, see Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources," *World Politics*, XX (July 1968), 660-93; Karl W. Deutsch, "The Future of World Politics," *Political Quarterly*, XXXVII (January–March 1966), 9-32.

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in the style and techniques used when processing and reacting to foreign policy issues. With fewer resources available for allocation to the foreign-affairs sector, the size and capacity of the organization charged with the primary responsibility for foreign policy are likely to be small. This means that there will be fewer persons involved in monitoring international events and executing foreign policy decisions. One consequence of this is their inability to cope adequately with the total range of international issues facing the small state. Certain functional and geographic areas must be emphasized, while others are ignored. Moreover, this reduced organizational capacity in foreign affairs means that small states will be less active overall, and differentially active in various areas of policy.

A second consequence is that small states are likely to be slower in perceiving events and developments in the international system. Because they have a smaller capacity to monitor the system, it is less likely that they will perceive various early warning signals indicating new developments and important policy shifts by other international actors. This in turn can have a profound effect on their foreign policy behavior.

Conflicts are often characterized in terms of stages in their development. A state which perceives a potentially troublesome situation at an early stage of development will have far more opportunity to influence the outcome of the situation. Conversely, a state which perceives a situation at a later stage of development may have fewer alternatives to consider. Deutsch, for one, argues that "governments frequently . . . decide to go to war when they believe themselves to be constrained by the lack of any acceptable political alternative to war."[11] By the time the signals are perceived by the small state, the situation may have reached a stage of development where definite, unambiguous, high-risk behavior must be taken. A small state does not enjoy the luxury of engaging in early, low-level, ambiguous behavior when trying to take effective action in such situations.

The behavior predicted from the alternative model, then, runs counter to that of the conventional model. According to the former, small-state activity is more likely to be at a higher level of intensity, less am-

[11] Karl W. Deutsch, "The Point of No Return in the Progression Toward War," in D. Pruitt and R. C. Synder, eds., *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1969), 60. The general communications-based model utilized here owes much to the work of Deutsch, although there are several points of disagreement between his position and mine. See Deutsch, *Nerves of Government* (New York 1963); Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability," *World Politics*, XVI (April 1964), 390-406.

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biguous, and frequently more hostile and threatening. The major difference between the two models of foreign policy behavior, therefore, concerns the degree to which small states engage in what can be considered high-risk behavior. The alternative model predicts more high-risk behavior for small states, while the conventional model predicts a more cautious, low-risk behavior pattern.

The assumption underlying the alternative model accounts for a third behavior pattern, one that is also predicted by the conventional model. Because of the relative lack of resources available for foreign affairs, the small state must seek methods of interaction that are less costly and more economical. Traditional bilateral diplomacy is a very expensive way of conducting affairs, and one that serves the interests of the large states well. Small states will rely more on other methods of interaction, such as multilateral diplomacy, international conferences, regional organizations, and multiple diplomatic representation.

Finally, there is an important difference between large and small states in their perception of the importance of various issues in world politics. Because of the primacy of internal demands on political decision-making (a situation even more acute in small states because of their lack of economic surplus and their smaller total resource base), certain traditional issues in international politics are generally of little interest to the small states. These are issues such as the Cold War, global prestige and influence, acquiring or maintaining alliances or spheres of influence, and territorial expansion. On the other hand, those international issues which are directely related to their economic growth and development will be most salient for small states.[12]

To summarize: Two different models of small-state foreign policy behavior have been discussed. Both models allow one to make predictions about the behavior of small states in foreign policy. In several areas, the predictions from the two models are similar. In one major area, relating to high-risk behavior, the models offer opposite predictions. The events data to be analyzed in this study will allow differences between the foreign policy behavior patterns of large and small states to be identified; on the basis of these analyses it should be possible to make some judgments about the relative veracity and utility of the two models.

[12] See Michael O'Leary, "Linkages Between Domestic and International Politics in Underdeveloped Nations," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics* (New York 1969), 324-46; Robert C. Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in Laurence W. Martin, ed., *Neutralism and Nonalignment* (New York 1962).

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The Data Set

The events data analyzed here were generated by the CREON Project and consist of 4,448 foreign policy events initiated by 32 nation-states during randomly selected quarters of each of the years in the decade 1959–1968.[13] The source of information for the data set is *Deadline Data on World Affairs*, a commercially produced and continually updated chronology of world events compiled primarily from major newspapers and wire services throughout the world. A major working assumption of the CREON Project is that the data set represents an acceptable first approximation of the distribution of actual foreign policy activities for these 32 nation-states during the time period under study.[14]

For a better understanding of the analysis, it is necessary to have some knowledge about the definition of a foreign policy event as used in this study.[15] Project CREON utilizes a conception of an event as a discrete action resulting from a decision by the political authorities of a state who have the power to commit the national government. An event is stipulated as having an actor, an action, one or more direct targets, and one or more indirect objects. In order to be considered as *foreign policy*, an event must have either a direct target or an indirect object which is external to the national territory of the initiating state.

Actors consist of individual political executives of a nation-state or their representatives. Each event involves actors from only one state. (If two or more states collaborate, as in the issuing of a joint communiqué, the political authorities in each government have made a decision to accept the joint action; therefore, each decision represents a separate event.) The *direct target* is the immediate recipient of the action initiated by the actor. It is the entity or entities (not necessarily

[13] For a more complete description of the CREON Project data set, see Charles F. Hermann, Stephen S. Salmore, and Maurice A. East, *Code Manual for an Analytic Deck of Comparative Foreign Policy Events* (mimeo), Ohio State University, 1971. The exact time periods included are the following: October–December 1959, April–June 1960, January–March 1961, October–December 1962, April–June 1963, July–September 1964, January–March 1965, July–September 1966, April–June 1967, and October–December 1968.

[14] It should be noted that a major task of the CREON Project is to undertake a series of quality control procedures to determine the effect and extent of source bias. Also, the data analyzed in this research represent only a part of those available in the data set.

[15] For a more complete description of the rules and procedures governing the identification and abstraction of foreign policy events, see Charles F. Hermann, "What is a Foreign Policy Event?" in Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., *Comparative Foreign Policy* (New York 1971), 295-321.

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other governments) to which the action is explicitly addressed. The actor/direct-target relationship has been borrowed from communications theory in which a communication is required to have both a sender (actor) and receiver (direct target). The concept of an *indirect object* is based on the assumption that official actions of political authorities are undertaken in an attempt to influence some person or collectivity. Any entity (or entities) that the actor attempts to influence or affect by his action comprises an indirect object. Direct targets and indirect objects *may* be one and the same, but need not be. However, both must be explicitly cited in the data source. An *action* is purposeful verbal or nonverbal behavior initiated by an actor. One action is differentiated from another on the basis of a change in actors, time frame, degree of commitment, or kind of resources or skills involved.

The Analyses

The foreign policy event is the unit of analysis in this study. The strategy of analysis is to group events according to attributes of the initiating state in order to identify differences in foreign policy behavior between groups. Thus, the attributes of nation-states are the independent variables used to group events. The dependent variables include various aspects of the foreign policy event itself; e.g., whether the event was verbal or nonverbal behavior, conflictful or cooperative, whether the action was specific or ambiguous, etc. These different measures of foreign policy behavior will be discussed more fully as they are introduced into the analyses below.

The results of the analyses will be organized as follows. First, the distribution of events initiated by large and small nations will be examined for important differences in the level of activity. Second, events will be analyzed to determine whether small states tend to utilize more economical or "low-cost" techniques of statecraft. Third, substantive aspects of events will be examined to determine the degree to which "low-risk" behavior characterizes small states. Finally, there will be an attempt to determine which areas of foreign policy are most important to large and small states.

A secondary focus of these analyses is on the differences between small developed and small developing states. The argument is frequently made that there is a fundamental difference between the "older" small *developed* states (primarily Western European) and the "newer" small *developing* states (primarily in Africa, Asia, and Latin

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America).[16] In order to examine this argument empirically, all relationships between size and foreign policy behavior have been controlled for level of economic development. Only in those instances where the size relationship is significantly affected by development will the results of the three-variable analysis, controlling for development, be presented.

The groupings of nations according to size and development are those established by Burgess who performed a discriminant analysis on 1963 data.[17] The distribution of the 32 states included in the CREON data set across the four groupings is given below.

SMALL DEVELOPED	SMALL DEVELOPING	LARGE DEVELOPED	LARGE DEVELOPING
Belgium	Costa Rica	France	China
Chile	Ghana	Italy	India
Cuba	Guinea	Japan	Turkey
East Germany	Ivory Coast	Mexico	
Israel	Kenya	Spain	
New Zealand	Lebanon	U.S.S.R.	
Norway	Philippines	U.S.A.	
Switzerland	Thailand	West Germany	
Uruguay	Tunisia		
Venezuela	Yugoslavia		
	Zambia		

LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY

Both the conventional and alternative models of foreign policy behavior of small states predict that small states will participate less in

[16] Both Vital (fn. 2) and Rothstein (fn. 1) attempt to grapple with this problem—but rather unsuccessfully, it seems. Rothstein's analysis of developing states is in a single chapter toward the end of the book and is not well integrated with the other sections which deal almost exclusively with the "older" small developed states. Vital's work focuses on case studies of Czechoslovakia, Israel, and Finland, none of which fit the criteria for small developing states. Furthermore, Vital, in an earlier work (*The Inequality of States* [Fair Lawn, N.J. 1967], 8), uses a different "rough upper limit" of population for developed than for developing states. For economically advanced countries, the upper limit of population is 10-15 million; for developing states it is 20-30 million.

[17] Discriminant analysis is a statistical technique for partitioning a linear combination of a set of variables so as to minimize the number of misclassifications and maximize the distance between the resulting groupings, taking into account the entire set of variables. In the final partitioning, large countries are those with populations above 23.7 million; developed countries are those with a GNP per capita exceeding $401. See Philip M. Burgess, "Nation-Typing for Foreign Policy Analysis: A Partitioning Procedure for Constructing Typologies," in Edwin H. Fedder, ed., *Methodological Concerns in International Studies* (Center for International Studies, University of Missouri–St. Louis 1970), 3-66.

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foreign affairs than will large states. An analysis of the data with regard to number of foreign policy events initiated gives ample support to this proposition. The average number of events initiated and the median for each group is given in Table 1.

TABLE 1

AVERAGE AND MEDIAN NUMBER OF EVENTS INITIATED, BY GROUPS OF NATION-STATES, 1959–1968

Group	*Average*	*Median*
All States ($N = 32$)	139	50
Large States ($N = 11$)	288*	196
Small States ($N = 21$)	55	43
Small Developed States ($N = 10$)	65**	46
Small Developing States ($N = 11$)	46	36

* The difference in means between large and small states is significant at the $p = .05$ level using a t test. $t = 2.63$ with $df = 30$

** The difference in means between small developed and small developing states is *not* significant at the $p = .05$ level. $t = 0.95$ with $df = 19$

Large states initiate considerably more events than do small states, reflecting a higher level of international activity overall. Using a t test for difference of means, large and small states show a significant difference at the $p = .05$ level. The difference between small developed and small developing states, however, is not significant at the same level. Even though this difference is not significant, the rank-ordering of groups of states indicates that size and development operate cumulatively with respect to international activity; i.e., a small state with low economic development initiates fewer events than does a small state with high economic development.

With regard to level of overall international activity, the data tend to confirm the original proposition. Large states do exhibit a higher level of international activity than small states. The fact that "the obvious" is validated in this instance also tends to confer a degree of credibility on the data set. Furthermore, Table 1 indicates that size is more important than development in accounting for differences in the level of international activity.[18]

[18] Although the 32 nations included in the data set are not a random sample of all nations, the choice of time periods for which data were collected is random by quarters. Therefore, there are certain inferential statistics in the tables presented here. In addition to the statistics given, it should be noted that a percentage difference of four per cent or larger is statistically significant at the $p = .05$ level, given the size of the groups being compared.

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"LOW-COST" FOREIGN POLICY TECHNIQUES

It has been argued above that because of the lack of resources, small states are more likely to employ various techniques of statecraft which will minimize the cost of carrying out their foreign policy. Several studies have noted, for example, the tendency of small states to utilize intergovernmental organizations (IGO's) to a larger extent than large states.[19] Using the CREON Project data, it is possible to examine the degree to which states engage in joint action in initiating foreign policy events. The hypothesis is that small states are more likely to engage in joint behavior in foreign policy because this allows two or more states to pool their resources to achieve greater influence.

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE OF EVENTS INITIATED, BY SIZE AND NUMBER OF STATES PARTICIPATING

	Number of States			
	One	*Two*	*Three*	
Large States	65	30	4	($N = 3{,}153$)
Small States	46	40	14	($N = 1{,}135$)

chi square = 202.57; *gamma* = .38

Table 2 supports the hypothesis: Small states do initiate more joint behavior events than large states. The *chi square* value and the percentage difference are both quite large, and the magnitude of the relationship using the Goodman-Kruskal *gamma* is .38. Although it was not possible to separate out IGO events from all others, it should be noted that the third column of Table 2 includes events initiated by states as participants in IGO's. Thus, the evidence would seem to indicate that small states do initiate a greater proportion of their foreign policy events as joint undertakings, including events initiated in IGO's.[20]

Another economical means of conducting foreign policy is to direct one's influence attempts at groups of states and at IGO's rather than at individual nations. Thus, it is hypothesized that many of the *targets* of small states' actions will be groups of states or IGO's. Table 3 presents these data.

[19] See Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations," *World Politics*, XIX (July 1967), 646-63; and Maurice A. East, *Stratification and International Politics*, unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Princeton University 1969), 128-46.

[20] For this and the remaining tables, the significance level of the *chi square* value will be given only if it is below $p = .01$. Also, it should be noted that the *chi square* values are likely to be large due to the large number of cases being analyzed.

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TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF EVENTS INITIATED, BY SIZE AND NUMBER OF TARGETS

	Number of Targets					
	One Target	*Two or Three*	*Four to Ten*	*Eleven or More*	*IGO as Target*	
Large States	85	5	1	0	8	($N = 3{,}166$)
Small States	75	5	2	1	17	($N = 1{,}145$)

chi square = 83.90; *gamma* = .30

The major differences between large and small states appear in the first and last columns. Eighty-five per cent of all large-state events have a single target, while only 75 per cent of small-state events have one target. Looking at the frequency with which IGO's are the target of foreign policy events, the difference is significant and in the predicted direction. Small states initiate 9 per cent more events where the target is an IGO.

There is a third type of foreign policy behavior which might also be considered "low-cost." The conventional model predicts that, if foreign policy events are dichotomized into verbal and nonverbal behavior, small states will engage more in verbal ("words") and less in nonverbal ("deeds") behavior. The assumption is that talking is a more economical form of activity than action.

However, the alternative model offers a competing hypothesis. Small states, according to the alternative model, are unable to maintain a high level of attention focused on foreign affairs. Furthermore, they do not often perceive developing situations until rather late. The result is that small states are not likely to exhibit much of the verbal behavior (comments, acknowledgements, posturing) that has been shown to make up much of international behavior. The action of small states, when it eventually comes, is more likely to be in the form of "deeds" or other nonverbal behavior. "Low-cost" verbal behavior is not likely to prove effective in influencing a situation which may have just come to the attention of a small state. Thus, the competing hypothesis is that small states will exhibit relatively less verbal behavior and more nonverbal behavior than large states.

In this context, it is necessary to discuss briefly the basis on which events were classified as verbal or nonverbal behavior. Verbal behavior involves no actual commitment of a state's resources. Examples of such behavior include comments on situations, threats, accusations, proposals, denials, promises. On the other hand, nonverbal behavior (i.e., deeds),

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always involves the actual commitment or utilization of resources. The use of military force, granting a loan, buying or selling goods, and sending personnel or equipment are all examples of deeds.[21]

Table 4 clearly supports the hypothesis derived from the alternative model of small-state behavior. There is a statistically significant difference of 14 per cent in the amount of verbal behavior exhibited by large and small states, with small states generating *less* verbal behavior and *more* nonverbal behavior.

TABLE 4

VERBAL/NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR BY SIZE
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	Verbal (Words)	*Nonverbal (Deeds)*	
Large States	76	24	($N = 3{,}168$)
Small States	62	38	($N = 1{,}146$)

chi square = 7.39

It is instructive to look at the effect of development on this relationship. In Table 5, it is clear that size is more important than level of economic development in accounting for differences in the amount of nonverbal behavior. The percentage differences between small and large states are substantial, while the differences between levels of development *within* the size categories are very small to virtually nonexistent.

TABLE 5

PERCENTAGE OF NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR
BY SIZE AND LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT

	Percentage	*Total N*
Small Developing States	40	501
Small Developed States	37	645
Large Developing States	24	774
Large Developed States	24	2,394

The rankings of size and development groupings by percentage of nonverbal behavior events support the alternative model. Developing states have fewer resources to devote to international affairs than de-

[21] Under certain conditions, announcements of actions may qualify as deeds rather than verbal behavior. Generally, this is where the announcement is of an action that has already taken place, or where there are no conditional factors likely to intervene between the announcement and the action. See Hermann and others (fn. 13).

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veloped states; thus, the cumulative effect of size and development on resources would predict to an ordering in which small *developing* states ranked first (because they have the fewest resources to expend on less important verbal behavior) followed by small *developed* states. Both of these groups have fewer resources to expend than large states. This is precisely the rank-ordering of states found in Table 5.

HIGH-RISK BEHAVIOR

The conventional model of small-state foreign policy behavior predicts that small states will exhibit behavior that produces the least amount of risk for them. Stanley Hoffmann summarizes this point well: "At all times, the line separating smaller from larger powers has corresponded to two different attitudes toward risk. Small powers are forced, by their resources, their location, and the system, to be satisfied with establishing a hierarchy of risks and with attempting to minimize the risks they consider to be most serious."[22] Such behavior is likely to include an unwillingness to engage in conflict or hostile behavior, a tendency to employ ambiguity to avoid alienating other states, and much cooperative *verbal* behavior. There would not be as much cooperative *nonverbal* behavior, since it is more "costly."

The alternative model again presents competing hypotheses. First, small states are likely to exhibit more conflict behavior than large states, particularly conflictful nonverbal behavior, because of the frequent need to take action of a definitive and often hostile nature. By the time a small state perceives the signals regarding a situation, that situation has frequently reached a stage where only definite "high-commitment" action will be effective. Furthermore, it is possible that, before being perceived by the small state, the situation may have developed along lines considered undesirable by it. In this case, only conflictful or hostile behavior is likely to be effective in changing the course of events. It is too late for utilizing lower-level actions such as bargaining and negotiation.

Using the same general argument, the hypothesis derived from the alternative model is that small-state behavior will be less ambiguous and more specific than large-state behavior, precisely to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations. Ambiguity may reflect maneuvering and attempts at enhancing one's bargaining position when it occurs at an early stage. But in the later stages (at which a small state is likely to become involved), ambiguity can be misleading and dangerous to a small state's position.

I will examine these competing hypotheses first with regard to con-

[22] Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War* (New York 1965), 138.

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flictful and cooperative behavior by analyzing the CREON data which have been coded using a modified version of the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) scheme for categorizing foreign policy interactions.[23] This modified coding scheme is organized into eight major categories of event-types, which can best be displayed in matrix form (Figure A).

FIGURE A

REVISED SCHEME FOR CATEGORIZING FOREIGN POLICY EVENT ACTIONS

	VERBAL			NONVERBAL
	Evaluation	*Desire*	*Intent*	*Deeds*
CONFLICT	Deny Accuse Comment (Neg.)	Demand Protest Propose (Neg.) Request (Neg.)	Threaten Warn Reject Intend (Neg.)	Force Demonstrate Increase Military Capability Aid Opponent Reduce Relationship Seize Expel Subvert
COOPERATION	Comment (Pos.) Approve	Request (Pos.) Propose (Pos.) Negotiate	Intend (Pos.) Offer Promise Agree	Yield Grant Decrease Military Capability Consult Carry Out Agreement Reward Increase Relationship
	Increasing Commitment to Action → → →			Action

The eight cells in the matrix represent three dimensions of foreign behavior: (1) verbal and nonverbal behavior, (2) conflict and cooperation, and (3) differing levels of commitment to action within the verbal

[23] On WEIS, see Charles A. McClelland and Gary Hoggard, "Conflict Patterns in the Interactions Among Nations," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, rev. ed. (New York 1969), 711-24. The revised scheme follows closely the work of Walter Corson, "Measuring Conflict and Cooperation Intensity in East-West Relations: A Manual and Codebook" (mimeo), University of Michigan 1970.

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behavior category, in which it is assumed that evaluative statements symbolize the lowest level of commitment to action. Statements of intent symbolize the highest level of commitment, with statements of desire having an intermediate position.

The categories will be arrayed on an eight-point scale in the following manner:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Cooperation				*Conflict*			
Deeds	Intent	Desire	Evaluation	Evaluation	Desire	Intent	Deeds

This scale can be collapsed to form different variables. For example, the first and last categories represent nonverbal behavior, while the rest are verbal; categories one through four represent cooperative behavior; five through eight represent conflict behavior.

The empirical relationship between size, development, and conflict behavior is a complex one. Nevertheless, the simple bivariate relationship will be examined first. The prediction from the conventional model was that small states would engage in *less* conflict behavior. By the same argument, the conventional model also predicts that developing states will engage in *less* conflict behavior. The alternative model, on the other hand, predicts that small states (and developing states, by the same logic) will exhibit *more* conflict behavior because of the perceived necessity to take high-risk and often hostile action if they are to influence the direction of situations as they develop.

Tables 6 and 7 show the distributions of conflict and cooperative action for both size and development. Note that both models, given these data, rate equally well: Both yield one correct and one incorrect prediction. Small states exhibit 6 per cent less conflict behavior than large states, and developing states exhibit 4 per cent more conflict behavior than developed states. In both cases, the relationship is statistically significant above $p = .05$, but the magnitude of the relationship is relatively small.

TABLE 6

CONFLICT/COOPERATION BY SIZE
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	Cooperation	*Conflict*	
Large States	63	37	($N = 3{,}168$)
Small States	69	31	($N = 1{,}146$)

chi square = 16.76, *gamma* = — .15

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TABLE 7

CONFLICT/COOPERATION BY DEVELOPMENT
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	Cooperation	*Conflict*	
Developed States	66	34	($N = 3{,}039$)
Developing States	62	38	($N = 1{,}275$)

chi square = 6.04 (Significant at the $p = .02$ level); *gamma* = .08

The relationship between size and conflict/cooperation is elaborated in a most interesting way (one not predicted by either model) when controlling for level of development. Large developing states have the highest percentage of conflict behavior, and small developing states have the lowest.[24] (See Table 8.)

TABLE 8

PERCENTAGE OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR
BY SIZE AND LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT

	Percentage	*Total N*
Large Developing States	49	774
Small Developed States	38	645
Large Developed States	33	2,394
Small Developing States	22	501

It is now necessary to utilize the uncollapsed coding scheme to examine another set of competing hypotheses. As indicated above, the alternative model predicts that small states are more likely to exhibit nonverbal behavior and especially nonverbal conflict behavior. These predictions can be tested by referring to Table 9.

The percentage of deeds, both cooperative and conflictful, is higher for small states, and small states do exhibit more conflictful nonverbal behavior than large states. Table 9 supports the alternative model of small-state foreign policy behavior.

Several other aspects of Table 9 also lend support, at least indirectly,

[24] The findings presented in Table 8 correspond nicely to a status discrepancy model of international conflict; i.e., those states whose status on one dimension (size) is incongruent with status on another dimension (development) are most likely to exhibit conflict behavior. Large developing and small developed states are the two status-discrepant types, and they rank first and second in percentage of conflict behavior. See Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," *Journal of Peace Research*, 1, No. 2 (1964), 95-119; East, "Status Discrepancy and Violence in the International System," in James N. Rosenau and others, eds., *The Analysis of International Politics* (New York 1972), 299-319.

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TABLE 9

REVISED FOREIGN POLICY ACTION SCHEME BY SIZE
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	Cooperation				*Conflict*				
	Deeds	*Intent*	*Desire*	*Evaluation*	*Evaluation*	*Desire*	*Intent*	*Deeds*	*N*
Large States	21	16	10	17	20	5	9	3	3,168
Small States	30	14	16	10	14	4	5	8	1,146

chi square = 189.42

to the theoretical basis of the alternative model. I noted above that much international behavior consists of low-commitment verbal behavior. However, the model predicted that, because of the lack of resources, small states would initiate fewer of these types of events than large states. In the revised coding scheme, this low-commitment verbal behavior is represented by the evaluative verbal categories. When the cooperative and conflictful evaluative events are combined, the small states initiate fewer evaluative events than do the large states.

The final aspect of high-risk behavior to be examined refers to the degree of specificity of foreign policy behavior. It will be recalled that the conventional model predicts that ambiguity (lack of specificity) will be a characteristic of the behavior of small states, who use it as a means to avoid alienating others. The alternative model, on the other hand, predicts that the behavior of small states will be *more* specific, as a way to avoid misunderstandings and misperceptions.

It is possible to test these two hypotheses, since the CREON Project data set allows for the analysis of two dimensions of specificity: problem specificity and target specificity. A problem-specific event is one in which the target of the event is clear about what the issue is and what the initiating state desires to accomplish as a result of the event action. An event has a specific target when it is clear what entities the actor is concerned about with regard to the issue at hand, and/or what entities the actor wishes to influence by his action. The following is an example of an event which has both an unspecified problem and an ambiguous target: Country A expresses its concern over recent developments in the South Pacific. Although specificity is clearly a matter of degree, for the present analysis the variable has been assigned a dichotomous yes or no.

As indicated in Table 10, the alternative model is supported with regard to both dimensions of specificity. Small states show 8 per cent

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more specificity with regard to the problem and 18 per cent more with regard to target. Development makes virtually no difference with regard to problem specificity. As for target specificity, the only difference occurs between large developed and large developing states, and, as implied by the alternative model, large developed states show the least specificity of target. These are precisely the states which can most afford to be ambiguous.

TABLE 10

SPECIFICITY OF FOREIGN POLICY EVENTS BY SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT (IN PERCENTAGES)

	Specificity of	
	Problem	*Target*
Large States	70 ($N = 3,154$)[a]	64 ($N = 3,152$)[b]
Small States	78 ($N = 1,144$)	82 ($N = 1,144$)
Small Developed States	79 ($N = 644$)[c]	82 ($N = 643$)[d]
Small Developing States	78 ($N = 500$)	82 ($N = 501$)
Large Developed States	71 ($N = 2,385$)	61 ($N = 2,382$)
Large Developing States	68 ($N = 769$)	72 ($N = 770$)

[a] The *chi square* value for the 2 x 2 table of size and problem specificity is 14.33.
[b] The *chi square* value for size and target specificity is 55.86.
[c] The *chi square* value for the 4 x 2 table of state-types by problem specificity is 31.93.
[d] The *chi square* value for type of state and target specificity is 162.93.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Both the conventional and alternative models predict that small states will be interested in a narrower range of foreign policy issues than large states. The alternative model further specifies that economic issues will be of great importance to small states (and, by the same logic, to developing states). Certain aspects of this relationship can be examined with the aid of the CREON data. All events were coded on a series of dimensions designed to capture various aspects of the internal decision unit and decision processes involved in the event. For example, each event was coded according to the bureaucratic structures that were involved in the event.[25] Also, each event was coded according to whether the primary skill or resource used in executing the event was economic, military, or diplomatic. By analyzing the relationship of size and de-

[25] Information on the bureaucratic structures involved in foreign policy events was available for 52 per cent of all events. Given the nature of the source, *Deadline Data*, this degree of richness in the data exceeded the highest expectations of the most optimistic members of the project.

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velopment to each of these variables, it is possible to investigate, at least in an indirect manner, the relative importance of various foreign policy issues.

The prediction is that the economic bureaucracies (i.e., those agencies responsible for the economic aspects of the polity) of small states as well as developing states will be involved in the execution of a higher proportion of foreign policy events than the economic bureaucracies of large states. Table 11 indicates that this is in fact the case. When controlling for development, the data indicate that small states still have a higher proportion of events involving economic bureaucracies than

TABLE 11

INVOLVEMENT OF ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACIES BY SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT (IN PERCENTAGES)

	Percentage	*Total N*
Large States	5	1,365
Small States	18	901
Small Developing States	22	416
Small Developed States	16	485
Large Developed States	6	1,079
Large Developing States	1	286

do large states. Small developing states have a higher proportion of such events than small developed states, as might be expected from the alternative model.[26]

An examination of the data on the skill or resources utilized in executing events is even more revealing. The assumption underlying this variable is that different types of states will employ different techniques of statecraft in conducting their foreign policy. Some may rely heavily on diplomacy or other traditional means of influencing other states; some may rely more on economic, cultural, or even military techniques.[27]

[26] It is not clear why large developing states have such a small proportion of events involving economic bureaucracies. Size again is the dominating factor, but the alternative model would predict that the large developing state would show more economically oriented activity. Also, it is of interest to note that in large developed states (the principal actors in international economic affairs), only 6 per cent of the total foreign policy activity involves economic bureaucracies.

[27] Given the conception of techniques of statecraft employed here, it is possible for a state to use economic aid as a technique of statecraft to secure military advantages. Similarly, military techniques, for instance mobilizing troops, could be used to gain economic or diplomatic advantages.

The original coding used six categories, but the distribution of events across categories was so skewed that three categories (containing only 3 per cent of the events) were omitted. The omitted categories were political-legal, cultural, and ideological.

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Table 12 shows the distribution of foreign policy events across the three skill or resource areas. As the alternative model predicts, small states initiate 15 per cent more events involving economic resources than do large states. Again, the small developing states initiate the highest proportion of such events. The evidence does seem to indicate that economic bureaucracies and economic techniques of statecraft are more frequently involved or utilized in the foreign policy behavior of small states.

TABLE 12

TYPE OF SKILL OR RESOURCES BY SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT (IN PERCENTAGES)[a]

	Economic	*Military*	*Diplomatic*	*Total N*
Small States	25	11	59[b]	1,145
Large States	10	5	82	3,166
Small Developed States	22	12	60[c]	644
Small Developing States	28	10	57	501
Large Developed States	12	5	81	2,392
Large Developing States	5	5	85	774

[a] As noted in the text, the percentages in this table do not add to 100 per cent because three categories have been omitted. The omitted categories account for about three per cent of all events. However, the total *N*-column includes events classed in all six categories.

[b] The *chi square* value for this 2 x 3 table is 240.25.

[c] The *chi square* value for this 4 x 3 table is 257.93.

Finally, another look at Table 12 reveals several additional findings. Although the primary focus here has been on economic aspects, examination of the military and diplomatic aspects shows that several hypotheses presented above are also supported by these data. For example, compared with large states, small states are shown to be involved in 6 per cent more events utilizing military skills and resources. Also, small states initiate 23 per cent fewer diplomatic events than large states. In both cases, these findings provide additional support for the alternative model of small-state foreign policy behavior.

CONCLUSIONS

In this study I have focused on the impact of size on the foreign policy behavior of states. A conventional model of small-state behavior was abstracted from the literature. This model is based on the defining characteristics of small size and the projection of a "rational" decision-making model into the situations that face small states. I also presented

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an alternative model, based to a large degree on a communications perspective: Small states act as they do precisely because of limitations on their organizational capacity and ability to monitor international affairs adequately. This leads to a lack of information, an inability to perceive situations at an early stage, and a tendency to employ high-commitment, high-risk types of behavior.

I have used foreign policy events data from the CREON Project to test the hypotheses stemming from the two models. The general thrust of the data supports the alternative model. Small states do tend to minimize the costs of conducting foreign policy by initiating more joint actions and by directing influence attempts at joint- or multiple-actor targets. Contrary to the predictions of the conventional model, small states do not initiate as much verbal behavior as large states. This finding is consistent with the alternative model, in which it is assumed that small states do not have the capacity or the resources to engage in large amounts of low-level verbal behavior.

In terms of high-risk behavior, small states engage much more in conflictful nonverbal behavior. Also, small states tend to avoid ambiguity in foreign policy behavior, exhibiting more specificity as to the issue at hand and the target being influenced. Both of these findings run counter to the conventional model's predictions that small states will tend to minimize risks.

Finally, the importance of economic factors in small-state foreign policy is demonstrated. The involvement of economic bureaucracies and the utilization of economic techniques of statecraft are more frequent in the foreign policy of small states than in that of large states.

Although the data at hand do give reason for believing that there are profound and significant differences in the behavior patterns of large and small states, such a belief cannot be sustained without considerably more research on foreign policy decision-making procedures in small and developing states. For example, it is important to determine whether the foreign ministries of small states do indeed perceive situations at later stages of development. Do small state decision-makers perceive the sense of urgency and need for high-risk, high-commitment action that is posited by the model? These and other areas of research at the micro-level of the nation-state must be carried out before the alternative model can be fully accepted. In addition, such research may reveal and emphasize differences in foreign policy processes that are not yet fully perceived or appreciated in foreign ministries around the world. To the extent that this is the case, additional research may aid in reducing some of the tensions arising in the contemporary international system.

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Research Notes

THE DIPLOMATIC IMPORTANCE OF STATES, 1816–1970:

An Extension and Refinement of the Indicator

By MELVIN SMALL and J. DAVID SINGER*

IN an earlier issue of this journal, we presented our findings on the composition of the interstate system, along with the diplomatic importance or "status" attributed to each member by the others in the system.[1] Covering the period between the Napoleonic Wars and the onset of World War II, we set out both to calculate the ranking of the states every five years during those 125 years, and to make explicit the criteria by which system membership and status ranks were established. Our major motivation was to identify the empirical domain within which our own research would go forth and to develop certain indicators which were relevant to the Correlates of War project; it also seemed likely that these data might be of use to others in the scholarly community.[2]

* The authors are indebted to the Carnegie Corporation and the National Science Foundation for their support of the overall project, and to those scholars who, in using the original data, were kind enough to communicate a variety of suggestions to us. We would also like to thank David Handley, Kathy Dillon, Vanu Bagchi, and Marsha Stuckey for their assistance in data acquisition, and Stuart Bremer, Raymond Tanter, James Ray, and Harald von Riekhoff for their perceptive comments and suggestions.

[1] See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, "The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System, 1815–1940," *World Politics*, XVIII (January 1966), 236-82.

[2] In addition to several studies now under way in which attributed diplomatic importance serves as one of our independent or intervening variables, others are also utilizing these data. See, for example, Michael Wallace, *War and the International Pecking Order* (Lexington, Mass. 1973); Manus I. Midlarsky, "Status Inconsistency and the Onset of International Warfare," Ph.D. diss. (Northwestern University 1968); and Maurice A. East, "Stratification and International Politics," Ph.D. diss. (Princeton University 1969). Among others who have done independent studies in this area are Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations," *World Politics*, XIX (July 1967), 646-63; Robert A. Bernstein and Peter D. Weldon, "A Structural Approach to the Analysis of International Relations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XII (June 1968), 159-76; Bruce M. Russett and W. Curtis Lamb, "Global Patterns of Diplomatic Interchange, 1963–64," *Journal of Peace Research*, VI, No. 1 (1969), 37-55; Steven J. Brams, "The Structure of Influence Relationships in the International System," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (New York 1969), 583-99; and Raimo Väyrynen, "On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status," *Cooperation and Conflict*, VI, No. 2 (1971), 91-102. Simon Schwartzman and Manuel Mora y Araujo, in "The Images of International Stratification in Latin America," *Journal of Peace Research*, III, No. 3 (1966), 225-43, using entirely different indicators of status, came up with a rank-ordering quite similar to our own.

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In extending the project beyond World War II and up to a more recent date, we faced not only the requirement to gather additional diplomatic representation data, but also the opportunity to reconsider some of our original indicators. In this supplementary report, therefore, we will not only present the additional data, but will also use the occasion as an opportunity to recapitulate (and where necessary, modify) the procedures and rationale behind our proposed index of diplomatic importance. Worth noting at the outset is the fact that we are not the only ones with certain reservations about the index. A number of our colleagues have, in spoken (if not written) word, raised some questions about its validity. Some of the criticisms can only be termed foolish, but most of them have struck us as eminently reasonable.[3] In the opening section, we will address ourselves to the question of validity; in later sections we will summarize our revised procedures, compare them to those originally employed, and then follow with a recapitulation of the resulting indicator values.

Diplomatic Representation as an Indicator of Importance

In the original study we argued that the relative importance that the states in the system attributed to one another could be inferred from the number and rank of the diplomatic missions accredited and dispatched to each of their capitals. The reasoning was that the decision to locate, maintain, or abolish a mission of any particular rank in any foreign capital reflected a wide variety of considerations within and between the several governments, and that the sum total of such missions would represent some consensus as to how important the recipient state was to all the others in the system. In other words, we treated the numerous and continuing decisions of whether or not to send diplomatic missions to foreign capitals as a sort of running sociogram, illuminating each state's relative diplomatic importance to the membership of the system at large. The resulting scores seemed, in our judgment, generally to vindicate that assumption, and to reflect the changing—as well as the stable—fortunes of the system's members over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

On the other hand, the problem of face validity remained far from solved. Not only were we somewhat dissatisfied with some of the rankings, but we also concluded that the reasoning behind the index needed

[3] One of the former is a witty, if uninformed, commentary in "Column," *Encounter*, XXVII (July 1966), 29-30. Our critic, identified only as "R," chose to ignore the text accompanying the tables, leading one to suspect that U.S. elites have used criteria of an extra-scholarly nature in selecting overseas recipients of our largesse.

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to be stated in more detailed and vigorous fashion. One of the purposes of this paper is to do exactly that; but before doing so, a few words as to the utility of such an indicator might be helpful.

What can one do with an adequate measure of diplomatic importance? At its simplest, such an index would help to distinguish between states with high, medium, and low diplomatic involvement vis-à-vis the others in the system, and thus differentiate between central and peripheral subsystems. Second, such an index would permit us to test a variety of hypotheses regarding the relationship between the diplomatic importance of a state and its foreign policy behavior, interaction, and relationship patterns. A third type of use might be to measure the discrepancy between a state's diplomatic importance and its capabilities—in order to test hypotheses, for example, which relate status discrepancies to foreign policy actions. Other uses come to mind, and are being followed in the Correlates of War project, but enough has been said to indicate that our interests are not merely antiquarian or encyclopedic.

Aside from the question of utility, what are the probabilities of constructing a valid and reliable index of diplomatic importance? A useful point of departure is to note that every effort to "measure" some social phenomenon requires us to infer back from what we *can* observe to what we cannot—or do not—observe in any direct fashion. We use words, numbers, and pictures as representations of the referent ("real") world, and make inferences about the referent world phenomenon on the basis of the symbols we use to represent it.

What we seek here is a rather general reflection of the relative importance of each state member to the others in the system during a given half-decade. One way to clarify the limitations of the proposed indicator is to spell out some of the things we are *not* trying to measure. First, we are not trying to measure power, capability, or influence.[4] These characteristics of a state will certainly affect its diplomatic importance, but they are not identical with it. And, as suggested above, the very magnitude of the difference between importance and these other

[4] In this vein, we are now gathering data by means of which we hope to calculate each state's military-industrial capability twice per decade for the same period, 1816–1970. Although we expect that these capability scores and ranks will show a high positive correlation with the diplomatic importance scores, we also expect some important and interesting exceptions. Two studies which explicitly examine the rank discrepancies produced by the two sets of measures are Wallace (fn. 2), and James Lee Ray, "Status Inconsistency and War Involvement in the European Sub-System, 1815–1965," Ph.D. diss. (University of Michigan 1973). In addition, there are some important theoretical implications in the fact that a given state's importance scores and capability scores may be rising or falling at sharply different rates, or perhaps moving in different directions at the same time.

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attributes remains a critical area of inquiry. Second, we are not proposing to measure "relative acceptance" or any other deviation in a country's score between what it *does* receive and what it *should* receive, given its geographical centrality, size, power base, or other intrinsic attribute.[5] Third, we are not (at least for the time being) interested in measuring the importance of one particular state to another particular state. To measure a specific dyadic relationship with sufficient precision would require much more evidence than will be offered here. Thus, no inferences should be—or can be—made about China's importance to the United States from the absence of their respective embassies in Peking and Washington (an example which is often suggested by critics of our proposed indicator). To extend that point a bit further, we are not trying to measure a state's importance in a particular region or in the context of a specific substantive problem. The index is intended to be *general* as to place and context, not specific. Nor are we interested here in measuring the short-run fluctuations in a state's diplomatic importance. Rather, the objective is to estimate the more slow-moving importance scores as they rise and decline in response to gross and general trends in international politics.

Further, we are not trying to measure the precise interval between two states that fall close to one another in our rank orderings. Even though we compute and present the raw and normalized interval-scale scores of the states, we urge users not to interpret these scores too literally. To emphasize the imprecision of these values, we eschew the convention which shows a tie by giving the equal scorers a fractional rank position, such as 7.5 for those which tie for seventh place in a given period. Rather, we rank them as seven and eight arbitrarily, by their state code number. For the same reason, we also convert those two sets of interval scores into grouped ordinal scores, dividing the membership of the system into quintiles, each of which contains approximately one-fifth of the members in the given observation year.

Returning, then, to what we *do* seek to measure, we reason as follows: first, most governments do not establish diplomatic missions in the capital (or principal) cities of *all* other sovereign members of the system. They send missions to only a fraction of the other states; as a matter of fact, that fraction has been a rather consistent figure, rang-

[5] For an application of that strategy to data on international trade, see Hayward Alker and Donald Puchala, "Trends in Economic Partnership: The North Atlantic Area, 1928–1963," in J. David Singer, ed., *Quantitative International Politics* (New York 1968); the original index is outlined in I. Richard Savage and Karl W. Deutsch, "A Statistical Model of the Gross Analysis of Transaction Flows," *Econometrica,* XXVIII (July 1960), 551-72.

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ing from a low of 37 per cent in 1849 to a high of 60 per cent in 1827, when the system was considerably smaller. This means that, over the past 155 years, we usually find missions from only about 45 per cent of the other states in the capital of the average state.

What accounts for this deviation from universality? We begin with the awareness that each government has a given propensity to exchange missions with each of the others in the system, in accordance with its judgment of their relative importance to its own state. Reflecting geographical and logistical distance, economic interdependence, cultural affinities, alternative modes of intercourse via third-party nations or organizations, and so forth, that set of judgments will, at the very outset, assure a less than universal exchange of missions. On top of this original estimate of importance, each government must also contend with a variety of resource limitations. These would include: a perceived limitation of funds and personnel in general; a lack of diplomats familiar with the language, culture, etc. of a possible diplomatic partner; and the reluctance of diplomats to accept certain posts, on grounds of remoteness, climate, housing, cuisine, servants, and ambiance. These limitations require that governments husband their scarce personnel and funds, and thus further reduce the likelihood that all will have missions in all. If the decision to exchange missions were simply a function of perceived relative importance in the context of limited resources, we *could* interpret our indicator as reflecting the relative importance of each state to every other state, and thus make reasonable inferences at the *dyadic* level.

But intervening between the judgment of another state's relative importance and the dispatch of a mission, there is a second set of inputs into the prospective sender's decision process. We refer to political constraints and incentives, some of which can occasionally be potent enough to outweigh the original judgment. These could include not only the political eagerness or reluctance of the potential partner, but: (a) domestic pressures favoring or opposing the establishment or perpetuation of a given bond; or (b) the urgings of other influential governments favoring or opposing such a bond. Although we would not argue that the original judgments as to the relative importance of a given state are completely apolitical, they are usually made within the context of the foreign ministry, and thus normally reflect a degree of detached expertise. But when special interest groups or foreign governments intrude into the process, we can expect an occasional deviation from what the bureaucratic consensus would have been.

Although it is often suggested that such "political" incentives or constraints are a twentieth-century innovation, the precedent goes back

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at least to the 1820's and 1830's. As the South American revolutions of that period succeeded in replacing monarchies with republics, the United States was eager to see the legitimization of the new governments. The more autocratic regimes of Europe (particularly Russia, Austria, and Prussia) were quite opposed, however, and such states as Britain and Holland found themselves caught between the two sets of pressures. And while many Europeans did eventually exchange missions with many of the American states, the Holy Alliance was able to slow down the rate of recognition. To some extent, such political pressures were again generated following the revolutions of 1848, but not to the extent found in the current century with the rise of the Communist regimes. This time, however, the United States has been on the other side, urging—with appreciable success—the *withholding* of recognition from the U.S.S.R. in the 1920's and 1930's, and from China in the 1950's and 1960's, to take the more dramatic examples. Even in 1970, with missions in 87 per cent of the system's members, the U.S. (and many of its allies) withheld official recognition from Albania and Mongolia—as well as China—on political grounds.

The effects of such extra-normal pressures will usually lead to depressed importance scores for the states whose isolation is sought by one or another of the major powers. Whether these "lower-than-expected" scores can be thought of as valid indicators of the holders' diplomatic importance depends upon the reasoning behind the measure, and this leads to the second part of the causal inference loop which we see as linking the indicator with the concept and with the referent world. One interpretation would have it that the recipient's score has been contaminated by extraneous considerations and that we therefore have a threat to our indicator's validity. Another interpretation—and the one which informs the argument at hand—is that the net score *does* reflect the recipient's importance. In one way or another, every government is faced periodically with the need to estimate, or re-estimate, how "important" it is to exchange missions with every other one in the system. That relative importance is reflected in its willingness to: (a) allocate limited resources to a given diplomatic bond; (b) incur the costs of overcoming domestic or foreign opposition to such a bond; and (c) sacrifice one set of attractive bonds in order to maintain or establish another set of more or less equally attractive ones.

We might think of those recurrent national choices as constituting a slowly changing and ongoing plebiscite among all the system's members, in which the separate governments must weigh a myriad of considerations in determining how important it is for them to have or not

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have a formal and reciprocated diplomatic presence in each of the other world capitals. To put it another way, the number (and/or rank) of missions in each state is a resultant of all the decisions concerning relative importance that have been made in the months and years preceding each observation year. Those several decisions, which cannot be reliably or economically observed, predict to (or "cause") the total number of ambassadors, ministers, and chargés d'affaires accredited to a given state in any half-decade.

Carrying the argument a step further, the importance indicator may also be interpreted in a *pre*dictive, as well as a *post*-dictive fashion. In that case, our causal inference is that the diplomatic importance of a state will be high if it has diplomatic bonds with many other states and low if it has few such bonds. While the essentiality of such missions may decline with the improvement in communications technology, or the increase in multilateral contacts via the IGO's, or shifts from bureaucratic to summit diplomacy, the relative ability of states to be important to others at a given time will clearly be a function, *inter alia*, of their place in the global communication network. If we consider diplomatic bonds as channels in such a network, and each capital as a node, a node into which a great many channels flow will be more critical and salient to the overall network than a node at which very few such channels intersect. That, too, is diplomatic importance.

In sum, then, our measurement argument is that the number of diplomatic missions found in a given national capital at t_1 will be both a *consequence* of the relative importance attached to that nation by the others in the system at t_0, and a *cause* of its relative importance at t_2.

Modifying the Indicator

In the original report, we spelled out our measurement and coding procedures in considerable detail, carrying the reader step by step from data acquisition through the varieties of index construction. Here, we will recapitulate the general procedures briefly, going into detail only where modifications or clarifications seem to be in order. On the basis of our own experience with the indicator (in its several forms) plus the comments offered by others, we find three sets of problems which call for further explication. These are: (a) the post-1945 inflationary trend toward greater use of ambassadors and the relative decline in the numbers of ministers and envoys; (b) the degree to which diplomatic missions are exchanged in a purely reciprocal and symmetric fashion; and (c) the extent to which the indicator should reflect the importance of the states *from* whom the missions are sent. Let us ex-

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amine these three problems in that order, and then summarize our revised coding and scaling procedures.

THE PROBLEM OF POST-1945 INFLATION

The original scores, it will be recalled, were computed in several ways. The first of these was the composite score, and it reflected not only the *number* of accredited missions in the recipient nation, but the *ranks* of those missions. Adhering to the *règlements* of Vienna (1815) and Aix-la-Chapelle (1818), we divided the missions into three ranks: ambassador, envoy or minister (whether accredited to the head of state or the foreign ministry), and chargé d'affaires; consular officials were not counted. The host state received three points for each ambassador, two for each minister, and one for each chargé. Such a scheme makes perfect sense as long as there is considerable differentiation, and the post-Napoleonic pattern did indeed hold for about 130 years. But on the eve of the second World War we already had some signs that the pattern was breaking down. By 1950, as Table 1 indicates, diplomatic "inflation" had clearly begun to take its toll. If more and more governments replaced ministers with ambassadors, scores based on the rank of the missions would begin to lose their discriminatory power. Examining eleven states representing the middle and major powers which have been in the system since its inception, we find that the ambassadorial rank accounted for about 15 per cent of their diplomatic missions until the 1930's. But on the heels of World War II, that figure rose sharply, and by 1965 it approached the 90 per cent level.[6]

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF DIPLOMATIC RANKS RECEIVED IN SAMPLE CAPITALS, 1816–1965

	1816	*1844*	*1874*	*1904*	*1930*	*1950*	*1965*
Ambassador	15.0	7.8	10.3	14.8	17.5	42.5	88.2
Minister	72.4	69.8	80.2	80.2	72.6	53.4	5.5
Chargé	12.6	22.4	9.5	5.0	9.9	4.1	6.3
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: The eleven states in the sample, all members of the central system, were Britain, France, Prussia or Germany, Sardinia or Italy, Holland, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, and the United States.

[6] Writing in 1946, diplomat-historian Harold Nicolson noted this inflationary trend when he wrote that "the Vienna *Règlement* (of 1815) did in fact settle the precedence problem for more than a hundred years. It may well be that some future Congress will find itself obliged, in view of the multiplicity of Embassies which have since been

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Faced with this situation, we considered and tried several alternative measures (including budget share, proportions of secretariat personnel, and elected officerships in various inter-governmental organizations) and found them quite invalid on their face; the reasons will be obvious to students of international organization and need not be reiterated here. Similarly, we quickly discarded the idea of weighting missions according to their staff size, their budget, or the value of their buildings.[7] Following those brief experiments, we returned to our raw data to see if it really made any difference whether we included the diplomatic rank of each mission received. With a mixture of chagrin and relief, we found that such a refinement made almost no difference in the rank orderings of the states. The smaller states, having originally received more low-ranking than high-ranking diplomats, suffer little by this change in coding rules. And the "top dogs," having so many missions of *all* ranks, lose little by the modification; only such states as Turkey, which often receive fewer missions than such middle powers as Holland or Denmark, but those frequently at the ambassadorial level, sustain any appreciable loss. As a matter of fact, the rank correlation between the weighted and unweighted scores for the period of 1816–1940 was .99, suggesting that we had invested considerably more time and money in data acquisition and computation than was necessary. The empirical lesson is that one's indicators can be too *refined* as well as too *crude*.

THE PROBLEM OF ASYMMETRIC REPRESENTATION

A second problem came to light once our data were all in and assembled into a machine-readable nation-by-nation matrix. We found that about ten per cent of our dyadic diplomatic bonds were asymmetrical. That is, while *X* may have sent an envoy to *Y*, *Y* was reported as not having reciprocated; the asymmetric pattern was coded accordingly.

The problem is, first, to identify the various ways in which such reported asymmetries can come about, and second, to settle upon a reasonable scheme for coping with them. In principle, there should be no such asymmetries, since the formal rules and established procedure make it clear that negotiations on the granting of diplomatic *recognition* should ultimately lead to an *exchange of diplomatic missions*. But there are several ways in which deviations can and do occur.

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created, to adopt a further *Règlement* under which Ambassadors are classified as of the first, second, or third category. This, it is to be expected, will provoke a most invidious discussion." *The Congress of Vienna* (London 1946), 219-20.

[7] For an analysis based upon size of mission in the post-World War II era, see Alger and Brams (fn. 2).

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First, on some occasions, one of the parties will be embarrassed by a shortage of funds or personnel, and will accredit one minister or ambassador to two or even three governments. He or she will *reside* in only one of these capitals, but will have a staff in the other(s) and will visit on a regular basis. In both the original coding and here, we score on the basis of missions established and staffed, regardless of whether the *head* of the mission is responsible for missions in additional neighboring states. That source of reported asymmetries, then, is of no consequence here. Second, the logistics and bureaucratic politics within governments could be such as to make for lengthy delays in the dispatch of a representative. This is usually true of only one party, and we no longer assume an asymmetry, but code Y's mission as if it were already in *X* once *X*'s has been established in *Y*. At worst, this coding convention could lead to a slight acceleration of the date at which *X* picks up an additional point. Given the temporal imprecision of our index, the effect of this change is inconsequential. Third, diplomatic lists are usually prepared by the protocol office in a foreign ministry and then made available to governmental and non-governmental users of those lists, including those who collate and publish them. Somewhere along that tenuous administrative chain, occasional errors of omission (and commission) would not be surprising. Under the revised procedures, we explicitly recognize that such errors can occur, and again utilize the assumption of perfect symmetry.

A fourth source of asymmetry could, however, be quite "real": a government could intentionally delay the dispatch of its representative, or recall him for an appreciable period of time. In very rare instances, the political realities might even lead to an *agreed* temporary asymmetry. But given the brevity of such possible periods of asymmetry in almost all of these cases, we are again justified in coding as if the bond were reciprocal at all times. A fifth possible source comes to mind, but it need not be seriously considered: the unilateral decision of one government to establish a mission in another's capital city without benefit of either negotiation or reciprocity. We have heard suggestions that the more aggressive states might engage in this practice as an indirect way of gaining visibility, influence, or importance, but we find no evidence of that practice now or in the past century-and-a-half.

To summarize, then, we now treat all the asymmetries that turn up in the historical record as irrelevant, recognizing that they are either temporary aberrations or the consequence of reportorial errors. The effect of this modification is to rectify the slightly understated scores of those states which were at the disadvantaged end of the reported asymmetries. How do the scores generated by these slightly different sets of

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coding criteria compare? The mean *tau* value for the correlation between the pre-symmetrized and the revised rankings is .83; it would be even higher were it not for the first three observation periods, whose data inadequacies produce rank-order coefficients of .63, .53, and .60 respectively. Notwithstanding the similarity in the original and revised rank scores, we are persuaded that the revision, calling for an assumed reciprocity throughout, provides us with an indicator whose validity is appreciably enhanced.

THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENTIATING AMONG SENDERS

A third problem *looks* most serious, but turns out to be negligible in historical fact. One of the more credible threats to the face validity of our index is that it assigns one point to the recipient state, regardless of whether the embassy or legation has been set up by Burma or Britain, Yemen or Yugoslavia. The alert critic might then suggest that we remedy this obvious deficiency by weighting each mission—not by its rank on the ambassador-minister-chargé ladder—but by the diplomatic importance of the *sending government*. This is readily accomplished by a simple iterative procedure, in which the computer is programmed not merely to count the number of entries alongside each state's name in the state-by-state matrix for each observation year, but to multiply each such entry by the number of missions found in each sending state's row. Thus, for 1970, Argentina would receive 40 points for the Spanish mission and 70 for the United States' mission in Buenos Aires, rather than just one point for each. Consequently, the states that are highly valued by those with the higher diplomatic importance scores will themselves receive a higher score than if most of their partners were middle- and low-ranking.

As suggested at the opening of this section, this procedure might indeed appear to make "more sense," but empirically it makes virtually no difference. The distribution of missions around the globe is, and has been, such that the non-weighted and weighted scores never show a rank correlation lower than .90 (1840); for 1935 the *tau* value is .96, and the mean for our 31 sets of observations is .94. The only discernible result of weighting is to raise slightly the scores of the states that exchange fewer missions, but to try to make them "count" by concentrating on the top-ranked system members. Thus, we can repeat a conclusion which we stated in the original article: the iterative weighting scheme adds virtually nothing to the validity of our index, but raises its computational cost considerably.[8]

[8] One indication of how closely the original and the revised indices converge is the magnitude of the coefficient of concordance. The minimum value of Kendall's *W*

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SCORING PROCEDURES SUMMARIZED

Having discussed the three major problems encountered in trying to devise a valid measure of diplomatic importance, let us now briefly summarize the coding procedures. For each diplomatic bond, as manifested by the exchange of missions at the chargé level or above, the host state receives one point. (Mere recognition, which may precede the dispatch or exchange of missions by several years, is not sufficient.) These observations are taken once per half-decade, producing 31 sets of readings when the compilation is updated to 1970. Given the generally slow rate of change in the scores, the researcher who is working with *annual* data may either use the same score for each of the four following years, or better still, interpolate, with little cause for concern. As long as the missions are at the rank of chargé d'affaires or higher, the host state receives one point; as reported above, differentiating among the three standard ranks makes virtually no difference up through the 1940's, and by 1950 almost all missions are at the embassy rank. For similar reasons, we find it neither necessary nor economical to differentiate according to the importance score of the sender.[9]

Once the total number of missions in each system member's capital has been recorded for each observation year, we have that state's raw importance score. To permit comparability across the years, in view of the rather steady increase in the size of the system, we normalize those scores by converting them into percentage form. Thus, the normalized score for each state is simply determined by ascertaining what percentage of the rest of the system's members have established diplomatic bonds with it in each half-decade. The top figure can range from 1.00 for several periods in the nineteenth century to a low of .82 for Italy in 1920; the lowest score is .00, for Rhodesia in 1970.

Finally, to re-emphasize our earlier point that neither of these inter-

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when the asymmetric, the weighted, and the non-weighted symmetric scores are correlated is .83 (for 1824); the maximum is .99 (for 1935); and the mean is .96.

[9] One other minor detail concerns the special case of the eight German and five Italian states which, prior to 1870, did not qualify for inclusion in the central system. Because the states in these two groupings had close dynastic ties, and were thus *expected* to exchange missions with their sister states, we excluded such missions in the original computation of each of their scores. In retrospect, that *ad hoc* rule seems both arbitrary and unnecessary; *many* groups of nations were in the same position of almost inevitably having to exchange missions. Furthermore, the effect of these more or less automatic missions is a minor one, raising the mean Italian score in 1859, for example, from 11.0 to 14.2, and that of the lesser German states from 8.63 to 13.75. Our data set, which is available at the International Relations Archive of the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research at the University of Michigan, now reflects this revision.

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val-scale figures be taken too literally, we also aggregate the states into quintile groupings for each observation year. That is, even though we compute and present cardinal and ordinal scores, the user must understand that such numbers offer only an approximate indication of each state's position; we are not suggesting, for example, that India, having two more bonds than Canada in 1965, is exactly two points (or .017) more "important" than the latter. Even the quintile scores must not be over-interpreted; our intention here is merely to provide one possible measure of the states' gradual ascents and declines in importance over the past century-and-a-half.

Data Sources

A generally accepted rule of thumb concerning quantification in the macro-social sciences is that the further back in time one goes in search of reliable data, the more difficult the problem becomes. The United Nations Secretariat, for example, and that of the League before it, have systematically compiled a large body of statistical information by which their member states might be described and compared along a wide variety of dimensions. National governments, industrial firms, and business associations have likewise begun the systematic compilation and publication of all sorts of figures in the past several decades. Unfortunately, what holds for certain economic and social data does not necessarily hold for diplomatic data, even if we leave aside matters of reliability and validity. The problem of ascertaining the presence or absence of diplomatic representation in national capitals for the sample years since 1945 has turned out, surprisingly, to be almost as acute as it was for the previous 130 years. As pages 251-52 and footnote 22 of the original article indicate, we were able to find most of the needed information for the earlier period in the *Almanach de Gotha*, and the gaps were filled without too much difficulty by recourse to fewer than a dozen additional sources. Since World War II, however, things have not been quite as simple.

Although many foreign ministries do publish one or more lists per year showing the states *in* which their government maintains an embassy, legation, etc., or *from* which they receive such missions, one can readily appreciate the effort of assembling over one hundred such lists for each sample year and then comparing and collating the information. Thus, we felt it would be more economical to find one or more single sources from which the missions sent by or received in a large number of states might be ascertained.

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Unfortunately, the *Almanach de Gotha*, which had weathered everything from Napoleon to World War I, did not survive the Nazi era and ceased publishing in 1940. In 1951, two different diplomatic yearbooks were published which offered detailed lists of the representatives accredited to each government, but, for reasons unknown to us, publication ceased in 1952, making it necessary to find alternate sources for 1955, 1960, 1965, and 1970.[10] (Of course, our task was eased immeasurably once we decided to abandon inter-rank discrimination and to score solely on the presence or absence of missions.)

For these four data points we used the *Europa Year-Book*, *The Statesman's Year-Book*, and the *Code Diplomatique*. For the earlier years, the first of these proved to be the most useful, since *The Statesman's Year-Book* did not provide relatively complete listings until the mid-sixties. In addition, we corresponded with a number of foreign ministries and were thus able to fill some of the gaps in these three publications. Finally, we were able to compare our results with those provided by East, who has collated all the separate listings from several of the postwar editions of *The Statesman's Year-Book*. Despite the diversity of our sources, however, we feel as confident about our figures for the post-World War II period as we did about those for the earlier span.[11]

Identifying Interstate System Members

So much for coding procedures, data sources, and the rationale behind the measures. Let us turn now to the equally critical matter of identifying those national political entities which constituted the interstate system during the period under study, and whose diplomatic importance we seek to measure. Since the criteria for inclusion in the system were carefully spelled out in the original paper and updated in Russett *et al.*, they will here be dealt with only briefly.[12] From 1816 to 1920, a state was considered a member of the system if it had a population of at least 500,000 and recognition from our two "legitimizers," England and France. From 1920 to the present, a state qualified for membership if it had the requisite 500,000 population and recognition

[10] See *Diplomatic Year-Book* (New York 1951), and *World Diplomatic Directory and World Diplomatic Biography* (London 1951).

[11] See Maurice East (fn. 2); for the pre-World War II study, we used the following: *Almanach de Brussels* (Paris 1918); *Almanach de Gotha* (Gotha 1764–1940); *Almanach de Paris* (Paris 1865–1869); *Annuaire Diplomatique et Consulaire de la République Française pour 1899 et 1900* (Paris 1900); *Europa Year-Book* (London 1926–1929); and *The Statesman's Year-Book* (London 1864–1940).

[12] See Bruce M. Russett, J. David Singer, and Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (September 1968), 932-51.

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from *any* two major powers, *or* if it was a member of the League of Nations or the United Nations, for however brief a period.

There were, however, the inevitable exceptions. Thus, even though they lacked the diplomatic recognition or membership in international organizations, five states were nevertheless classified as members of the system: Nepal from 1920, Mongolia from 1921, Yemen from 1926, Saudi Arabia from 1927, and Rhodesia from 1966. On the other hand, five states which did meet our criteria were *not* classed as independent members of the system. India, despite her membership in the League, was excluded until 1947; Byelorussia and the Ukraine were excluded, since their membership in the United Nations was merely the result of a political bargain arranged at Yalta; and Manchoukuo and Slovakia clearly failed on the grounds that they exercised virtually *no* control over their foreign policies.[13]

The Results: Diplomatic Importance Scores

In Table 2 we show the diplomatic importance scores of all members of the system for the post-World War II period. Given the exceedingly unsettled state of the world during the war and immediately after its termination, we do not show any figures for 1945; thus we move from 1940, the final reading in the original paper, to 1950 as the first meaningful set of data for the period under study here. For each of the years (1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, and 1970), we divide the states into quintiles, as before, and show the total number of diplomatic bonds for each state. In addition, we have again controlled for change in the size of the system to permit comparison across time; this normalization is achieved by dividing each state's total score by the size of the system, less one, that year. Therefore, a score of 1.00 would mean that *all* the others in the system had missions in that state's capital that year; the U.S. score for 1950 means that 93 per cent of them had missions in Washington that year. Rounding to two places (with decimal points removed) frequently creates the appearance of tied scores, but we have retained the rank positions reflected by the three-place figures. These scores are based on the state of affairs at the beginning of the half-decade; thus the 17 new states which entered the system *during* 1960 and the three states which entered the system *during* 1965 are not included in our tabulation or used in computing normalized scores until the following observation years.

[13] Space limitations preclude the listing here of the fluctuating system membership which emerges from the application of these coding criteria; the resulting lists may be found in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 of J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *The Wages of War* (New York 1972).

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TABLE 2

DIPLOMATIC IMPORTANCE RANKS AND SCORES BY HALF-DECADE, 1950–1970

1950

Rank		*Missions Received*	*Normalized Score*
1	United States	70	93
2	France	70	93
3	United Kingdom	67	89
4	Belgium	62	83
5	Italy	61	81
6	Holland	58	77
7	Denmark	54	72
8	Argentina	51	68
9	Norway	51	68
10	Switzerland	50	67
11	Sweden	50	67
12	U.S.S.R.	45	60
13	Chile	44	59
14	Brazil	43	57
15	Egypt/U.A.R.	42	56
16	Mexico	41	55
17	Spain	40	53
18	Czechoslovakia	39	52
19	Cuba	38	51
20	Turkey	38	51
21	Poland	36	48
22	India	35	47
23	Canada	34	45
24	Venezuela	34	45
25	Portugal	34	45
26	Dominican Rep.	33	44
27	Ecuador	33	44
28	Colombia	32	43
29	Peru	32	43
30	Finland	32	43
31	Iran	32	43
32	Greece	30	40
33	Panama	29	39
34	Uruguay	29	39
35	Lebanon	29	39
36	Yugoslavia	28	37
37	Salvador	26	35
38	Taiwan	26	35
39	Guatemala	25	33
40	Costa Rica	25	33
41	Rumania	25	33
42	Bolivia	24	32
43	Hungary	24	32
44	Nicaragua	22	29
45	Australia	22	29
46	Haiti	21	28
47	Honduras	21	28
48	Bulgaria	21	28
49	South Africa	21	28
50	Iraq	21	28
51	Pakistan	21	28
52	Paraguay	20	27
53	Syria	20	27
54	Luxemburg	19	25
55	Afghanistan	17	23
56	Saudi Arabia	16	21
57	Iceland	15	20
58	Israel	15	20
59	China	15	20
60	Ireland	14	19
61	Thailand	14	19
62	New Zealand	13	17
63	Ethiopia	12	16
64	Jordan	12	16
65	Philippines	12	16
66	Liberia	10	13
67	Albania	9	12
68	Burma	8	11
69	Indonesia	8	11
70	Ceylon	7	9
71	Nepal	4	5
72	North Korea	3	4
73	South Korea	3	4
74	Mongolia	2	3
75	Yemen Arab Rep.	1	1

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TABLE 2

DIPLOMATIC IMPORTANCE RANKS AND SCORES BY HALF-DECADE, 1950–1970

(*Continued*)

1955

Rank		*Missions Received*	*Normalized Score*
1	United Kingdom	77	92
2	United States	76	90
3	Italy	76	90
4	France	74	88
5	Holland	68	81
6	Sweden	65	77
7	Belgium	63	75
8	West Germany	63	75
9	Denmark	63	75
10	Switzerland	62	74
11	Spain	61	73
12	Norway	60	71
13	Argentina	58	69
14	Austria	58	69
15	Brazil	55	65
16	India	55	65
17	Mexico	54	64
18	U.S.S.R.	54	64
19	Yugoslavia	52	62
20	Japan	52	62
21	Chile	51	61
22	Poland	51	61
23	Canada	50	60
24	Egypt/U.A.R.	50	60
25	Turkey	49	58
26	Pakistan	49	58
27	Czechoslovakia	48	57
28	Venezuela	44	52
29	Iran	44	52
30	Portugal	43	51
31	Finland	43	51
32	Cuba	41	49
33	Indonesia	41	49
34	Greece	40	48
35	Peru	38	45
36	Lebanon	38	45
37	Ecuador	36	43
38	Uruguay	36	43
39	Dominican Rep.	35	42
40	Syria	35	42
41	Israel	35	42
42	Australia	35	42
43	Colombia	33	39
44	Guatemala	32	38
45	Bolivia	32	38
46	Hungary	32	38
47	Bulgaria	32	38
48	Panama	31	37
49	Paraguay	31	37
50	Rumania	31	37
51	Thailand	30	36
52	Honduras	29	35
53	Salvador	29	35
54	Philippines	29	35
55	Iraq	28	33
56	Costa Rica	27	32
57	Luxemburg	27	32
58	Afghanistan	27	32
59	Haiti	26	31
60	Nicaragua	26	31
61	Ethiopia	26	31
62	South Africa	26	31
63	China	25	30
64	Taiwan	25	30
65	Burma	24	29
66	Iceland	23	27
67	Saudi Arabia	22	26
68	Ireland	21	25
69	Jordan	21	25
70	Ceylon	21	25
71	Libya	19	23
72	New Zealand	19	23
73	Liberia	12	14
74	Yemen Arab Rep.	12	14
75	Albania	11	13
76	East Germany	10	12
77	South Vietnam	9	11
78	Cambodia	8	10
79	Mongolia	7	8
80	North Korea	7	8
81	Nepal	7	8
82	Laos	6	7
83	North Vietnam	5	6
84	South Korea	3	4

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TABLE 2

DIPLOMATIC IMPORTANCE RANKS AND SCORES BY HALF-DECADE, 1950–1970

(*Continued*)

1960

Rank	*Missions Received*	*Normalized Score*
1 Italy	82	92
2 United States	80	90
3 United Kingdom	80	90
4 Holland	77	87
5 France	75	84
6 Sweden	73	82
7 Austria	71	80
8 Denmark	71	80
9 West Germany	69	78
10 Belgium	67	75
11 Japan	65	73
12 Yugoslavia	63	71
13 Switzerland	62	70
14 Spain	62	70
15 Norway	62	70
16 India	61	69
17 Argentina	60	67
18 Czechoslovakia	58	65
19 Egypt/U.A.R.	58	65
20 Brazil	56	63
21 Poland	55	62
22 U.S.S.R.	55	62
23 Finland	55	62
24 Cuba	54	61
25 Turkey	54	61
26 Israel	53	60
27 Mexico	52	58
28 Portugal	52	58
29 Canada	51	57
30 Greece	50	56
31 Pakistan	50	56
32 Chile	49	55
33 Venezuela	47	53
34 Iran	47	53
35 Indonesia	47	53
36 Lebanon	45	51
37 Thailand	45	51
38 Uruguay	43	48
39 Rumania	43	48
40 Taiwan	42	47
41 Hungary	40	45
42 Colombia	39	44
43 Peru	39	44
44 Ceylon	39	44
45 Dominican Rep.	38	43
46 Ecuador	37	42
47 Afghanistan	36	40
48 Salvador	35	39
49 Iraq	35	39
50 Guatemala	34	38
51 Haiti	33	37
52 Costa Rica	33	37
53 Bolivia	33	37
54 Burma	33	37
55 Philippines	33	37
56 Australia	33	37
57 Panama	32	36
58 Paraguay	32	36
59 Sudan	32	36
60 Ethiopia	31	35
61 Tunisia	31	35
62 Honduras	30	34
63 Bulgaria	29	33
64 Jordan	29	33
65 Nicaragua	28	31
66 Luxemburg	27	30
67 Saudi Arabia	27	30
68 China	27	30
69 Iceland	26	29
70 Morocco	26	29
71 Cambodia	24	27
72 Ghana	23	26
73 New Zealand	22	25
74 Ireland	20	22
75 South Africa	20	22
76 Nepal	20	22
77 Libya	19	21
78 Malaysia	18	20
79 Albania	17	19
80 Liberia	16	18
81 Laos	15	17
82 South Vietnam	15	17
83 South Korea	14	16
84 East Germany	12	13
85 Mongolia	10	11
86 Yemen Arab Rep.	8	9
87 North Korea	8	9
88 North Vietnam	8	9
89 Guinea	5	6

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TABLE 2

DIPLOMATIC IMPORTANCE RANKS AND SCORES BY HALF-DECADE, 1950–1970 (*Continued*)

1965

Rank		*Missions Received*	*Normalized Score*
1	United States	112	93
2	United Kingdom	112	93
3	France	111	92
4	Holland	109	90
5	West Germany	102	84
6	Sweden	102	84
7	Italy	101	83
8	Belgium	95	79
9	Japan	95	79
10	India	89	74
11	Canada	87	72
12	Switzerland	87	72
13	Israel	85	70
14	Austria	84	69
15	U.S.S.R.	83	69
16	Egypt/U.A.R.	83	69
17	Denmark	82	68
18	Norway	79	65
19	Yugoslavia	76	63
20	Lebanon	75	62
21	Pakistan	75	62
22	Poland	74	61
23	Spain	71	59
24	Czechoslovakia	70	58
25	Brazil	69	57
26	Finland	67	55
27	Argentina	66	55
28	Sudan	66	55
29	Turkey	65	54
30	Greece	64	53
31	Ghana	62	51
32	Indonesia	62	51
33	Iraq	61	50
34	Hungary	59	49
35	South Korea	59	49
36	Mexico	57	47
37	Portugal	57	47
38	Rumania	57	47
39	Chile	55	45
40	Nigeria	55	45
41	Morocco	55	45
42	Cuba	54	45
43	Algeria	53	44
44	Iran	52	43
45	Bulgaria	51	42
46	Thailand	51	42
47	Venezuela	49	40
48	Peru	49	40
49	Uruguay	49	40
50	Tunisia	49	40
51	Syria	49	40
52	Ceylon	49	40
53	Jordan	46	38
54	Saudi Arabia	46	38
55	China	46	38
56	Ethiopia	45	37
57	Afghanistan	45	37
58	Guinea	44	36
59	Colombia	42	35
60	Mali	42	35
61	Australia	42	35
62	Philippines	40	33
63	Senegal	39	32
64	Guatemala	38	31
65	South Vietnam	38	31
66	Eucador	37	31
67	Luxemburg	37	31
68	Taiwan	37	31
69	Haiti	36	30
70	Dominican Rep.	36	30
71	Salvador	36	30
72	Panama	36	30
73	Libya	36	30
74	Burma	36	30
75	Laos	36	30
76	Bolivia	35	29
77	Zaire	35	29
78	Nicaragua	34	28
79	Costa Rica	34	28
80	Paraguay	33	27
81	Liberia	33	27
82	Cameroun	33	27
83	Iceland	32	26
84	Malaysia	32	26
85	Honduras	31	26
86	Dahomey	31	26
87	Cambodia	31	26
88	Ireland	30	25
89	Ivory Coast	28	23
90	New Zealand	28	23
91	Cyprus	27	22
92	Nepal	26	21
93	Togo	24	20

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TABLE 2

DIPLOMATIC IMPORTANCE RANKS AND SCORES BY HALF-DECADE, 1950–1970

(*Continued*)

1965

Rank		*Missions Received*	*Normalized Score*	*Rank*		*Missions Received*	*Normalized Score*
94	Tanzania	24	20	108	Malagasy	17	14
95	Niger	23	19	109	East Germany	16	13
96	Upper Volta	23	19	110	Chad	16	13
97	Sierra Leone	23	19	111	Kuwait	16	13
98	Congo	23	19	112	North Vietnam	16	13
99	South Africa	23	19	113	Zambia	13	11
100	Yemen Arab Rep.	22	18	114	North Korea	13	11
				115	Central African R.	12	10
101	Albania	21	17	116	Rwanda	12	10
102	Gabon	21	17	117	Burundi	10	8
103	Kenya	21	17	118	Jamaica	9	7
104	Mongolia	21	17	119	Trinidad-Tobago	9	7
105	Somalia	19	16	120	Malawi	9	7
106	Uganda	18	15	121	Malta	2	2
107	Mauritania	17	14				

1970

1	United Kingdom	122	92	31	Greece	68	51
2	Holland	119	89	32	Sudan	68	51
3	France	119	89	33	Algeria	67	50
4	Belgium	117	88	34	Lebanon	67	50
5	Switzerland	117	88	35	Ethiopia	66	50
6	United States	115	86	36	Hungary	64	48
7	Sweden	114	86	37	Morocco	63	47
8	Canada	113	85	38	Mexico	62	47
9	Italy	110	83	39	Ghana	62	47
10	West Germany	106	80	40	Nigeria	60	45
11	Japan	103	77	41	Indonesia	60	45
12	India	103	77	42	Chile	59	44
13	Austria	98	74	43	Tunisia	59	44
14	Denmark	97	73	44	Australia	58	44
15	Pakistan	96	72	45	Venezuela	55	41
16	Yugoslavia	95	71	46	Mali	55	41
17	U.S.S.R.	92	69	47	Iran	54	41
18	Norway	92	69	48	Thailand	53	40
19	Rumania	91	68	49	Guinea	52	39
20	Spain	88	66	50	Syria	52	39
21	Egypt/U.A.R.	86	65	51	Ceylon	52	39
22	Argentina	85	64	52	Peru	50	38
23	Israel	85	64	53	Uruguay	50	38
24	Poland	83	62	54	Senegal	50	38
25	Czechoslovakia	80	60	55	Kenya	50	38
26	Finland	80	60				
27	Bulgaria	78	59	56	Portugal	49	37
				57	Afghanistan	49	37
28	Brazil	75	56	58	Taiwan	49	37
29	Turkey	72	54	59	Jordan	48	36
30	South Korea	71	53	60	Cuba	47	35

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TABLE 2

DIPLOMATIC IMPORTANCE RANKS AND SCORES BY HALF-DECADE, 1950–1970

(*Continued*)

1970

Rank		*Missions Received*	*Normalized Score*
61	Tanzania	47	35
62	Iraq	47	35
63	China	47	35
64	Malaysia	47	35
65	Zaire	46	35
66	Colombia	45	34
67	Saudi Arabia	45	34
68	Ivory Coast	43	32
69	Kuwait	43	32
70	Philippines	43	32
71	Luxemburg	42	32
72	Cameroun	42	32
73	Libya	42	32
74	Panama	41	31
75	Dominican Rep.	40	30
76	Salvador	40	30
77	Ecuador	40	30
78	Burma	40	30
79	Guatemala	39	29
80	Paraguay	39	29
81	Liberia	39	29
82	Uganda	39	29
83	Costa Rica	38	29
84	Cyprus	38	29
85	Dahomey	38	29
86	Nicaragua	37	28
87	Bolivia	37	28
88	Laos	37	28
89	Iceland	36	27
90	Mongolia	36	27
91	Cambodia	36	27
92	Mauritania	35	26
93	Singapore	35	26
94	New Zealand	35	26
95	Haiti	34	26
96	Honduras	34	26
97	Malta	34	26
98	Zambia	34	26
99	Nepal	34	26
100	South Vietnam	34	26
101	Somalia	33	25
102	Congo	31	23
103	North Korea	31	23
104	Upper Volta	30	23
105	Niger	29	22
106	Sierra Leone	28	21
107	Togo	28	21
108	Chad	28	21
109	Malagasy	26	20
110	Albania	25	19
111	Central African R.	25	19
112	North Vietnam	25	19
113	Ireland	24	18
114	South Africa	24	18
115	Gabon	23	17
116	Burundi	23	17
117	Yemen Arab Rep.	23	17
118	Malawi	22	17
119	Jamaica	21	16
120	Trinidad-Tobago	20	15
121	Rwanda	18	14
122	Botswana	17	13
123	East Germany	16	12
124	Barbados	15	11
125	Guyana	14	11
126	Lesotho	13	10
127	Mauritius	13	10
128	Gambia	12	9
129	Yemen People's R.	12	9
130	Equatorial Guinea	11	8
131	Swaziland	5	4
132	Maldive Islands	3	2
133	Rhodesia	0	0

The foregoing data, plus those found in the earlier paper, permit one to ascertain which states were in which approximate position vis-à-vis others in any given half-decade since the Congress of Vienna. For some theoretical purposes, such cross-sectional pictures of the system's hierarchy can be quite useful; but for others, it would be more valuable to have a longitudinal picture, and were space available, such a

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table would be presented. Potential users may request the data for "Diplomatic Importance Score of Each Nation by Quintile during each Half-Decade, 1816–1970" from the Archive, as mentioned in footnote 9.

Conclusion

The general impression, as one scrutinizes the scores and rankings in Table 2, is that we have come fairly close to "tapping" the concept of diplomatic importance. By and large, the major powers always cluster at the top; the "pariah" states and their satellites score somewhat lower than their better-established opposite numbers; the non-aligned states outrank their NATO and Warsaw Pact counterparts; the smaller but centrally placed states show up higher than might be expected; and the more peripheral actors systematically fall into the lower quintiles. Further, the longitudinal picture is quite satisfactory: the peripheral states move up on the diplomatic importance scores as they industrialize and/or seek an increasingly active role in the system; those which suffer defeat (or great damage) in war show the expected decline and vice versa; and the newly independent states begin near the bottom of the listing but move up as their potential is developed and recognized.

On the other hand, the index does produce some readings that might seem out of place, and they also merit attention. One apparent anomaly is the tendency of certain smaller states of Western Europe to hover near or at the top of the rankings during most of the post-World War II period, above the U.S.S.R., China, India, or Japan. Partly, this is due to the reluctance of governments to sever long-established ties, and partly to the fact that the interstate system is still centered in Europe. In addition, Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland are major trading states as well as hosts to a variety of international organizations, while Italy also provides the seat of the Vatican, making it an important focal point for the Catholic countries of the world. The position of Soviet Russia, then, below these smaller Western states, should come as no surprise.

Further, as we have already emphasized, we are not trying to measure size, military capability, or industrial potential, even though such factors will affect the scores. Moreover, as a revolutionary (and therefore pariah) state in a conservative and capitalist-dominated system, the Soviet Union's score will inevitably reflect the fear and hostility of other members of the system, plus the systematic efforts of the major Western powers to keep her in isolation. The same may be said, but more forcefully, of Communist China. Not only are her capabilities

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considerably fewer than the Western press suggests, and her energies largely directed toward internal development, but the United States has, until very recently, systematically discriminated against and tried to isolate this latest challenger to the old diplomatic order.

Having noted these possible discrepancies between the computed scores and what might have been "expected," we remind the reader that, as a first systematic attempt, any index such as this will certainly have some deficiencies. More important, there will be disagreement as to whether deviations from the expected are indeed discrepancies. That disagreement will, in turn, depend upon both the folklore out of which our expectations arise and the clarity and face validity of the reasoning behind the measuring procedures. Though there is little we can do about the former, we hope that our performance on the latter is adequate. In any event, we regard the argument made here to be considerably more rigorous and explicit than that found in the original paper.

Finally, some may feel that we have taken on an impossible task: trying to reflect, in a single indicator, a complex state of affairs which emerges from a variety of background factors. It is clear that we have not produced a simple proxy indicator, with a one-to-one association between the observed phenomenon and some single unobserved condition in the empirical world. But the very diversity of the factors that affect the measure and the very complexity of the decision processes that produce the outcome may well be viewed as an asset. When we can, by parsimoniously observing a single set of traces, tap the resultant of a very complex set of interactions, we have progressed on the measurement front. And what holds for the GNP of a nation, the IQ of a schoolboy, the earned-run average of a baseball pitcher, or the force of a moving object would seem to hold for the diplomatic importance of a state.

We realize, however, that such single-index measures of complex phenomena are never fully satisfactory in reliability and validity, and that they usually undergo improvement as they are put into use and their inadequacies become evident. As the science of world politics develops, we trust that the measure at hand will not only prove useful to many researchers, but will experience whatever improvements and refinements turn out to be necessary.

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BUREAUCRACY, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

By GERALD A. HEEGER

THE growing role of governmental bureaucracy has been one of the most noted and discussed characteristics of developing political systems. The phenomenon of bureaucratic intervention in politics, already discernible in the 1950's in many of these states, has, so it seems, become the rule rather than the exception in the years that have followed. Despite the prevalence of the politicized bureaucracy, however, and the amount of discussion engendered by the phenomenon, the sources of bureaucratic growth and dominance in the developing states remain obscure. Most analysts emphasize the superior organization of the bureaucracy and argue that this organization, reinforced by the transfer of techniques from abroad and uncontested because of weak indigenous political institutions, provides much of the explanation for the aggrandizement of the bureaucracy in the policy-making process.

In this brief paper I seek to reexamine these theories, not only in terms of what they say about bureaucracies in developing societies, but also in terms of what they say about the political processes of those societies in general. I offer an alternative hypothesis: that bureaucratic dominance results not so much from its organizational superiority as from the pre-emption and monopolization of key governmental offices in the political system by bureaucratic élites. Such a pre-emption prevents political élites from building political organizations that could function as alternatives to the bureaucracy in the policy-making process.

I

Bureaucracies have always been deeply involved in the policy-making process; and the various terms which have evolved, "action groups," "institutional interest groups," and so forth, are efforts to conceptualize the bureaucracy's policy-making role. Of principal concern for students of developing political systems, however, is the tendency of bureaucracies in those systems to dominate the policy-making process almost completely. Despite this concern, the reason offered for the "overgrowth" of bureaucracy and the means suggested for curtailing it have both tended to be relatively simplistic. In part, the emergence of the bureaucracy as a primary political force is seen as being inextricably linked with mod-

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ernization itself. The complexity of issues in the modern state and the bureaucrat's expertise, or superior access to expertise, seems to necessitate a greater role for bureaucracy in the initiation of policy.

Moreover, bureaucratic dominance is frequently considered to be an almost inevitable result of the bureaucracy's superior organization. The role of bureaucracy in the newly emerged nation-state, it is argued, expands in the organizational vacuum left by the departure of the colonial regime and by the failure of political parties to survive the transformation from nationalist movement to ruling party. In the absence of other viable institutions, the bureaucracy becomes, almost inevitably, the dominant institution in the political process.[1]

This argument has also been stood on its head. A bureaucracy's superior organization may explain its dominance in a political system, but organization can also provide a means of limiting the political role of bureaucracies. Both S. N. Eisenstadt and Fred Riggs, for example, stress the need for "strong political élites" and for viable political organizations to restrain the bureaucracy's tendency "to obtain autonomous power."[2]

A kind of "countervailing-powers" model of political development results from these analyses. Modernization and political development are linked to the emergence of viable and effective political and governmental institutions. Such institutionalization, however, must be "balanced." The emergence of a single institution with significantly more organizational capability leads, almost inevitably, to arrogation of the system by that institution, often at the expense of continued development. Such is the case, it is argued, in many of the developing states in which bureaucracies have asserted themselves.

To some extent, this argument appears to be simply an enlargement on the "bureaucratic" model.[3] The argument begins with a description of an ideal type of bureaucracy defined in terms of its structural and functional characteristics, and posits growth in terms of positive changes in those characteristics.

The "bureaucratic" model, by its very formulation, has tended to produce an overemphasis on organization as a variable—a situation often exacerbated by the kinds of data available. There are numerous

[1] For examples of this argument, see Joseph LaPalombara, "Bureaucracy and Political Development: Notes, Queries, Dilemmas," S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," and Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucracy and Political Development," all in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963).

[2] *Ibid.*, 117, 126-29.

[3] The bureaucratic model is discussed in Dwight Waldo, *Comparative Public Administration: Prologue, Problems, and Promise* (Chicago 1964).

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historical data on the growth of the bureaucracies in the developing states. Contemporary data—many of them collected by the bureaucracies themselves—tend to attribute to those bureaucracies all the concreteness of their counterparts in the developed states: the physical apparatus of buildings and files, the staffs, the hierarchies, and, in theory at least, the procedures. By contrast, political institutions seem disorganized at best. Many political parties were illegal during the struggle for independence and operated covertly, a situation not conducive to record-keeping. Legislatures seem devoid of procedure and tradition; political parties appear to be fragmented.

The emphasis on organization distorts both sides of the "countervailing-powers" model. As most studies have shown, the bureaucracies in the new states have been poorly organized, suffering from inexperience of personnel and from poor facilities.[4] Nor has it always been true that in those states where bureaucracies have been politically weaker, their weakness is the result of the organizational development and strength of other political institutions. This is especially perceptible in those states in which bureaucratic constraint has been associated with the emergence of what were thought to be mass political parties of the Leninist type. There is an increasing amount of evidence to suggest that these parties are something less than they were originally thought to be.[5] A study of one such party, TANU, in Tanzania, for example, shows it to be very limited, both in its impact on the general population and in its capability to mobilize support for its goals.[6] Far from being an African version of a Leninist party, TANU is a "grouping of organizations that functioned under a few well-known leaders" and is becoming progressively looser.[7] At the same time, however, other studies suggest that, despite the organizational weakness of the party, the relatively well-organized Tanzanian bureaucracy is far from the seat of power. TANU governmental élites have altered the structure of regional and local administration to increase their control, recruited civil servants into the party, and in general constrained the bureaucracy to the point where its function has been severely hampered.[8] Similar

[4] See, for example, Ralph Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan," in LaPalombara (fn. 1), 379.

[5] Aristide Zolberg, *Creating Political Order* (Chicago 1966).

[6] Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development* (Princeton 1970).

[7] *Ibid.*, 452.

[8] *Ibid.*, 147-51; William Tordoff, "Regional Administration in Tanzania," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, III (May 1965), 63-89; Anthony H. Rweyemanu, "Managing Planned Development: Tanzania's Experience," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, IV (May 1966), 9.

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situations can be found in the Ivory Coast, in Egypt, and elsewhere.

The tendency to utilize the structural and functional characteristics of a bureaucracy to explain its political power or lack of it persists in what are intended to be alternative models of bureaucratic development. Some scholars, seeking to explain bureaucracies which depart radically from the Weberian ideal that is basic to the "bureaucratic" model, have attempted to construct societal models from which bureaucratic structure and behavior can be deduced. Fred Riggs has perhaps been most prominently associated with this approach. In analyzing developing societies in terms of what he calls a "prismatic" model, Riggs has developed a series of propositions about bureaucracy in such societies—their specificity, effectiveness, and range of power—as compared to other bureaucracies in both developed and non-developed systems.[9] The "organization" variable is implicit in his writings. Riggs notes that bureaucratic organizations adapted from more advanced systems seem to increase a bureaucracy's capability for control.[10] This becomes more explicit in his subsequent writings, in which he stresses institutional and organizational "balance" as a condition necessary to prevent usurpation of the political system by any single institution, whether it be the bureaucracy or a political party.[11]

The shortcomings of the traditional "bureaucratic" model for understanding developing nations have given rise to an alternative perspective: development administration. Emphasizing developmental programs and projects, proponents of this perspective seek to focus on organizational variables only with reference to the achievement of particular goals and programs. No particular organizational arrangement or set of procedures is held to be *a priori* more effective. The developmental goals are primary, and institutional arrangements, procedures, and changes are analyzed with reference to those goals.[12]

This perspective has been more successful for theory-building than for guiding actual research. Despite the explicit theoretical concern for relating bureaucracy to its environment, much of the research using a development-administration model has tended to yield case studies

[9] Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries* (Boston 1964).

[10] *Ibid.*, 227.

[11] See, in particular, Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," in Riggs, ed., *Frontiers of Development Administration* (Durham, N.C. 1970), 375-414.

[12] For the most recent discussions on this topic, see *ibid.*; also, Ralph Braibanti and others, eds., *Political and Administrative Development* (Durham, N.C. 1969); Dwight Waldo, ed., *Temporal Dimensions of Development Administration* (Durham, N.C. 1970); Edward W. Weidner, ed., *Development Administration in Asia* (Durham, N.C. 1970).

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of administrative development with little explicit linkage to developmental goals. As a result, this perspective, while at variance with the traditional bureaucratic model, tends also to overemphasize organizational procedures and arrangements.

It would appear, then, that the linkage of bureaucratic usurpation of the decision-making process and organization and the hypothesis that such usurpation can be prevented by counter-balancing political organizations are grounded more in the limited focus of the bureaucratic model (with its excessive reliance on organizational structure and function) than in concrete fact. Nor have alternative models succeeded in explaining bureaucratic dominance.

II

By and large, the growth of bureaucracies and bureaucratic power and the development of political institutions such as political parties are viewed as distinct processes. That is, they are seen as involving different sets of actors seeking to institutionalize different sets of procedures, rules, and goals. Therefore the failure of political institutions is generally attributed to the political leaders themselves and, once in a while, to ill fortune. Political élites are, according to many students of bureaucracies in the new states, inept organizers, apathetic, and, more often than not, corrupt.[13] These characteristics alone, so it seems, explain their weakness vis-à-vis the bureaucracy.

The political parties in the West, whether parliamentary or extra-parliamentary in origin, expanded their constituencies in the wake of a widening franchise, articulating and aggregating interests generated by various social cleavages within a society. Such parties are distinct organizational entities, separate from government. If they fail, they do so as a result of inadequate organization or inability to adjust to a changing social environment.

In discussing the emergence of effective political party élites in the less developed countries, it is generally assumed that the development of political parties will roughly replicate the pattern of party development in the West. Such an assumption ignores the role of "government" in the institution-building process in the developing states. National politics in those states consists principally of the effort of extending authority downward and outward from the élites who claimed power initially. These élites seek to infuse their authority into society and to generate widespread acceptance of that authority. Political de-

[13] For an example of this argument, see Henry Goodnow, *The Civil Service of Pakistan* (Princeton 1964), 91-96.

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velopment is, then, a process which seeks to interrelate widely diverse groups and to institutionalize those relationships. The political party often plays a critical role in this process—both extending authority and being extended by it.

The focus of this process is government. Elites who occupy governmental offices possess at least some capability to dispense goods and services in the society. The availability of such power, in effect, structures the loose system of élites and groups, forcing them into various coalitions in an effort to gain access to, and perhaps even control of, the government-focused system. The control of key governmental offices allows the ruling élites, if they desire, to build a political party in much the same way that political machines were built in American cities in the early part of this century.[14] In other words, political organization does not produce power; rather, the possession of power is often crucial to building political organization. In many African and Asian states the nationalist parties never succeeded in amassing the support of even half the eligible electorate before independence; they gained control only after the colonial regimes, for a variety of reasons, designated them as their successors. More often than not, it was only after governmental power was secured that the so-called "mass" parties were built. Political élites claimed a monopoly over access to government and authority, and were generally able to build party organizations because of that monopoly.

If the control of key governmental roles is essential for the party-building process and for the emergence of political control over the policy-making process, the reverse seems to be true as well. The failure of political élites to control key governmental roles and to use their positions to build a party may lead to complete ineffectiveness of a political system vis-à-vis military or bureaucratic élites.

The case of Pakistan is a good example of the latter circumstance. Although the Civil Service of Pakistan inherited the rich Indian Civil-Service tradition, and although the nationalist Muslim League never succeeded in effectively organizing itself, the ultimate failure of the political élites in the Pakistani system seems to have been less a result of these factors or of the venality of the politicians than a result of the exclusion of the political élites from the key political roles of Governor-General (President) and Prime Minister. Under the nation's first leaders, Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, civil servants were allowed to dominate the national and provincial governments

[14] The "machine model," and its utility for understanding political parties in developing political systems, is briefly explored in Bienen (fn. 6).

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completely, a situation which considerably hampered efforts to build up the Pakistan Muslim League.[15] What is perhaps more important, Jinnah's principal successors to the office of Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza, continually frustrated the efforts of political parties to organize themselves. Both men had been career civil servants, and the latter was especially vocal in his desire for a return to the bureaucratic rule that he saw as the basis of the British *raj*. Active civil servants and career civil servants-turned-politicians occupied the principal political offices at all levels of the Pakistani political system. These élites continually manipulated the party system through their control of government and fragmented the Muslim League beyond repair in 1956. The military coup of 1958 briefly replaced the top élites with military figures. Only then were political parties banned officially, but they had long before been rendered ineffective.

What I am suggesting here is that in the dichotomy between bureaucracy and political parties, the critical variable is not organization or the lack of it; rather, it is the dominance of key governmental offices and the choices made by the occupants of those offices. In the case of Pakistan, it was not that the politicians were more venal or more disorganized than their counterparts elsewhere, or even that the administrators were significantly better organized. Rather, bureaucratic dominance resulted from the failure of the initial occupants of the key offices, who were political élites, to monopolize access to governmental power. After their removal from the scene, there was nothing to prevent bureaucrat-politicians from making a series of maneuvers which effectively closed off governmental access to other political élites. The expansion of the bureaucracy in Pakistan seems to have been less a flow into an institutional vacuum than a pre-emption of the offices through which political party institutions could be built. The vacuum was as much created by bureaucratic élites as it was filled by them.

Fred Riggs has suggested that the premature development of a bureaucracy which recruits on the basis of universalistic achievement criteria inhibits the development of a political party system by depriving the parties of spoils as a means of mobilizing support.[16] Riggs is correct in his emphasis on spoils, but it is not only through the depoliticization of government jobs that a party is inhibited. The crucial variable is the control of key governmental offices and, through them,

[15] Khalid Bin Sayeed, "The Political Role of Pakistan's Civil Service," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXI (June 1958), 131.
[16] Riggs (fn. 1), 128.

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the privilege of dispensing spoils. In this sense, one can describe the Pakistani case in terms of bureaucratic-political élites dispensing spoils in an effort to *break down* any potentially effective political party. A venal bureaucracy can as effectively inhibit the development of a political party system as one that is autonomous, merit-based, and uncorrupted.

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Review Article

IN SEARCH OF CHINESE NATIONAL CHARACTER VIA CHILD-TRAINING

By PI-CHAO CHEN

Richard H. Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971, 604 pp., $16.75; $5.95 paper.

I

THE postwar period has been an unusual era in the annals of political science. Numerous practitioners of the discipline have ventured into areas previously unexplored, formulating new concepts, constructing new conceptual frameworks and models, putting forth new hypotheses and theories previously unstated, borrowing and importing ideas and methodological tools from sister disciplines, and improving upon old and innovating new research techniques (particularly quantitative techniques)—all in the interest of pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge. It seems no exaggeration to say that this is one of the most creative, if not necessarily the most fruitful, episodes in the development of the discipline. For all of this, publication of Herbert Hyman's *Political Socialization* (1959) and Gabriel Almond's and Sidney Verba's *Civic Culture* (1963) must be regarded as important milestones. In a sense, their appearances marked the branching out of the study of comparative politics into a new "catchment area,"[1] namely, the study of political socialization and political culture. To be sure, the area of intellectual concern explored by these two works can be traced back to Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, Weber, and—last but not least—to a whole generation of students of "national character." However, in terms of the analytical and operational distinctiveness and the focus and techniques of empirical research, they represent new departures. This is particularly true with respect to the work by Almond and Verba, which broke new ground and opened up a new dimension of the scientific study of politics.[2] The significance of Hyman's

[1] J. P. Nettl, *Political Mobilization* (New York 1967), 44.

[2] There are, however, a number of defects and deficiencies inevitable in a pioneering work. See for example, Moshe M. Czudnowski, "A Salience Dimension of Politics for the Study of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (September 1968), 878-88; David S. Gibbons, "The Spectator Political Culture: A Refinement of

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book consists not so much in its being an original piece of scholarship (which it is not), as in its calling the attention of political scientists to the relevance of political socialization for understanding and explaining certain political orientations and behavior, through a masterly summary and synthesis of a vast amount of previously published psychological and sociological research on socialization.

In the years since the books by Hyman and Almond and Verba first appeared, they have exerted profound influence on the direction and focus of research, as evidenced by the recent mushrooming of literature on political culture and socialization. So great has been their impact on the discipline that today the jargon and many of the concepts they coined or popularized have become household words among political scientists. They have even made their impact felt in the field of Chinese politics, which, until the appearance of Chalmers Johnson's[3] and especially Franz Schurmann's works,[4] had had a rightly deserved reputation of leading a life of splendid isolation within the larger academic community. Publication, in recent years, of a number of studies on Chinese political socialization and culture bears eloquent testimony to the influence of these pioneering studies.

Of all the recent studies on Chinese political socialization and culture, Professor Richard H. Solomon's *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* is undoubtedly the most provocative and imaginative. Unlike Wilson[5] and Ridly and colleagues,[6] who on the whole confine themselves to subject matters of manageable proportions and do their best to interpret and analyze the data collected, Solomon takes on nothing short of the Chinese political culture and contemporary Chinese politics in their entirety. It is a tour de force, an ambitious attempt at psychocultural characterization of the Chinese political system, and a neo-Freudian psychoanalysis of the politics of "one-fourth of mankind." Unlike Pye,[7] who makes sweeping, unqualified statements about

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the Almond and Verba Model," *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, IX (March 1971), 19-35.

[3] Chalmers A. Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (Stanford 1962). For a recent critique, see Tetsuya Kataoka, "Communist Power in a War of National Liberation: The Case of China," *World Politics*, XXIV (April 1972), 410-27.

[4] Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley 1966).

[5] Richard W. Wilson, *Learning to be Chinese: The Political Socialization of Children in Taiwan* (Cambridge, Mass. 1970).

[6] Charles Price Ridly, Paul H. B. Godwin, and Dennis U. Doolin, *The Making of a Model Citizen in Communist China* (Stanford 1971).

[7] Lucian W. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968). See also Pye, *China: An Introduction* (Boston 1972), and James C. Hsiung's critical review in *Perspective*, I (December 1972), 237.

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Chinese political culture and behavior (some of which are admittedly interesting, insightful, and plausible) without even making a pretense to "prove" them, Solomon makes serious attempts to "substantiate" his observations by "data" and to interpret contemporary Chinese politics from the perspective of his theory of "dependency political culture." And unlike Lifton,[8] who psychoanalyzes the politics of Chairman Mao, Solomon psychoanalyzes nothing less than the politics of a nation of 700 million and the Chairman's attempts to transform the political culture of that nation.

Although Solomon considers the first half of his book a study of Chinese political culture, his conceptualization of political culture has little, if anything, in common with that of Almond and Verba. (This does not discredit Solomon, whose conceptualization of political culture, although not operationalized, is far more imaginative and to the point than that of Almond and Verba.)[9] According to Solomon, political culture consists of a wide range of "social attitudes, emotional concerns, and moral norms which influence political behavior" (p. 2).

Guided by insights derived from psychoanalytical theory and writings on "culture and personality," Solomon attempts to establish connections between: (1) modes of child-rearing practice in China and the modal personality configuration of the Chinese, and (2) the Chinese modal personality and Chinese political culture.

Solomon observes that in Chinese culture the process of socialization is divided into two distinct stages: from birth to the teens and from the teens to early adulthood. During the first stage, the child experiences extreme oral indulgence, permissiveness, and light discipline, especially regarding toilet training. Unlike American parents who try to inculcate the cultural norm of self-reliance in their child at as early an age as possible, Chinese parents prolong indulging their child as late as possible. They not only take care of but anticipate the child's physical and other needs. However, the child suddenly encounters a radically different, painful treatment when he reaches his teens. His father becomes stern, more controlling, and more distant. Through the threat of isolation, physical punishment, the use of shaming techniques, ceaseless exhortation of the Confucian filial virtue, and by not

[8] Robert J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York 1968).

[9] Students of political culture have yet to come to some sort of consensus as to what constitutes the core of intellectual concerns and appropriate research procedure. This is reflected in a recent conference summarized in Dorothy Knapp and others, "Digest of the Conference on Political Culture and Comparative Communist Studies," *Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism*, v (May 1972), 2-17.

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allowing the child to "talk back" to them, Chinese parents develop considerable anxiety in their child about disobeying instructions and, indeed, fear of direct contact with the stern father.

Solomon theorizes that persons undergoing this kind of experience in childhood develop certain personality traits in adulthood: oral passivity, ambivalence toward authority, fear of being rejected by authority. These traits constitute part of the modal personality configuration of the Chinese.

Another outstanding feature of Chinese child-rearing practices is the parents' severe disapproval and swift punishment of the child's expression of hostile and aggressive impulses toward themselves, his siblings, and his neighborhood peers. This socialization results in the formation of other salient components of the modal personality configuration of the Chinese: ready submission to authority, inability to handle emotional release and lack of faith in their ability to do so, and fear and avoidance of competition and conflict.

Solomon goes on to delineate what he considers to be the outstanding and enduring characteristics of the Chinese political culture. He finds that there exists a perfect or high degree of "fit" (or congruence) between the Chinese modal personality configuration, molded largely by Chinese child-rearing practices on the one hand, and the Chinese political culture on the other. He then invokes the Chinese modal personality configuration to explain Chinese political culture and certain recurrent features of Chinese politics.[10]

In Chinese political culture, Solomon observes, there exists a paradoxical combination of the desire for a strong leader and a concomitant resentment against the demands of this powerful authority. He accounts for this paradox in terms of the process of socialization. The sudden, drastic transition from the permissiveness of infancy to the harsh discipline of the teens produces in a maturing son a "strong sense of ambivalence to authority." He is worried about approaching it too closely and resents its manipulativeness, aloofness, and harshness. As a result of his interaction with his father (that distant, harsh, anxiety-provoking, and uncontrollable authority figure in the family), the child learns a variety of strategies for dealing with authority: avoidance of contact, ready obedience when contact becomes unavoidable, and appeal to stronger third parties for intercession.

Solomon also invokes the process of socialization during the teens

[10] See also Solomon, "Mao's Effort to Reintegrate the Chinese Polity: Problems of Authority and Conflict," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Chinese Communist Politics in Action* (Seattle 1969), 271-364.

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to explain other psychological predispositions and personality traits of the Chinese. The "taking in" of orders, the unquestioning submission to and dependence upon that distant and unapproachable authority, the father, who makes decisions for him, takes care of him, rewards him for conforming to demands, and punishes him for disobeying—all of these reactions have profound bearings on Chinese political culture. The ways of dealing with authority that are learned by the child in his teens prepare him for his adult political role and socialize him to respond in certain ways to things political in his adulthood. Psychological predispositions and personality thus formed—i.e., passivity and anxiety before authority, lethargy and lack of initiative, and panicky fear and shunning of responsibility—in turn constitute part of the style of Chinese political behavior.

Another apparently paradoxical phenomenon in interpersonal relationships and the sharp contrast between cultural and political reality is observed by Solomon. Interpersonal relationships in China tend to be characterized by excessive politeness and mannerism (*li mao* and *ko chi*) and avoidance of competition and conflict, but often erupt into uncontrollable emotional outrage and unrestrained violence when the politeness breaks down.[11] In other words, the Chinese are incapable of "disciplined" and "controlled" conflict. Historically, the enduring Confucian tradition that elevates love of peace and interpersonal harmony to supreme social values has sharply contrasted with the recurrent reality of periods of tranquillity and social order that were shattered by episodes of uncompromising political conflict and unrestrained violence. Chinese history has been an alternating pattern of peace and conflict.

Here again, Solomon finds the explanation for the paradoxes in the Confucian cultural tradition that allegedly denies any legitimacy to limited release of hostility and aggression whatsoever, and the parental disapproval and punishment of any such expression on the part of their children. As he matures, a Chinese learns not to express any sentiments of hostility against those in positions of authority, and to swallow his resentment. He also learns early that emotional expressiveness is dangerous. Having been denied the opportunity to learn how to handle emotion, he grows up without any well developed control over released emotions and with no faith in his ability to handle emotion and to engage in controlled conflict. Consequently, he develops excessive fear and avoidance of conflict. Having been taught that "holding in"

[11] Ruth Benedict has made more or less similar observations about the Japanese. See *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston 1946).

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one's emotion is the only proper response to interpersonal dealings, he has a tendency to erupt into uncontrollable violence once the lid on the emotion is removed.

Having learned not to express hostile and aggressive sentiments (except against subordinates), having no faith in his ability to handle his own emotional impulses, fearing confusion, yearning for interpersonal harmony and peace, and yet distrusting his peers, a Chinese naturally comes "to see the only hope of maintaining social order in the external controls of social organization, in which the individual will be 'boxed in' by the combined forces of group obligations and ties, and the authority of strong leaders" (p. 132). This sentiment, combined with ambivalence toward authority and readiness to abandon one authority figure in favor of another, explains the alternation of periods of tranquillity based on submission to strong and unchallenged authority with episodes of uncompromising political conflict and unrestrained violence.

II

In the foregoing section I have summarized Solomon's attempts at conceptualizing and theorizing about the Chinese modal personality configuration and political culture, and about their causal links to Chinese child-rearing practices. Together, they constitute the first two parts of his mammoth volume. Parts three and four analyze and interpret the Maoist political revolution and Maoist political reconstruction from the perspective of the frame of reference and theoretical insights developed in the earlier parts. All in all, the volume is one of the most provocative pieces of scholarship on the politics and culture of China that has appeared in recent years. It is full of insightful observations, perceptive analyses, and subtle and brilliant interpretations. It sheds much light on Chinese personality traits and political culture, and clarifies, for me at least, many puzzling issues and enigmatic events in contemporary Chinese politics. Solomon's analysis, from a psychocultural perspective, of Mao's revolutionary strategies in pursuit of power before 1949 is highly illuminating and full of convincing arguments. However, his chapters dealing with Mao's attempts to transform Chinese society and culture in his own image, and with Chinese politics since 1949 in general, are not as convincing. This is especially true with respect to his interpretation of the Cultural Revolution, which has a quality of rushing to judgment. Whatever its long-run status in the community of Sinologists, it is certainly one of the most original and provocative, and therefore controversial, interpretative works on Chinese politics

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and culture. It is likely to be a work that students of Chinese politics will have to reckon with whether or not they agree with one or another of its particular theses.

Although Solomon's attempts at psychocultural characterization and interpretation of Chinese politics may be a novelty in political science (at least in terms of its thoroughness and the size of the society it covers), the approach itself is nothing new, at least to the cultural and psychological anthropologists. For what Solomon (and others, such as Lucian Pye and Nathan Leites)[12] calls the psychocultural approach is no different from what the anthropologists have long known as the approach of "culture and personality," or the so-called "national character studies" associated with some of the most illustrious names in twentieth-century anthropology—e.g., Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Geoffrey Gorer, Clyde Kluckhohn, Cora DuBois, Ralph Linton, Weston La Barre, Erik Erikson, and Abram Kardiner.

Although I greatly admire Solomon's herculean efforts at psychocultural characterization and analysis of the Chinese modal personality configuration, I must admit that I have serious reservations about the results. Personality and culture form phenomena too complex to be fitted into simplified characterizations. Inasmuch as attempts at psychocultural characterizations of the small, "primitive," "simple," "pre- or non-literate" societies have come under severe criticism in the last two decades,[13] one must be skeptical about attempts at psychocultural characterization and psychoanalysis of so large and diverse a cultural area as China—even though one may at the same time be sympathetic and admiring.

Underlying the writings on culture and personality is the premise that a given cultural configuration has its counterpart in the individuals of each society, and that a given culture tends to produce a "modal personality," or a "basic personality structure," or a "character structure." The very concept of modal personality configuration assumes cultural homogeneity, an extremely unrealistic assumption even for small, "primitive," "simple," "pre- or non-literate" societies, and a much less realistic one for a civilization or cultural area like China.

[12] Lucian W. Pye (fn. 7); Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts," *World Politics*, I (October 1948), 102-19. Among the studies by political scientists that attempt to explain politics in terms of culture and personality, two readily come to mind: Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, Ill. 1958), and Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation-Building* (New Haven 1962).

[13] See, for example, Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, "A Critique of Culture-Personality Writings," *American Sociological Review*, XV (October 1950), 587-600.

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Alex Inkeles, one of whose writings inspired Solomon to use the concept of modal personality, takes advocates of the tradition of culture-personality to task for failing to account adequately for differentiation within large national populations. As he puts it, the culture-personality approach "emphasizes the central tendency, the existence of which it presumes but does not prove, and neglects the range of variation within and around the average or typical. Once we begin to deal with distributions, with variations and range, we must recognize that a second weakness of this approach is that its descriptive language, the technical terms on which it is based, does not easily permit the precise measurement and quantitative expression necessary to the study of a distributive phenomenon."[14]

Solomon is aware of the indefensibility of the assumption of homogeneity; he concedes that "even in the small sample of Chinese interviewed for this study we see a rich variation in personality style which thoroughly eliminates any 'all alike' interpretation" (p. 5n.). He feels confident, however, that his data show that there is "a range of social attitudes and emotional concerns common to this group [his sample], and shared patterns of behavior used [by this group] in coping with interpersonal situations" (p. 5n.). He believes that he can best confront the objection by turning the questions around: " 'All Chinese are different.' Is there nothing which they have in common? Unless one believes that all generalizations about human social life, or history, are invalid—which we do not—the question is in what respects are Chinese alike, and in what ways is their individuality expressed?" (pp. 22-23). In his view, the issue boils down to the empirical question of whether such a range of common attitudes, emotional concerns, and shared patterns of behavior exists. The picture that emerges from this study shows that with respect to attitudes and responses to authority, confusion, and conflict, the Chinese indeed have much in common and tend to behave in more or less similar ways. Solomon believes, therefore, that the assumption of homogeneity is sustained by empirical investigation.

Solomon's findings seem to contradict those of a field investigation by the anthropologist Francis L. K. Hsu in a village in southwest China, which was far removed from the coast and treaty ports and had preserved much of the traditional cultural pattern at the time the investigation was undertaken in the early 1940's. Hsu observes that a strong father-son identification and "big-family ideal" dominates the family

[14] Alex Inkeles, "National Character and Modern Political Systems," in Francis L. K. Hsu, ed., *Psychological Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality* (Homewood, Ill. 1961), 184.

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relations in the West Town and is partly responsible for a social system that "deprives the younger generation of any feeling of independence, while at the same time enables them to share whatever wealth or glory is due their immediate or remote ancestors"[15]—a cultural pattern which Solomon also notices. Hsu, however, points out that although submission to ancestral and parental authority is among the most important elements in the "basic personality type" of the community, this basic type applies to different status groups in different ways. "While the same father-son identification exists among the rich and the poor, the difference in their economic conditions has caused the young of the rich and the young of the poor to develop two different types of personality; the former, a higher degree of dependency upon the old and upon the traditional authority, the latter, a high degree of independency from the old and from traditional authority."[16] While the rich and persons with higher status submit and adhere more readily to ancestral and parental authority, the sons of a poor family not only are little concerned about their remote ancestors but also have less incentive to compete for paternal approval. "The old men, being poor, have little material wealth to give them, whereas wealthy fathers can express their pleasure or displeasure in very material ways."[17]

Furthermore, Solomon's unqualified statement, based on the observations of unnamed observers, that Chinese parents "literally attempt to beat the aggressiveness out of their youngsters through physical punishment" (p. 79) does not square well with the impression one gets from reading another field investigation. Hsiao-tung Fei's *China's Gentry* contains life histories of six Chinese families collected by Yung-teh Chow. One of them, Captain Yang, is a gangster-gentry, and what follows is his neighbor's description of how the captain's father reared his son: "Yang Keng-ju was very austere to his children. If he detected any cowardice in them, he would either scold them severely or beat them. He encouraged them in, or even drove them into, various exploits. If he saw his son showing recklessness or courage, he would be greatly delighted. He admired anyone who could instill fear in others."[18] During his boyhood, Captain Yang organized the boys of his village into a group and repeatedly led them in fights with the boys of other villages until the latter were defeated and submitted to his control. "This event was told to Captain Yang's father. Yang Keng-ju praised him highly and encouraged him to be more combative."[19] This

[15] Francis L. K. Hsu, *Under the Ancestor's Shadow* (New York 1967), 8.
[16] *Ibid.*, 10. [17] *Ibid.*, 9.
[18] Hsiao-tung Fei, *China's Gentry* (Chicago 1953), 248.
[19] *Ibid.*, 249.

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life story of Captain Yang does not "invalidate" Solomon's thesis, but it does suggest that Chinese child-rearing practices may not be as uniform as he believes.

Solomon's thesis would stand even if it allowed for a few cases of deviation from "the central tendency" or "the average." A few individuals may be aggressive and not fear or avoid conflict where the majority in the same society are not aggressive and do fear conflict; a few may have no sense of ambivalence toward authority and may not easily submit themselves to authority where the majority do. In other words, Solomon may be adhering unnecessarily to a rigid and inflexible position and thus make himself vulnerable to attack. However, the procedures and methods whereby he arrives at his conclusions are an even more critical issue.

Concerning his methodology, I would like to know a great deal about such matters as sampling, statistical distributions, regional differences, social classes, status groups, and so forth. I would also be interested in knowing the techniques whereby Solomon arrives at his characterizations of the Chinese personality type, and how he obtains his information about Chinese child-rearing practices. The sample, methods, techniques, and procedures used have much to do with questions of selectivity and neglect of corroboration by other investigators; they are intricately related to and largely determine his conclusions.

The sample from which Solomon generalizes consists of 91 Chinese refugees who fled to Taiwan and Hong Kong in the late 1940's and 1950-60's. Of this sample, 61 per cent were from eight provinces in East and South China. Regional unrepresentativeness is not as serious as the sampling bias with respect to degree of education. All of the respondents were "functionally literate." There were only a few "pure peasants." One-third had gone to college or had received a military education above the high school level. This means that the sample excludes the majority of the population, the illiterate. Solomon admits the unrepresentativeness of his sample when he observes: "This group of respondents represents the social base of semiurbanized or urbanized, literate, middle to upper income level Chinese from coastal provinces . . ." (p. 16). In spite of this defect, he feels confident there exists "a shared core of culture and personality common to those reared within a social tradition like China's, which was stable for many generations" *because* "there is a high degree of 'fit' between Mao's notion of the leadership process needed to mobilize peasants into the ranks of the revolution, and the social attitudes of our 'bourgeois' respondents" (p. 17). No one would, of course, blame Solomon for not being able to obtain a ran-

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dom sample representative of a cross-section of a population of 700 million, but few scholars would agree that it is valid to leap from such a highly biased and small sample to the entire population of China. I could accept his findings more readily if he had conceded that his is a study of the modal personality and political culture of the Chinese refugees whom he interviewed. On the basis of his sample Solomon could hardly establish what the average or typical Chinese is like—if he exists at all.

"Sampling errors" aside, there are difficult problems of interpretation. In his attempts to characterize the Chinese modal personality and political attitudes, Solomon goes beyond conventional analytical techniques (e.g., administering standardized questionnaires), combining them with in-depth interviews and TAT (Thematic Apperception Test).

TAT may be useful for some purposes, but its utility as a scientific tool for studying personality and culture is highly dubious. Bert Kaplan, "perhaps the most qualified psychologist to analyze the role of projective testing in psychological anthropology,"[20] expresses serious reservations on whether the projective test adequately samples a respondent's personality process:

> A single Rorschach, TAT, or both, even when augmented with life history materials and extensive observation studies . . . must yield an incomplete account of the person. To the extent that the anthropologist or psychologist believes that personality is encapsulated in the microcosm of the test protocol, he is undoubtedly in error and in particularly serious error because he isn't likely to be aware of it. . . . When the worker knows that his sample is seriously incomplete, as most psychologists do, but treats it as though it were not, he is equally in error.
>
> Characteristically, projective techniques yield very interesting but somewhat cryptic responses. These responses, whether they are Rorschach responses or TAT stories, are difficult to interpret even under the best conditions. When a drastic cultural difference exists, which the interpreter because of his inadequate knowledge of the culture and language of the subject cannot take into account, the responses are often completely uninterpretable. Unfortunately, in this situation where the interpreter has had the choice of either admitting his helplessness or of going ahead and making the interpretation he would if the response had been given by someone in his own culture, the latter course has been followed. The result has been that modal personality pictures have often had little more meaning than fairy tales. . . .[21]

Although Kaplan agrees that projective tests, including TAT, have been correct in part of their descriptions, he suggests that "most if not

[20] Hsu (fn. 14), 231.
[21] Bert Kaplan, "Cross-Cultural Use of Projective Techniques," *ibid.*, 238-40.

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all modal personality studies utilizing projective techniques have most probably been arriving at incorrect descriptions of the people they are concerned with."[22]

TAT and life histories derived from in-depth interviews may be very useful in illustrating a hypothesis, but they cannot prove it. Through selective use of data, quoting those that support one's hypothesis and neglecting or excluding those that contradict, one can usually make the data "prove" almost any hypothesis. The first two parts of Solomon's volume are full of excerpts from his respondents' replies that either "substantiate" or are made to substantiate his theses. In page after page Solomon makes sweeping, unqualified statements and the only evidence cited in support of such statements is an excerpt from one respondent's answers to TAT cards or Solomon's questions. Although such excerpts are illustrative of Solomon's theses, they do not "validate" them, for they do not constitute "proof" according to the acceptable canons of scientific investigation.

Very often Solomon treats responses to his TAT cards as though they were living attitudes, as though the Chinese (and not only those in his sample) were predisposed to reacting in a more or less automatic fashion in certain ways (implied by their TAT-induced fairy tales or responses to questions put to them by the interviewer) if and when confronted with the situations portrayed. Worse still, he often theorizes solely on the basis of his respondents' (and quite often a single respondent's) replies to the question or TAT cards, rather than on the basis of field observations—the least one is entitled to expect of a modern social scientist.

The result is that Solomon's statements often rest on very shaky evidence. For example, using the answers of a few respondents to one of his TAT cards, he says: "Competition among peers is seen [by the Chinese] to be as troublesome for social unity as differences of opinion, for the expectation is that rivalry will bring out bad feelings and lead to unrestrained conflict" (p. 131). It is difficult to reconcile such a statement with the intense competitiveness of the Chinese in business, education, or imperial civil service examinations. Nor is it easy to reconcile the statement with the field observation of Wilson, who makes an analytical distinction between sanctioned and nonsanctioned expressions of hostility.[23] How else would one explain such phenomena as *tsu-tou* (inter-clan struggles), a frequently observed phenomenon in certain parts of China, especially South China?

In addition, there is the question of the validity of the substantive

[22] *Ibid.*, 240.

[23] Wilson (fn. 5), chap. 3.

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theory itself. Like many writers who try to link personality and culture, Solomon posits causal connections between the experience of early childhood and adult political culture and behavior because they coexist side by side, albeit separated in time, in the same cultural setting. Apart from the accuracy of his portrayal of Chinese child-rearing practices and his characterization of the Chinese modal personality configuration, the very validity of the presumed causal chains is by no means beyond legitimate doubt. For the procedure of proof is one of "proof by juxtaposition," a *post hoc* procedure of reasoning.[24] Such a procedure involves what the anthropologist Orlansky calls "anthropomorphism," the main characteristics of which include: (1) little direct study of infants or children to determine whether the reactions attributed to them actually occur; (2) an assumption that the reaction of infants or children to a given type of experience "must be" of a certain character without any effort to prove that such is the case; (3) a dualistic procedure which postulates psychic "processes and states" as forces or "first causes" that produce behavior, resulting in an untested attribution of motives and reactions.[25] The following example nicely illustrates the first two points. First, Solomon observes: "As a child approaches his teens . . . his relation to parental authority, which at the end of infancy had become stern and controlling, becomes more distant. His father increasingly *cuts himself off* from direct interaction with him, and the child experiences only the taking of orders, the unquestioning reliance on a more distant and unapproachable source of control" (p. 56). Then Solomon quotes a respondent's answer to "substantiate" the hypothesis. From this reasoning and evidence, Solomon jumps to the following observations: "Several important patterns in relations between superior and subordinate which find clear manifestation in Chinese political behavior seem to have their roots in the harsh and distant treatment a father accords his growing sons. First, the child learns there is a distinction between decision-making and action in his relations with authority. The father passes judgments regardless of the child's will, yet the child must obey when informed of parental decisions. Authority becomes associated with thought and word; subordination with the need to act or execute the will of others. . . . Second, the child's contacts with authority become laden with anxiety . . ." (p. 57). Solomon makes no effort to establish the fact that the father-son interaction indeed becomes increasingly stern, controlling, and distant. Nor

[24] Lindesmith and Strauss (fn. 13), 597.

[25] H. Orlansky, "Infant Care and Personality," *Psychological Bulletin*, XL (1949), 1-48, as recapitulated in Lindesmith and Strauss (fn. 13), 596, 598.

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does he make any attempt to "prove" that the kind of father-son interaction in the latter's teens does result in this kind of adult political behavior. The causal chain is assumed because the two conditions are found in the same culture.

Methodologically, such a procedure of "proof by juxtaposition" is inadequate, and yet it permeates the whole study. One more example must suffice. Solomon postulates a causal relationship between parental inhibition and punishment of the child's aggressive expressions, and lack of aggressiveness on the part of the child when he grows up—two separate phenomena widely separated in time. Important as it is for explaining certain aspects of Chinese political behavior, the hypothesis has yet to be proved empirically. The findings of a few studies of the relationship between parental punishment and aggressiveness (or nonaggressiveness) on the part of their child are inconclusive at best and contradictory at worst. After reviewing existing psychological analyses, Bandura and Walters conclude that "generally speaking, punishment by an authority figure [i.e., father or mother] seems to inhibit direct aggression in the presence of the punitive agent, but to be associated with high aggression toward other possible targets. However, it is obvious that no firm statements can be made concerning the relationship of punishment and aggression unless the agent of punishment, the recipient of aggression, and the nature of both the punitive and aggressive responses are taken into account."[26]

Central to Solomon's theory is the notion of tension between the indulgence of infancy and the subsequent harsh discipline of youth, and the assertion that the transition from one to the other is sudden, drastic, and painful. According to him, the tension, the sharp contrast, and the drastic transition explain much of Chinese political culture—e.g., the Chinese ambivalence toward authority, tensions between cultural ideals of peace and harmony and the reality of bickering hostility masked behind the face of politeness and mannerism, paradoxical combinations of ready submission to and ready abandonment of authority, basic social rhythms of *ho-p'ing* and *hun luan*, alternations between "harmony" and the "confusion" of vented aggression, and the dynastic cycle. Although the foregoing theses are ingenious and interesting, their status as empirically proved propositions remains in doubt.

In setting forth his assertion concerning the sudden transition from one stage to another, Solomon makes no reference whatsoever to previous anthropological field investigations or psychological studies. Nor

[26] Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walters, *Social Learning and Personality Development* (New York 1963), 130.

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does he quote any of his respondents to "prove" his assertion (contrary to his usual practice). And yet this notion is vital to his attempt to theorize about presumed Chinese ambivalence toward authority.

There is also the problem of transferring concepts from one culture to another. In a review of recent Sinological studies, Tang Tsou points out and cautions against some of the pitfalls of unreserved and careless application of concepts and theoretical insights originally developed by Western social scientists—rooted in Western cultural tradition—to characterize, explain, and theorize about the Chinese experience which has a vastly different cultural pattern and historical development.[27] The criticism is applicable to Solomon's work.

Freudian psychoanalysis posits that persons who experience oral indulgence in childhood, and consequently develop a great fondness for food and drink, tend to manifest passivity and dependency in their dealings with others, especially their superiors, and are always in search of a "magic helper." Although it may be suggestive and useful in organizing a great deal of data, the thesis has not been clearly proved in empirical studies. Gerald S. Blum and Daniel R. Miller tried to test this psychoanalytically inspired insight. Their findings, although lending support to the hypothesis that oral indulgence in childhood tends to be significantly correlated with the oral characteristics identified above, show that correlations between orality and dependency are equivocal, with one being significant ($r=.5$) and the other insignificant ($r=.1$), depending upon how the concept "dependency" is operationally defined and measured.[28] In view of this inconclusiveness in the Western cultural setting, in which the thesis of orality first originated, one wonders how useful it is as a "theory" to account for certain Chinese personality traits (dependency and passivity, lethargy and lack of initiative, indifference, fear of assuming responsibility, the constant search for a "magic helper"—i.e., authority—and the presumed ambivalence before authority), identified by Solomon as forming part of Chinese "dependency social orientation."

If individuals reared in an "oral culture" tend to develop "oral character" which forms part of a "dependency social orientation," as Solomon's theory posits, then how does one account for cases of extraordinary filial piety in which sons or daughters went to the extreme to fulfill the obligations called for by the cultural ideal? The individuals

[27] Tang Tsou, "Western Concepts and China's Historical Experience," *World Politics*, XXI (July 1969), 655-91.

[28] Gerald S. Blum and Daniel R. Miller, "Exploring the Psychoanalytic Theory of the 'Oral Character,'" *Journal of Personality*, XX (March 1952), 287-304.

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involved willingly and heroically underwent sacrifices including "slicing flesh from their arms to be boiled in the medicine pot of one or another of their parents" in the belief that this would cure the latter's sickness. These kinds of filial acts "did not remain as ideal literature but were somtimes copied to the letter by sons or daughters"[29] and are often found in the local gazetteers and genealogical records. The personality traits exemplified by this type of behavior demonstrate anything but passivity, lethargy, lack of initiative, or more concern with being loved than with loving.

III

Solomon, in the best tradition of writers on culture, personality, and national character, has attempted to explain adult Chinese political behavior and culture almost exclusively in terms of socialization during childhood—to the neglect of continuing socializing experiences during adulthood. Although the assumption of the predominant importance of early socialization appears plausible to many social scientists, it remains an unproven assumption. Enthusiasm for it is not uniformly shared by all students of personality, culture, and political socialization. Herbert H. Hyman, for instance, has suggested that a number of other factors, particularly adult experiences, may better explain certain political behavior.[30]

The view that personality configuration is molded in pre-adolescent childhood implies that personality does not change, or changes only in minor ways in response to later experiences and cultural influences. This view reflects an uncritical commitment to Freudian theory which, while plausible, remains largely unsubstantiated. If personality is conceived as a system of responses arising in a cultural matrix, the individual lives his entire life within such a matrix and is never independent of it. Why then, unless one assumes that learning and organization of responses take place only in childhood, should childhood experience be accorded so much weight, and later experience be largely ignored?[31]

[29] Francis L. K. Hsu, *Americans and Chinese*, rev. ed. (New York 1970), 79.

[30] Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, Ill. 1959), 72 and *passim*.

[31] Uncritical adherence to this view could at times lead to ridiculous theorizing. According to Solomon, adult Chinese submissiveness, ambivalence, and impotence before authority is largely a function of interaction with the father in childhood. If this theory were correct, then the increasing insubordination, rebelliousness, and readiness to challenge the constituted "authority" (i.e., "the white power structure"), by post-1954 American blacks and other ethnic minorities might be explained in terms of a profound change in the way in which these groups have raised their children in the recent past; and the rebellion of the students in the 1960's might be explained in terms of the increasing permissiveness with which middle-class white Americans have raised their children in the recent past; and the relative reticence and subsidence of the campus rebellion in

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This more or less exclusive orientation and narrow theoretical perspective is further complicated by Solomon's other basic assumption. Instead of viewing the relationship between culture and institutions as being one of circular and cumulative causation, he perceives the two to be dichotomous: "It is our basic assumption that China's difficulties in responding to the changing world of the past century have been largely cultural and psychological in quality rather than institutional or economic" (p. 1). Far from being dichotomous, the two are mutually, causally interrelated. Under "normal" circumstances, attitudes and cultures tend to support institutions and to be supported by them at the same time.[32]

The result of all this is what one may call, for lack of a better term, "diaperological determinism," or "political diaperology." It is a theory that explains virtually every significant manifestation of political behavior and culture of a society almost exclusively in terms of childhood experience, and virtually neglects historically, economically, and institutionally determined factors.

The picture of Chinese modal personality and political culture that emerges from Solomon's study is one of political passivity and indifference, meekness and subservience in the face of authority, panicky fear of assuming responsibility, and lack of initiative. The Chinese are described as perceiving politics as a dangerous "tiger world," and as regarding the political and bureaucratic authorities as distant, aloof, harsh, manipulative, and uncontrollable. Most social scientists who have had first-hand experience with both the Chinese and the Western cul-

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the last two or three years might again be accounted for in terms of a return to a less permissive child-rearing practice in the still more recent past. The "women's lib" movement might be explained in the same manner, and so forth and so forth. But what ridiculous explanations all these must appear to many, if not all of us. Assuming that Solomon's theory is correct and his exposition of Chairman Mao's motives for stirring up the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (which constitutes part of his explanation for that great turmoil and upheaval) is also correct, then the most effective and the least painless way to change the political culture of China would have been for the Chairman to call upon the parents of the whole nation to "go all the way out" to "emulate" and "surpass" the American way of raising kids à la Dr. Spock, rather than to launch the Cultural Revolution—and thereby avoiding its tremendous costs.

[32] For the idea of circular causation, see Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York 1944), 75ff., and Appendix 3, 1065ff.; and Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama* (New York 1968), Appendix 2, especially 1844-47. By attempting to account for personality and culture exclusively in terms of child-rearing practices, students of personality and culture have a hard time explaining away personality and cultural changes in a society where child-rearing practices have remained virtually unchanged. For a study that shows that attitude and behavior toward authority could and did change in spite of the persistence of traditional child-rearing practices, see Margaret Mead, *New Lines for Old: Cultural Transformation, Manus 1928–53* (New York 1956).

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tures, especially the American, would readily concur in such characterizations. I, for one, readily subscribe to all of these, but the agreement ends there. I find it hard to accept Solomon's self-imposed narrow theoretical perspective and explanations. To begin with, in China as elsewhere, the father is not the only authority figure a child encounters before reaching adulthood. Throughout his life, a person in traditional China was required by custom to submit not only to the authority of his father but also that of the *tsu* (clan) of which he was a member. The *tsu* (or its founder or current leaders) prescribed rules of personal conduct (e.g., filial piety, deferring to one's seniors, supporting aged parents, the merit of *jang,* i.e., yielding to others in the interest of avoiding conflict) for its members, and enforced the rules through rewards and punishments available to it, with the sanction of imperial law and the approval of administrative authorities.[33] In addition, a child from a well-to-do family encountered a secondary socializing agent, namely the tutor, as soon as he reached school age. By all accounts, the pupil-tutor relationship in traditional China (and to a lesser extent in contemporary China and Taiwan) was one of submission and domination, of taking orders and giving orders. The tutor was expected to be a surrogate father, and was in practice despotic, dictatorial, stern, distant, and harsh. The parents eagerly delegated disciplinary authority, including severe physical punishment, to the tutor and exhorted their son to submit to and blindly obey the authority of the tutor. Thus, there existed a high degree of congruence between the son-father relationship and the pupil-tutor relationship, with the latter tending to reinforce the former, resulting in the formation of the submissive personality trait which Solomon has correctly observed. There is, however, no reference in Solomon's study to the interacting relationship between the growing child and his tutor. This omission is surprising when one recalls that the majority of Solomon's respondents had schooling of one sort or another.

Historical, economic, and institutional patterns provide other, equally plausible, explanations of behavior. Historically, the *hsien* magistrate, vis-à-vis the commoner, was aloof, harsh, manipulative, and distant. His office, which was referred to as a "tiger gate," indeed administered legal justice without all the minimally necessary legal trappings and

[33] Hui-chen Wang Liu, *The Traditional Chinese Clan Rules* (New York 1959), and "An Analysis of Chinese Clan Rules," in D. S. Nivison and A. F. Wright, eds., *Confucianism in Action* (Stanford 1959); also Hsien-Chin Hu, *The Common Descent Group in China and Its Functions,* Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 10 (New York 1948).

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procedural niceties that qualify as "civilized" legal processes.[34] Politics in traditional and modern China was indeed a dangerous "tiger world," a "zero-sum game." The politicians and the bureaucrats were manipulative, untrustworthy, uncontrollable, arrogant, corrupt, and abused their position and status. For commoners, the best course to follow in dealings with them was to respect but to avoid them if possible, and to submit to their whims when contact became unavoidable. In a society where the Western idea and practice of rule of law is unheard of, and where there is no tradition of civil liberties and individual freedoms (as a matter of fact, there was no Chinese equivalent for the words "freedom," "right," and "civil liberties" until the introduction of these ideas from the West in the late nineteenth century), an individual would only have courted more troubles by behaving differently.

There also exists an institutional explanation for the oft-noted fear of imperial bureaucrats to assume responsibility and initiative; it is at least as convincing as Solomon's psychocultural explanation. Given the long tradition of absolute monarchial control of the apex of the imperial bureaucracy with its "checks and balances,"[35] given the traditional rulers' refusal to delegate minimally adequate discretionary power to the provincial and local officials while holding them accountable for everything that went wrong,[36] the best course for an average bureaucrat to follow, in the interest of sheer survival, was to assume as little responsibility and take as little initiative as circumstances allowed. Given the vast difference between "floating in the official sea" and being "in the wilderness," a bureaucrat was likely to go out of his way to please his superior in the interest of "job security," and to submit to a new authority when there was a change in dynasty. Further, given the enormous monetary investment required to obtain a bureaucratic position and the meager official salary (which was inadequate for maintaining his office, much less paying off his debts),[37] a bureaucrat was likely to bully his inferiors, and to squeeze and plunder as much as he could while in office.

In short, political culture and personality traits are shaped as much

[34] See Sybill Van der Sprenkel, *Legal Institutions in Manchu China* (London 1962), especially chap. 6.

[35] Ping-ti Ho, "Salient Aspects of China's Heritage," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China's Heritage and the Communist Political System* (Chicago 1968).

[36] Kuang-chuan Hsiao, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle 1960), *passim*.

[37] T'ung-tsu Ch'u, *Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing* (Cambridge, Mass. 1962).

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by economic, institutional, and historical factors[38] as they are by the interactions of individuals with their parents in early childhood. The Chinese Communists have been acutely aware of this and have striven very hard since at least 1940 to combat this situation. Through the institutionalization of the *hsia-fang* (downward transfer) system and the periodic party and bureaucratic shake-ups by means of rectification campaigns (the latest and the greatest of which was of course the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution), Chinese Communist leaders have attempted to check the inherent tendency of those in power to abuse their position and to claim privileges. By accelerating the trend toward universal education and by introducing measures designed to reduce the "three great differences" (i.e., income and other differences between rural and urban areas, between peasants and workers, and between intellectual and manual labor), they have attempted to reduce the psychological and status distance between the cadres and the masses, between superiors and inferiors, and between the leaders and the led. By insisting on a "mass line" approach, they have hoped to institutionalize mass participation in implementing but not necessarily in making policy, and thus to reduce the mass apathy and alienation so characteristic of the Soviet system. Finally, but not least importantly, through the nation's educational system[39] and the institutionalization of political study sessions replete with criticism and self-criticism, and through constant exhortation to "serve the people," Communist leaders have attempted to eliminate the traditional attitude that regards a bureaucratic position and advancement as the natural and most honorable way of getting ahead and getting rich, and instead to inculcate the socialist norm that insists that a cadre or bureaucratic position be a "civil service"

[38] Among studies that also attempt to account for the oft-noted Chinese submissiveness to authority, I would single out Fei (fn. 18), and Francis L. K. Hsu, "The Effect of Dominant Kinship Relationships on Kin and Non-Kin Behavior: A Hypothesis," *American Anthropologist*, LXVII (June 1965), 638-61. Contrary to Solomon, Hsu argues in this article that "the individual reared in the father-son dominated system [an example of which being the traditional Chinese society] will have no resentment against benevolent authority, in fact, he will love it" (653). Consider also the following statements by Hsu: "[In a father-son dominated system] the superior does not have to disguise his power because he knows this is his due, and the subordinate has no need to disguise his obeisance since it is not necessary to be ashamed of it. Authority and compliance to authority are therefore carried out openly and elaborately with no qualms on either side. Difficulties may arise if the superior becomes too oppressive, but the salvation of the oppressed lies in finding individual relief from it, not in changing the entire social structure in which such oppression occurs" (652-53). This seems to be as plausible as Solomon's psychocultural explanation for the fact that, until the twentieth century, China had experienced numerous rebellions but no revolution.

[39] For themes emphasized in Chinese school texts, see Ridly (fn. 6).

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in the true sense of the term. To be sure, most of these institutionalized measures are essentially "checks from above" and not the "checks from below" that are prevalent in a functioning pluralistic democratic polity. Their long-term effectiveness is therefore still in doubt, although for the time being they seem to work well. Well-entrenched bureaucrats have typically been able to circumvent institutionalized arrangements designed to restrain them. Genuine and effective checks against the inherent tendencies of an authoritarian, bureaucratic system entail evolution toward a more symmetrical distribution of power, genuine delegation of power to the grass roots, evolution toward rule of law with ever-strengthened constitutional guarantees of civil liberties, and legitimization of political opposition. But those are precisely the kinds of developments the Communist leadership will not allow to take place for the simple reason that the post-1949 revolution has largely been a revolution from above. To impose revolutionary transformation from above, the party leaders need a monolithic, omnipotent bureaucracy capable of penetrating the society and controlling and mobilizing the population. The development of such a bureaucracy almost inevitably generates the tendencies previously described.

Chinese Communist leaders, especially Mao, have been acutely aware of this dilemma and have tried their best to solve it. But the weight of cultural heritage and institutional legacy has been against them. In a sense (and this is only one of the many senses that one can conceive), it is correct to characterize the Cultural Revolution as the Chairman's last-ditch effort to shake up and cleanse the Chinese nation from its traditional cultural shackles and psychological "hang-ups" through a mass "speak-out" and "act-out" in a vast encounter session involving millions of participants, some voluntary and others not so voluntary. Needless to say, the Cultural Revolution has been more than a gigantic encounter session, however one may interpret such a great political turmoil from a narrow psychoanalytical perspective.

Another picture that emerges from Solomon's analysis is the low threshold of tolerance for confusion on the part of his respondents. The Chinese in his sample are obsessed with preserving social order and tranquillity and show little tolerance for *hun luan* (confusion, chaos). His explanations sound convincing, but can hardly tell the whole story. During the last hundred years, China has been in an extreme state of social breakdown and political chaos; it is not simply another interregnum in dynastic cycles. Persons growing up in this period of unprecedented chaos and turmoil naturally long for tranquillity and social

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order, whether or not there is a cultural tradition that places a premium on interpersonal harmony and peace.[40]

IV

To recapitulate, Solomon presents a qualitatively suggestive but quantitatively inconclusive analysis of the Chinese modal personality configuration and political culture, and their relationship to Chinese child-rearing practice. His theory of a social dependency orientation (or of a dependent political culture) has yet to be proven and clarified by further investigation. The skills and requirements of undertaking such a gestalt description of a cultural area as large as China are so immense and so numerous that the task must appear hopelessly impossible to one not imbued with the psychocultural fervor. One may admire the boldness of his attempt and the imaginativeness and ingenuity with which he analyzes and makes sweeping, unqualified generalizations, but one must view the results and the methods of proof with a generous measure of skepticism.

[40] One is reminded of President Nixon's successful capture of the White House in 1968 with the rhetoric "I have a plan to end the Vietnam War" and the promise to restore "law and order" and to stop "crime in the streets." The turmoil in this country in the mid-1960's is lilliputian compared with the upheaval and turmoil China underwent in the century following the Opium War and the Taiping Rebellion.

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

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